“Everything indicates that Russia is going to deliver the system to Turkey and that will have consequences,” Kay Bailey Hutchison, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, said in Brussels.

“There will be a disassociation with the F-35 system, we cannot have the F-35 affected or destabilized by having this Russian system in the alliance,” she told reporters.

Turkey produces parts of the F-35s fuselage, landing gear and cockpit displays. Hutchison said Ankara was an important partner in that production but that security concerns about Russia were paramount.

“So many of us have tried to dissuade Turkey,” she said.

“It’s not over until its over, but so far Turkey has not appeared to retract from the sale,” Hutchison. “The consequences will occur, we don’t feel there’s a choice in that.”

U.S. Ambassador to NATO told reporters that at present, Washington was only considering conventional, not nuclear weapons, in any possible response.

“All options are on the table but we are looking at conventional systems, that’s important for our European allies to know,” she said.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO.

Ambassador Hutchison:  I’m very pleased to be able to start our Defense Ministerial this week and talk about the things that we will be discussing.

First and foremost will be welcoming our new Acting Defense Secretary.  Mark Esper will be coming in.  We’re very pleased that after just one week he has chosen to come and show the allies how important NATO is to America for him.  And of course this is kind of like coming home for him because he has a military background, went to West Point, he served in active duty for ten years and then the Reserves for another ten years, Army.  Now he’s Secretary of the Army and has done a wonderful job in that role and was very pleased to be able to then come back to some of the missions that he has served in himself for the U.S. and for NATO.  So I think we are going to see an experienced person hitting the ground running and showing our allies how important NATO is for our country as well as theirs.

With that, I think we will start into the Ministerial talking about our key issues.  Of course defense investment that we’ve talked about.  The importance of our readiness, our capabilities, comes from our spending and our contributions to the Alliance.  Our allies are stepping up.  They’re increasing spending in all of their countries.  We’ve reversed what used to be a decline in defense spending now to everyone increasing because we know we have an adversary in Russia, we have counterterrorism that is hurting many of our countries, we have cyber threats, hybrid threats, and it’s expensive and we need to cover those expenses for the security of our people.

We also will be talking about the demise of the INF Treaty.  We have given Russia one last chance to come back into compliance with the INF Treaty, but we know they have been violating it and we can no longer sit back without a defense to the many missiles that they are now producing and setting up.

So we hope they’ll come back into compliance but we’ve given them an August deadline.  I think the Alliance is very clear and unified that Russia should come back to the table.  They are destabilizing the European security by not doing that.  And they have about a month to show that they are destroying the missiles that they have produced.

In addition to that we will also be talking about our mission in Afghanistan, our new mission in Iraq, talking to our partners.  We have 41 partners helping us to stabilize Afghanistan and work with the people of Afghanistan.  There’s an important peace negotiation going on now that is being led by Ambassador Khalilzad from the United States and our allies are very hopeful that that will be successful.  We are looking at maybe a post-peace capability in Afghanistan, but we’ve got to let the peace process work first.  We will get a report from not only our Acting Secretary, but the generals in the field and those who are participating in the partnership.  We’re looking forward to that as well.

So we have quite a heavy agenda to talk about our missions, to talk about our future, to talk about how we are going to adapt our Alliance in readiness to face the risks that our NATO allies and partners are facing every day in a trouble world that we hope we can bring peace and stability to, but we want to make sure that we are doing what’s necessary to deter and defend against the risks that we see out there.

Question:  There will be a NATO-Russia Council meeting next week.  What are your expectations for that meeting and on what day will it be held ?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Russia has not firmly said they will appear.  We’re hoping to have one on July the 5^th.  That’s what we’ve offered to Russia.  We hope to achieve that because it is important that we talk.  We’re very concerned about Russia’s activities in the Ukraine.  We’re calling on Russia to return the ships and the sailors that they took in November and they’re holding now hostage.  It’s not right.  There is a violation of the rights of the Ukraines to be in the Kerch Straits and they certainly have the right to be able to have navigation and commerce through those straits, and Russia needs to come back and give them their sailors, give them their ships, and start acting more reliably.

So we’ll bring up Ukraine.  We will bring up other activities that Russia has been participating in.  The INF Treaty certainly will be a topic.  They will have one more month after the NATO-Russia Council to come back into compliance.  It’s clear they have been violating it for years.  The United States has called them to come back to the table for five years at least, and NATO has joined in that call.  Now it is down to the final hours that they can destroy the missiles that they have produced in violation of the treaty, come back to the table, and we will be happy to reinstate the INF Treaty.

Question:  The U.S. has lately expressed concerns about European defense initiatives including EDF and PESCO.  Are these topics going to be discussed during the Ministerial?

Ambassador Hutchison:  I think certainly we will bring up the concerns that we have as a non-EU member in NATO that the regulations that are going through the European Union now would box out third party participation with a sector of the regulation that says if any third party or outside EU collaborator, comes into an EU project that is funded by the European Defense Initiative or PESCO, that they would have to give up their intellectual property in order to collaborate.

Well no United States company is going to give up its intellectual property in order to collaborate on systems, and the Europeans know that.  So we’re calling on them to take that out.  We call it a poison pill because it is.  We want to have total interoperability with NATO systems, NATO equipment, all the things that we do together need to have collaboration.  The European Union should not be putting in poison pills that would keep America or Norway or Canada from competing and being a part of a collaboration to make sure that we have the best equipment and also collaborative efforts that are interoperable.  So we’re working with the EU.  It will come up and we hope to have a better outcome than we’re seeing right now.

Question :  Norwegian tankers were recently attacked by Iran.  How will NATO respond to this attack?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Most certainly we are working with our ally Norway to address the concerns with Iran.  Iran attacked actually two of their ships, and they were in navigable waters and they had a right to be there, and we must protect the rights of navigation through the Straits of Hormuz.  We will work with Norway.  We’ll work with Japan, another partner that also was attacked by Iran.  And try to come to a conclusion that keeps the navigation open and stops Iran from the maligned activities that they have taken up in the last few years, but also the last few weeks.  And Iran knows what they’re doing.  We asked them to come to the table, asked for a diplomatic solution, asked for them not to make threats against other allies that they’re going to go more into gaining a nuclear weapon.  That is an unthinkable end.

We want Iran to be a trading partner.  We want Iran to treat their people right, to adhere to the norms of countries that would be a part of the community of nations, and Iran’s not doing that right now.

Question:  The government of Finland wants to keep the door open for a NATO option.  How does the current administration see Finland’s possibility for joining NATO?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well most certainly Finland would be a wonderful NATO partner and if they choose to seek NATO membership I don’t have any instructions on this, but I know in my heart that we would welcome the Fins.  They are good partners with us.  We would love to have them as an alliance in the NATO partnership.  But we know that’s a decision that they need to make for their people.  But we would love to always welcome Finland.

Question:  Do you think there is a chance that President Trump and President Erdogan will find a solution to the S400 crisis during their meetings in Osaka on the margins of the G20 Summit this week?

Ambassador Hutchison:  I hope so.  Hope is eternal there, because we’re getting now closer to the time when they say they are going to import a Russian defense system into the middle of our Alliance in Ankara.  We don’t want that to happen.  We would like for them to reject that possibility.  We have said on many occasions that there will be consequences that are not good for Turkey and they’re not good for the United States, but they will be necessary.  We have no choice.  Turkey has made a decision that we think will hurt the Alliance and will most certainly hurt their participation in the F-35.

We want them to be a productive partner.  We want the jobs that will be created by the F-35 in Turkey.  Turkey’s been a great ally and partner in NATO.  We want that to continue.  We don’t think having a Russian missile defense system in Turkey will achieve that end.

Question:  Is it important for Europe to have her own solid defense military system?  Or is it better to find a solution by creating a new structure or alliance between NATO and the EU?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, I think the NATO parameters that we have now are very good.  Each country makes its sovereign decision if it wants to be a part of NATO.  There are EU members that are not in NATO and there are NATO members that are not in the EU.  And that should be a choice that people make based on their own needs and the will of the people.  But having said that, we certainly welcome every country that wants to be in NATO, that has the requirements to be in NATO, that they want to be in Article 5, they want to be bonded in our North Atlantic bond, our North Atlantic Alliance, that they would stand with us as we would stand with them, and that they have a democracy, a rule of law, and human rights requirements.  We want them as members if they will meet those requirements and want to be members of NATO.

Question:  When do you think North Macedonia will become a full member of NATO?  Do you expect this to happen this year in December during the NATO Summit in London?

Ambassador Hutchison:  It’s our hope that that would happen at the Leaders Meeting in December.  That is something that we’re all working toward.  But every one of our Alliance members has different requirements of their parliament agreeing and confirming that they will agree to the accession of North Macedonia.

I know it is moving through our United States Senate for its agreement, and we believe very firmly that our Senate will ratify the accession of North Macedonia.  We hope it will be this summer, but for sure we think it will be in the fall.

All of the others that are working toward having this approval which has been done by our NATO Ambassadors, so we know that all of our countries are supportive of North Macedonia.  It’s a matter of timing, and we hope that by the end of the year at our Leaders Meeting we will have a wonderful celebration of welcoming North Macedonia into our Alliance.

Question:  How do you see former Soviet allies who are now becoming members of the EU and NATO?  Is this strengthening or weakening the defense and diplomacy of NATO and the EU?

Ambassador Hutchison:  I think it is certainly strengthening.  It’s strengthening by their countries becoming stronger, because to come into EU or NATO you have to have certain rules of engagement.  You have to have a military, you have to have a strong democracy, you have to have a rule of law and certainly adhere to human rights.  So all of those strengthen each individual country, but it also strengthens our partnership and our Alliance.

When we go from 29 to 30 members, we speak with one unified voice, and that’s very effective when we are looking at maligned activities of Russia or dabbling by China in some of the security of our Alliance.  Or when we see counterterrorism occur.  We speak with 30 voices that will say we’re going to defend our way of life, our freedom, and our quality that we give to people.  That’s so much more impressive than one country that has no allies or has allies that are mistreating their own people.  

Question:  What plans does NATO have with the EU to prevent terrorist attacks and threats of terrorism to the EU by illegal immigration?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, most certainly we are trying, first of all, to stop terrorism where it has built in the past.  We have an effort that has gone on for years now to stop terrorism from fomenting in Afghanistan.  That’s where the 9/11 attacks against America were planned and programmed.  So that’s number one, that we stop terrorism in the countries where it has built and not let it be exported to any of our countries.  And we are in a very strong network where we are sharing information in our NATO Alliance where we see potential terrorists migrating into any of our countries.  We’re sharing that information.  That’s an important part of the Alliance, in fighting terrorism.  So we’re trying to stop it in its tracks before it comes, but when we see that known terrorists are infiltrating any of our countries we’re reporting that and taking the necessary steps to try to protect against it.

Question:  Has Turkey explained to the U.S. why they think the S400s are not dangerous for NATO?  Can there be more contacts with Ankara on this matter?  And on what level?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, most certainly Turkey and the United States have been in talks about what the problems are to the F-35. Having a Russian computerized system that is a missile defense system that is programmed to shoot down enemy aircraft in our midst.  So yes, we’ve talked about it quite a bit at many levels, and the United States position is firm, that you can’t have a Russian missile system like the S400 in the proximity where we make and repair and house the F-35s.  So much of the F-35 strength is its stealth capabilities, and you don’t want a Russian missile system that can detect or learn how to detect those stealth capabilities.  

It’s part of our overall Alliance security, and we hope that Turkey will see that and understand that they cannot coexist as the Chairman of the two major committees for defense and security in our United States Senate said in an OpEd recently.  You can have S400 or the F-35, but you can’t have both.  I hope that the Turks believe that the F-35 is in their interest.  It certainly creates job opportunities and sharing of intelligence and information with Turkey and the United States and our NATO Alliance, as it has done for all the years that Turkey has been in the NATO Alliance.   They are a good ally in the NATO alliance.  But this is not something that will strengthen the ties.  It will hurt the capability to share in the F-35.

The United States said imposing economic sanctions on Turkey for its purchase of Russian S-400 missiles remained a very viable option and there was no discord on the issue.

“Seeking resolution is still within the realm of possible today, but imposition of sanctions remains a course of action and a very viable one at this point,” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Clarke Cooper told reporters on a teleconference.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Assistant Secretary Clarke Cooper, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

A/S Cooper:  I just want to share at the top of our discourse today what it is that I do, why I’m actually in Europe.  As Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs I have the portfolio, the global portfolio of security assistance and foreign military sales.  So from a very general sense what that means is we actually are the primary lead for the United States government on acquisition and sustainment when it comes to military equipment, military sales for our partners, to enable their own sovereignty as well as play their regional roles in their security.   We’ll talk a little bit more about that today in the context of Europe.

The other aspect of that is security assistance.  This is not just in the form of hardware or in munitions.  This also comes in the role of training, of joint exercises.  This also comes in the role of supporting peacekeeping operations that have either been identified or mandated by any multilateral body, particularly the United Nations.  We do provide a role for that in our Global Peace Operations Initiative.

Finally, one that’s maybe not known to some of you is the work that we do on destruction of conventional weapons.  Conventional weapons destruction, remediation of minefields, actually providing reconciliation for societies that have sustained conflict and are looking to get past conflict and back to day-to-day lives.  

So it’s a very deep, very broad portfolio.  Again, including some what people would see as the large, expensive, big ticket items for Ministry of Defense to the operational level of security assistance, either from a bilateral level or again on peacekeeping operations.  Then finally, again, playing a significant role on the humanitarian side of actually assisting communities in a post-conflict environment and then getting them back to a stable state.

With that, why I’m in Europe was to participate in the Paris Air Show there.  That’s an opportunity for any of us who are working in the national security framework, and Europe certainly has an opportunity for growth.  We are a tremendous advocate of where Europe is going as far as their own burden-sharing, but providing a more robust posture for their own sovereign security and also a regional role for Europe.  In particular, we are huge supporters of the joint declarations that were initiated in 2016 and 2018 between the European Union and NATO and we are acutely aware that even the non-NATO member states have a role when it comes to that collective defense.

In addition to having bilaterals in and out of Paris, I did take time to go to London.  I did an event focused on mine remediation and addressing destruction of conventional weapons.  I did that with a number of parties that we work with including an NGO.  Shared the stage with His Royal Highness, the Duke of Sussex, Prince Harry.  Came back to Paris for more bilats and now am here in Brussels actually doing engagements and meetings with our partners at the European Union as well as at NATO headquarters. 

Question:  Regarding statements of Vladimir Putin said that he really wants to talk about a strategic nuclear weapon and the situation with the sanctions.  What do you think has happened?

A/S Cooper:  Part of that conversation from the United States side is to actually keep Russia focused on where their commitments have been.  What I don’t doubt won’t be raised is there certainly will be a conversation, a very pointed one probably, about where Russia has failed to meet their commitments on the INF Treaty.  I think there’s also room for opportunity to actually identify where Russia has violated their commitments on the INF Treaty.  So from a strategic standpoint, that’s a continuing conversation.  It is one that probably needs to not only occur at the operational level, the diplomatic level, the ministerial level, certainly all the way up to the head of government.  It is something that is still of note and requires the attention.

Question:  You’ve expressed concern about the PESCO treaties and the U.S. firms being shut out.  Are you making any progress in your discussions there with the EU officials?  

A/S Cooper:  I appreciate that.  I’ll start with the EU one since we’re sitting here in Brussels, but I’ll go to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia one next.

Discussions today and tomorrow have been focused on what we could do collectively to answer some of the concerns that have been developing not just on the U.S. side, and this is part of the conversation with the EU.  Also EU member states.

So on a principal level I’ll start out with we, the United States, are very supportive of the concept of a stronger Europe, a Europe that is able to bolster the sovereignty of the individual member stats as well as that collective defense.  We are certainly very much strong advocates for states being able to meet requirements that may be shared.  What I mean by that is, there’s only 22, I shouldn’t say only, but the fact that there is 22 of all the entire EU that are in NATO, there are that many more states out there that are not members of NATO but yet will have what we call shared responsibility, we call it burden-sharing in other quarters, that require them to be interoperable with NATO.  So some of the concerns that have been identified at a more technical level or an operational level are associated with interoperability amongst the different partners to ensure that there’s not any issues that may occur in delivery of defense.

What we have done on a more granular level is sat down with EU technocrats and member states to identify where there may be issues that arise with EDF or PESCO.  I think in some cases there’s a certain level of edification that is required not only within member state governments, but also industry.  I’m saying industry I’m not being parochial and limiting it to the United States.  We’re talking about industry overall.

That has been received positively.  I do think the timing is of the essence for us to have a more detailed conversation.  Not to be date specific, but I can say it’s going to be sooner than later, and that’s going to provide an opportunity for issues that have either been identified by the United States, by EU member states, or by industry to address where we don’t want to, we don’t want to have an issue where capabilities are reduced.  We don’t want to have an issue arise where interoperability is a problem.  So again, I would look at it from what we’re seeking to work with the European Union on and NATO on, is to ensure that these defense initiatives that you mentioned, that they are complementary and that they’re not duplicative.  And in worst case, they’re not a detraction or a deterrence.  We don’t want that to happen.

So on a principle, we certainly appreciate the trajectory that the EU and NATO are wanting to bolster their status and bolster their posture, but we want it done in a way that is not going to detract from capabilities and interoperability.

I am not going to speak to their own internal ministerial considerations, but I would say that like the U.S., the UK has had longstanding bilateral security relationships.  I know that there are certainly difficult situations with this partner that none of us can deny, but nonetheless, they are a long-term security partner for the UK but they’re also a much deeply rooted security partner for the United States.  When we’re looking, at least from an American perspective, they are carrying a significant amount of equity to protect U.S. interests and U.S. persons, and it’s incumbent upon us to stand shoulder to shoulder with our partners, especially when they are on the front line for our interests.

But as far as where the UK has decided at this time, I would not want to opine on their internal deliberations.

Question:  The Draft Bill No. 3047 which was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in May 2019 envisages designating Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally for the period until Ukraine joins the alliance in the future.  What is the current stage of considering this draft?  And what stages could it possibly bring for the U.S.-Ukraine military cooperation?

A/S Cooper:  I think it should come as no surprise to you and to your readers and your news audience that there’s been a growing relationship between Ukraine and the United States.  And that commitment is just getting deeper and more fulsome.  I think that the legislation like this, and it’s not dissimilar to other legislation that’s been introduced, be it in the form of a resolution or an actual authorization, is an affirmation of where American interests are with the Ukraine.  

So it is fair to say that there’s a growing bipartisan or it’s safe to say nonpartisan support for our partners of Ukraine.  That we’ve seen not only in a political sense, but as you noted, from a defense security sense.

There’s certainly an appetite for where we can partner better, not only just on the equipment part.  As I mentioned earlier, one of my portfolios is training as well as joint exercises.  It is fair to say that there’s a healthy appetite in the U.S. government, particularly in our Congress, to stand close with our partner, with Ukraine, and I do see that as a growing relationship.

So this draft legislation is just one example of an expression of where we went to be close with Ukraine. 

Question:  The Senate is voting today to block the President from using his emergency authority to complete arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  It’s likely to pass, but I’m sure you know that it’s unlikely to clear the threshold needed to override a veto. What you think of this action in Congress and the statement that supporters of this bill are making, and also on the policy that they are seeking to put into effect ?

A/S Cooper:  I would start, and I apologize if this is going over old news, but the authority that’s being cited here that the Secretary of State has to declare an emergency as far as getting military sales or direct commercial sales addressed for partner, and in this case Gulf State partners, was an authority granted by Congress 40 years ago.  That is in the Arms Export Control Act, and that part of the statute was authorized by Congress.  So this is not the first time.  It’s also not the first time that Congress has been concerned about its application.  Over the course of the history of this statute or this authority it has been very judiciously applied starting in 1979 with President Carter to to date with the Trump administration.

I say that because it’s a diplomatic tool, and in those cases it was applied as a diplomatic tool to deter further violence.  For Secretary Pompeo specifically, application of this emergency certification was to deter further escalation of force by Iran and Iranian proxies.

That said, we understand that some in Congress are certainly concerned about a number of issues.  I think some that are being followed, particularly in the U.S. media, is the consultative process.  I want to reiterate that the 22 cases that were included in the emergency certification, none of them are new, they have been before Congress.  In some cases, particular cases are so old they’re over 18 months before Congress.  

So again, nothing new.  A very refined focus to do three things.  One, that deterrence that I mentioned as far as a diplomatic tool for the Secretary to send a message to Tehran to mitigate, and also note direct threats to U.S. persons and U.S. interests.  Second, is to actually reassure those partners.  We talked a little bit about our partners in the Gulf on an earlier question, but when we’re looking at their readiness and their capability to not only protect their sovereignty, but they’re also protecting U.S. equities and U.S. persons.  We need to ensure that they feel like we’re standing with them and not having them bear the entire burden themselves or feel abandoned.

Finally, that emergency declaration was a reminder, a not so gentle reminder, to near peer adversaries that even though there’s a shift in threat posture in the region and there’s some disruptive activity and molestation of commercial traffic, please do not, absolutely do not see this as an opportunity to incur upon the sovereignty of these Gulf States and please do not see this as an opportunity to incur upon our bilateral relationships or our regional relationships in the Gulf.

As the Secretary has stated many many a time, we want to make sure that maritime security remains, and not just for U.S. interests but for those who travel on the seas and through the Straits of Hormuz, but also make sure that the U.S. persons and interests are not in direct threat and that our partners have the assurance that we’re with them.

As far as the legislative activity goes, on a positive it does allow for that discourse to take place in open for a, in a very transparent fashion.  It does show our partners that there are issues that remain of concern to the U.S. government. So while we are strong security partners, it does not preclude us from addressing other points of interest or other priorities important to the USG.

But I would say, my one concern is I would not want any of our partners in security to feel like we were potentially walking away from them.  That is not what we need at this time.  It is a unique circumstance.  The current threat posture is what necessitated and what predicated the Secretary to look at what options were available to him in a diplomatic capacity, to send a message to Tehran, to send a message of support to our partners, and tell our near peer adversaries to not take any opportunity.

Question:  The U.S. has warned Turkey that it faces CATSA sanctions if it acquires a Russian S400 system.  Would the individuals or entities targeted by sanctions be limited to those in the e Turkish defense sector?  Or would the remit be wider?

A/S Cooper:  As you’re aware, sanctions are yet another diplomatic tool available to the Secretary of State.  I also go back to, as we were discussing earlier about the Arms Export Control Act, that was provided as a diplomatic tool to the Secretary of State by Congress.  CATSA is a diplomatic tool provided to the Secretary of State by Congress.  It is fair to say that Secretary Pompeo is looking at the full breadth and depth of what could be applied in sanctions to Turkey as we address their acquisition of the S400.

We have done due diligence on a bilateral level to communicate our concerns to our NATO partners.  We have also done due diligence to work with other NATO partners to address our concerns with Ankara.  The biggest one being interoperability.  There is no room at all for us to allow the introduction of non-NATO capabilities or particularly Russian capabilities into the ecosystem of NATO.  Turkey knows this.  As far as accepting that reality is another issue.

So to your question as to the specificity of the application, I would say that multiple courses of action and multiple degrees of application of sanctions are within the realm of consideration, and as with everything, for the Secretary, what we’re looking to do is to seek resolution before we get to a punitive position.  And seeking resolution is certainly within the real of possible today, but imposition of sanctions remain a course of action and a very viable one at this point.

Question:  Is there any possibility of moving forward with the sale of the Patriot system to Turkey?  Have you done anything to sweeten the offer, if you will, to make it more attractive to Turkey to purchase the Patriot system instead of the S400 system?  I wanted to ask given the resignation of Acting Secretary Shanahan, will Acting Secretary, or soon to be Acting Secretary Esper take part in those conversations?  Or does he have to recuse himself, given his role as a former lobbyist for Raytheon?

A/S Cooper:  I’m not going to speak to the legality of recusable.  We’ll talk at a policy level.

Your question first about offering ballistic missile defense.  So be it Patriot or otherwise, yes.  The United States as well as other NATO partners have remained very persistent in letting Turkey know that there are options.  So we haven’t stopped that.  That’s why I was saying when we were talking about the CATSA question or the sanctions question, it is not as if we’re just looking right towards sanctions.  We still have not given up on provision of an alternative, so that is very much on the table.  Again, it’s not limited to the United States offering that provision.  It is also partners.

As to the Department of Defense, from a policy level, this isn’t State on its own.  State has, we have the policy tools as far as sanctions are concerned.  We certainly have the role, the primary role as the lead for the offering of the missile system.  But there’s no light between the Department of State or the Department of Defense as far as what we would like to see Turkey do as far as decouple themselves from the S400 and remain a fulsome and corporate member of NATO.  But I can’t speak to the granularity of how an Acting Secretary Esper would not be involved in that.  I would imagine from a policy level he would have to be because we’re talking about a NATO partner here.  So maybe it’s a matter of semantics to say ballistic missile defense alternatives.  But again, from a department level, a ministerial level, we’re lockstep with each other.

A/S Cooper: Again, I appreciate the opportunity.  I’m happy to do any other follow-ups through our offices back in Washington, DC.  I also look forward to future discourse as these issues move forward.  A number of the ones that we addressed today are moving rapidly and quickly, and certainly we’re willing to do any follow-ups that may be required on your part.  Thank you.

Military officials say the 47th BALTOPS, which ends Friday, aims to improve teamwork among allies and partners while presenting a united front to Russia, which closely watches NATO activities in the Baltic Sea.

The exercise is taking place throughout the Baltic region, including in an area not far from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The participating nations brought 50 ships, 40 aircraft and more than 8,500 personnel to the Baltic Sea, but officials said the exercise isn’t meant to escalate tensions.

“We are very aware of the difference between deterrence and provocation, and we’re not interested in provoking anyone,” Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, 2nd Fleet commander, told reporters at the start of the exercise.

Lewis and his staff are overseeing BALTOPS from the 6th Fleet command ship USS Mount Whitney, while coordinating with U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

BALTOPS comprised 389 different activities this year, almost four times more than last year, Navy officials said.

The exercise included several training staples. Warships fended off simulated attacks from smaller, faster vessels; crews practiced anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures; aircraft and ships worked together to protect the air and sea.

Meanwhile, U.S. Marines teamed up with other militaries to launch multiple amphibious landings across the region. One simulated assault happened while live artillery rounds were fired at a safe distance.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet; Joint Forces Command Norfolk and Rear Admiral Andrew Burns Commander, United Kingdom Maritime Forces.

Vice Admiral Lewis: My name’s Vice Admiral Lewis, Commander of the U.S. 2^nd Fleet and Commander of BALTOPS 2019.

With me today is Rear Admiral Andrew Burns, Commander of the UK Maritime Forces and my Deputy to BALTOPS.

It’s our belief that we are here almost two full weeks after the beginning of the exercise.  BALTOPS focus is on strengthening our partnerships.  A key component in ensuring the multinational exercise is a success.  No one nation can face today’s challenges alone, and we are stronger together.  Together our partners and NATO Alliance will continue to strengthen our deterrence and defense efforts by improving our collective readiness and responsiveness.

The impressive display of professionals from 18 nations — 16 NATO allies and 2 partner nations; more than 8,600 personnel participating with 50 ships, 36 aircraft and 2 submarines.  BALTOPS 2019 was an opportunity to work together and integrate our forces in order to display the collective commitment to maritime security in the region.

During this exercise there were numerous examples of integration and action.  A specific day that comes to mind is our Distinguished Visitor Day, highlighting amphibious and air demonstrations that took place this past weekend on the beach in Lithuania.  It was a remarkable demonstration of the essential partnerships we seek to build between military professionals. 

We had Romanian Marines coming ashore off, Polish amphibious transports; American Marines and Spanish Marines assaulting the beach from the same landing craft; a UK Merlin helicopter and a Spanish Sea King helicopter conducting and demonstrations on the teach in tandem as a wave of British, U.S. and Spanish Marines assaulted the beach simultaneously.  It was a powerful demonstration of partners working together as professionals to optimize their presence in the region.

Although this was the 47^th iteration of BALTOPS there were quite a few firsts this year.  The United States 2^nd Fleet was reestablished and took the reigns as Commander of Baltic Operations.  We had an increased focus on mine countermeasure operations.  It was quite successful as German, Norwegian, Danish and U.S. sailors in a Mine Warfare Task Group came together to clear nine World War II era bottom mines, giving our team the opportunity to put their skills to the test.  And we’re clearing two additional mines today.

Principals from the NATO Amphibious Leaders Expedition Symposium, NALES, were trained [for the first time].  NALES focuses on developing multinational command and control of an amphibious task force level capability, allowing the coordinated command and control of naval and amphibious forces across different nations’ amphibious forces.  BALTOPS was the first opportunity to evaluate these multinational command and control constructs, and it was executed well.

Also the Joint Force Maritime participated as an amphibious task force commander during BALTOPS 2019.  JEFM is UK led.  A joint force that can be stood up in any environment.  It can support numerous tasks from combat operations to deterrence to humanitarian support.

BALTOPS is voluntary in nature with each year being shaped by individual country force offerings.  This year we were fortunate to welcome to the exercise the Spanish flagship Juan Carlos Primero, an amphibious assault ship with seven Spanish AV-8B Harriers and three AH-3 Sea Kings, significantly increasing the number of maritime based fixed wing aerial events for training.

This exercise marks the first time a Hellfire missile was fired into a training range in Lithuania, thanks to the coordination between BALTOPS planners and the Lithuanian government.  We also hosted the Lithuanian Air Force Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron, Detachment 1 on board our flagship USS Mt. Whitney for helicopter deck landing qualifications.  This was an invaluable opportunity to establish the foundation for helicopter operations on air-capable ships.

These are just a few examples of the exciting firsts we experienced during BALTOPS 2019.  The more we operate together, the more opportunities we have to integrate our forces and expand their capabilities across the coalition.

We shared BALTOPS focus on reinforcing and enhancing existing partnerships among our militaries, showing presence and protecting our combined maritime power while always adhering to international laws and operating as professionals.

As we have done for 47 years, we will continue to carry out various maritime operations while strictly adhering to international rules and norms.

This training has no target or enemy, but rather is to demonstrate that NATO allies and partners can and will defend against any adversaries.  By training together we enhance our interoperability and we show our collective commitment to deterring potential adversaries while ensuring our shared strategic interests are preserved.  Together we are part of the strongest military alliance the world has ever known.  This is why we must continue to integrate operations amongst NATO allies and partners to contribute to the security of the globe on behalf of our nations.

Question:  My question is to the Vice Admiral, Andrew Lewis.  Sir, a question to the information you just gave us.  The most part of the operations which the allied force was trained for during BALTOPS operations were offensive operations like SAMs, et cetera.  So do you consider that Russian forces on the other side of the Baltic Sea should consolidate its defense when such operations and training of NATO forces are held in the Western part of the Baltic Sea?  Thank you very much.

Vice Admiral Lewis:  I think we were operating in the Baltics under three tenets.  Under partnership, presence and professionalism.  So our partners in the region, our partners in NATO, we were operating with them, present, operating on the high seas and in the air over the high seas in international water and airspace in a professional manner.  And all those in the region are certainly expected to do the same.  There’s no, as I stated up front, there’s no, it was an exercise to operate together, integrate together, and with the forces that were in the exercise but not aimed toward anyone else, but it was just to operate on the high seas in this region, which is a very unique region of the world.

Question:  According to the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, more than 80,000 naval miles and other explosives placed during World War I and World War II are estimated to still be underwater and pose a threat to individuals working on and in the Baltic Sea.  How can you find a solution to this? Or is it only going to be part of history?  Will the U.S. start cleaning up the sea area with the help of other NATO members?

Vice Admiral Lewis:  First of all the U.S. and NATO has an organization called the Standing Maritime Group that does Mine Countermeasures.  They operate in the Baltic frequently and were a part of BALTOPS this year and will continue to be a part of BALTOPS in the future.

What we were able to do this year was apply some new capabilities in finding these mines and disposing of them.  We found in excess of ten unexploded mines from the 2^nd World War and that have been disposed of now. Another two today.

I’ll let Admiral Burns comment on this because of his nation’s Navy has quite a bit of experience in the region and quite a bit of experience he has personally in this area of warfare.

Rear Admiral Burns:  The only thing I would add is that the Royal Navy participates in the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group, which operates regularly in the Baltic.  And part of the program is directed tasking which is specifically to hunt and dispose of historic ordinance.

Obviously, we’ve achieved some progress during this exercise, but it’s going to require a concerted effort to continue to reduce the numbers from the 80,000 that are indicated in the question.  We’re not going to be able to do that quickly, but we are determined to make inroads into that number.

Question:  Considering you’ve been operating in the Baltics, and I know this exercise you say isn’t looking at any one specific person in particular, one specific nation state that might be, but it’s close to the Russians.  So I’d just be curious to know how credible a threat you feel the Russians are today, and whether they’re just saber rattling; and more to the point, how do you think Moscow views these in the Baltics?

Vice Admiral Lewis:  I’ll defer to Admiral Burns first.

Rear Admiral Burns:  I think as a Baltic state we would expect Russia to operate in the Baltic region and of course we’ve been operating alongside Russian units throughout the exercise.  And as we’ve been operating in a professional manner, so have the Russians.  And of course they would recognize the importance of this region to their economy and their prosperity.  As part of the superhighway of the high seas upon which our individual and collective prosperity depends, I think we share an interest in maintaining security in this region.

So I’m not surprised that Russia has been operating and exercising which is entirely within their right to do so, as we have been doing.  And what they’ve been doing has been within national norms, which is precisely what we are here to demonstrate and uphold.

Vice Admiral Lewis:  I would just add that operating in the Baltics during the exercise and operating with other regional nations in the Baltics, it’s been with [inaudible] success in professional and safe interaction.  What I perceive is rather than a provocative nature, it’s actually a nature of which it’s lending stability and security to the region.  It’s very obvious that it’s to everyone’s benefit and the stability of the regional nations have an obligation and a right to patrol the high seas and that’s expected.  But it’s actually, I believe, is a stabilizing effect in the Baltics, not a disruptive effect.

Question:  Reestablishment of the 2^nd Fleet in 2018 was a clear response to Russia’s military assertive behavior.  Is the Baltic Sea a primary area of responsibility in this regard?  Do you consider the fleet capabilities’ deployment in other areas, for instance in the framework of increased NATO naval presence in the Black Sea?

Vice Admiral Lewis:  The 2^nd Fleet was reestablished in August of 2018.  And reestablished in order to operate in the Atlantic, from Norfolk, Virginia in the Atlantic and into the North Atlantic and potentially into the Arctic.  And the approaches of the Baltic and the approaches of the Mediterranean.

Now as a maneuver arm, a maneuver fleet, the 2^nd Fleet can be employed wherever directed to be employed, but not, in an expeditionary fashion.  That’s exactly what we’ve been doing during this exercise.

Could it be that we are employed other than the areas I just mentioned?  Certainly.  But not by design specifically to operate anywhere other than the areas that I mentioned.  Really just in the Atlantic and the reaches into the Arctic.

Question:  Was NATO being in the Gulf region ? I mean The security of the Gulf region ? 

Vice Admiral Lewis:  I can tell you that NATO and a very large coalition is operating in the Persian Gulf region and in the Arabian Sea and has consistently for a number of years and will continue to do so in the same manner that we’re operating here in the Baltic and throughout the world to ensure sea lines of communication and to ensure operations in accordance with the International Law of the Sea.

Vice Admiral Lewis:  I just want to reemphasize the positive nature of this exercise and how I personally learned an incredible amount from our allies and partners and those who live and work around here.  So it’s quite a pleasure to be here, and I think it goes a long way towards stability in the region.  Thank you very much for your time.

Six NATO Allies took a critical step towards making the future Multi Role Tanker and Transport Capability (MRTT-C) more affordable. A Letter of Intent on cooperation around the MRTT-C was signed between France and the five current MRTT-C participants: Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. This will help make maintenance and repair operations for the MRTT-C more affordable. The Letter of Intent sets out areas of cooperation including exchanges of expertise and joint training.

The MRTT-C initiative will provide its participants with strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling and medical evacuation capabilities, enabling them to conduct more flexible air operations. Participants in the initiative will operate Airbus A330 MRTT aircraft starting in 2020. A total of eight aircraft will be procured and operated by the participating nations in the following years. 

The MRTT-C programme is an initiative of the European Defence Agency. The aircraft are owned by NATO and procured by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) through the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). NATO ownership allows all participants to benefit from the complete fleet through a flexible and guaranteed pooling and sharing concept. They will be stationed at the Eindhoven and Cologne airbases and will include a 24/7 medical evacuation capability. Participation in the MRTT-C initiative is open for other member states to join.

The project is an example of effective cooperation between NATO and the European Union in the delivery of critical capabilities for the benefit of all.