The message coming from the NATO alliance and from Washington, including the president, is that a no-fly zone is not on the table right now, according to Ambassador Julianne Smith, US permanent representative to NATO.

“That’s not something that the alliance is looking at,” she said on Tuesday at a media briefing.

The collective goal of the United States and its allies “is to end this war, to get Russia to leave Ukraine, to get Russia to stop these attacks on both the Ukrainian military and these indiscriminate attacks on civilians,” Smith said. “We don’t want to expand this conflict. We do not want to see it spread above and beyond the current context. And so the feeling is that if we were to consider something like a no-fly zone, that would take us in the wrong direction.”

There is also a broader question about the utility of considering this type of option, she said, noting that Russia recently attacked a military training facility in western Ukraine, about 15 km. (nine miles) from the Polish border.

“What we learned from that was that Russia actually was able to instigate that attack from a Russian bomber in Russian airspace, begging the question about whether a no-fly zone in Ukrainian airspace would actually have a major impact on Russia’s ability to attack Ukrainian territory.”

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador Julianne Smith U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Ambassador Smith:  Great, First, let me thank everybody for dialing in and joining the call today.  Always happy to hear from folks and answer questions.  At the top, I guess what I’ll just say, of course, is, as many of you know, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Austin, will be landing in Brussels later this evening.  We have laid on a snap defense ministerial.  This is an ongoing signal, I think, of the Administration’s interest in engaging Allies at the highest levels on what’s happening inside Ukraine.  So, we’re thrilled to welcome back the Secretary this evening and have him here tomorrow for two sessions.  

We’ll cover the situation in Ukraine, but we’ll also be talking about some longer-term questions about how NATO should be positioning itself in the future.  There are some questions on the table right now about the degree to which the Alliance should be looking at medium and longer-term posture changes.  There’s been a lot of posture changes.  Many NATO Allies have moved posture into Eastern Europe, and we can get into that later, over the last few weeks.  But there are additional questions on the table about what type of posture the Alliance should take going forward.  So we’ll be tackling some of that while ministers are here.   

We’ll also be engaging with our partners; Finland and Sweden will join us at the table and will also be joined by the Ukrainian minister of defense.  That’s my understanding. 

Question: What is the bright line for a direct U.S. military response to Russia should any Russian aggressions, intended or not, spill into NATO territory? 

Ambassador Smith:  NATO has a very clear line already enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and that is of course that an attack on one is considered an attack on all.  You’ve also heard the President as well as other members of the administration, such as Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin, talk about the fact that the U.S. commitment to Article 5, to our Allies, is rock-solid and that we will defend every inch of NATO territory.  We’ve also had – I would say in recent weeks, what’s interesting is we’ve utilized and relied on a different article in the Washington Treaty, and that is Article 4.  

We’ve actually had some Article 4 consultations.  A group of countries in Central and Eastern Europe came forward right after February 24^th and put in a formal request for Article 4 consultations.  We’ve had those and, frankly, they’re ongoing to respond to their concerns about how the situation in and around their territory is evolving and changing, and that article in particular is useful because it allows the Alliance to come together at 30 and hear from the Ally or Allies in question and to determine what steps, if any, the Alliance needs to take in that moment to respond to any sort of changing security environment that they’re facing.  Obviously, countries in Central and Eastern Europe do believe that this is a time for a conversation about potential changes to NATO force posture in their neighborhood, and as I noted at the top, that’s going to be part of the discussion that we’ll be having tomorrow at the ministerial. 

Question:  Ambassador, I have a question about what was called a no-fly zone.  It’s clear what was said, that NATO will not impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, but my question is on another way and especially providing Ukraine with weapons.  And I mean, first of all, fighter jets – I’ve heard from many U.S. officials that providing Ukraine with Soviet military jets, MiG-29 from Poland, would not be efficient militarily.  Can you explain why it would not be efficient militarily while Ukrainian officials say that no, it will be a big help for Ukraine to defend its skies against airstrikes?  And the second part:  Is the U.S. also considering providing air-defense capabilities more than just man-portable air-defense capabilities, more than just Stingers, some bigger high and medium air-defense capabilities?  

Ambassador Smith:  Okay, So, we’ve got a couple of things going on there.  So, let’s start with your comment on the no-fly zone.  So, you’re right, the message coming from the NATO Alliance and from folks back in Washington, including the President, is that a no-fly zone is not on the table right now.  That’s not something that the Alliance is looking at.  I think our collective goal, the United States in consultation with its Allies, our goal right now is to end this war – to get Russia to leave Ukraine, to get Russia to stop these attacks on both the Ukrainian military and these indiscriminate attacks on civilians.  We don’t want to expand this conflict.  We do not want to see it spread above and beyond the current context.  And so the feeling is that if we were to consider something like a no-fly zone, that would take us in the wrong direction.  

There is also a broader question here about the utility of considering that type of option.  If you take, for example, the recent attack that we saw by the Russians on this military training facility in western Ukraine that was about – my understanding is it’s about 15 kilometers from the Polish border – what we learned from that was that Russia actually was able to instigate that attack from a Russian bomber in Russian airspace, begging the question about whether or not a no-fly zone in Ukrainian airspace would actually have a major impact on Russia’s ability to attack Ukrainian territory.  So that’s a broader set of questions.

But again, I think when you think about the Alliance’s position on escalation and our interest in not escalating this conflict right now, where the Alliance has landed is to take that option off the table.  

On the jets, I mean, what I can say broadly is, look, every member of this Alliance right now is trying to think about what more it can do.  The remarkable story of the last couple of weeks, first and foremost, is that every member of this Alliance, every single one has already stepped forward and offered assistance.  That assistance takes many forms.  Several Allies are offering lethal assistance; some are offering humanitarian; most of them are offering both.  

In the case of Poland, they obviously had some requests through their contacts in Kyiv.  They heard loud and clear the request for these Soviet-era MiGs that they have in Poland.  We had a debate about that particular option.  At the end of the day, you heard the U.S. weigh in and say that they felt that this particular option was untenable.  There were a number of – and there still are – open-ended questions about the mechanics of actually moving these planes from Poland to Ukraine.  There are open-ended questions about pilots, about fuel, about missiles.  And so, at this point, this is ultimately Poland’s decision, but to the extent that the U.S. has a view on this. Again, you’ve heard directly from the Pentagon on this matter that folks did not believe that at this point, this was the best option, and this was an option that had all of the details adequately sorted to actually make this transfer happen.  So, that’s on that front.

On your last bit about air defense, look, the U.S. has already provided – really since the President came to the Oval Office in early 2021 – $1.2 billion worth of security assistance to Ukraine.  Just in the last two weeks, we have provided $550 million in security assistance, and that mostly takes the form of anti-armor or anti-tank weapons.  You’ve heard the President and the Secretary of Defense talk about the fact that we are continually assessing what additional needs our friends in Kyiv have.  We will continue looking at what other aspects of or other forms of air defense we might be able to provide to Ukraine.  And of course, you’ve no doubt seen the news that Congress just recently approved an additional $13.6 billion of support for Ukraine.  So, this is an evolving story.  It’s hard to take a snapshot on any given day because it’s clear that not only the United States but NATO Allies are continuing to look for additional ways that they can address Ukraine’s air-defense needs.  

Question:  Ambassador, you spoke earlier about Article 5, which I believe, talks about an attack on NATO.  But looking in the past few days, we’ve had these issues with UAVs, drones entering NATO airspace – Poland, Romania.  Where do you draw the line?  What if it’s a brief incursion into airspace, or something that looks potentially accidental, a UAV straying and crashing?  How do you decide what is an act of aggression and what is a mistake in the middle of an armed conflict?  

Ambassador Smith:  Well, look, each NATO Ally has the right to come forward, come into NATO Headquarters and invoke Article 5 anytime it believes – for a variety of reasons – that its security environment, threat environment has changed and that they have, quote, “been attacked”.  The work that NATO has done in recent years is to think in more detail about ways in which Article 5 could be applied in new domains.  We’ve had some interesting conversations over the years about cyber, as many of you know.

So, look, I mean, we could sit here all day and go through different scenarios.  I really don’t want to take, like, each individual scenario.  What I think our Allies fundamentally understand and has been messaged to them in very clear terms is that we all take that commitment, our Article 5 commitment, seriously, and we are all prepared to come to the aid of a country should they feel the need to invoke Article 5.  

So, that is kind of the atmospherics here inside the NATO Alliance.  What’s been very reassuring in recent weeks is to see the Alliance come together to reiterate and stress again our collective commitment to Article 5, and to reassure all members that should they feel compelled to turn to Article 5, the Alliance will be there for that Ally.   

Question:  Okay, I have two questions.  First one:  Yesterday, the Bulgarian President, Mr. Rumen Radev, demanded the sky over Bulgaria to be guarded only by Bulgarian fighter planes with Bulgarian personnel.  So, would you comment that, having into account that the Netherlands and Spain had sent their planes to help us?  

And second question:  After the latest taking into account the latest developments in Ukraine, can we expect more U.S. or NATO deployment, NATO or U.S. troops’ deployment in this – at the southeastern flank of NATO, especially in Bulgaria and Turkey? 

Ambassador Smith:  Well, the United States has already deployed thousands of U.S. troops, both troops that were previously stationed in Europe – so we moved some troops from Germany to Romania, for example – but we’ve also deployed a number of troops from CONUS, from the United States, over to Eastern Europe into Poland.  There’ll be a smaller presence in Bulgaria, as you no doubt heard about.  And the good news is the United States does not stand alone in this regard.  We’ve had several Allies come forward – the Danes, the Dutch, the French, the Spaniards, our friends in the UK; I mean, I could go on and on, Italy – almost all of the NATO Allies come forward to offer additional force posture.  They’ve offered ships and troops and fighter jets to those countries on the eastern flank to reassure and deter.  Those help with – those nations deter any potential threats on their or against their territory.  

So, this has been a remarkable story in the last couple of weeks.  Actually, NATO started moving force posture into Eastern Europe before Russia went into Ukraine.  We reached a point where collectively, the Alliance began to start moving troops weeks before February 24^th, and since then it has moved additional posture.  So again, this is an evolving story; it’s not over by any means.  I think one of the reasons we’re having ministers meet here in Brussels tomorrow is to talk about other steps that collectively, we can take to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, and whether or not we need to map out in more detail a medium and longer-term plan.  So, stay tuned on that front. 

On your point about the president back home stating that his preference would be to have Bulgaria’s skies patrolled strictly by Bulgarian fighter jets and Bulgarian pilots, that’s obviously a decision for Sofia, for Bulgaria to determine on its own.  Each NATO Ally can decide to accept offers of support from other NATO Allies, or they can say, look, we think we’ve got it covered.  And I’ll leave it to your government to make that determination.  But the good news, as you noted, is that Allies are standing by to help.  And if Bulgaria reaches a point where it would like additional assistance in some of those missions, whether it’s air policing or something else, I have no doubt that the NATO Allies will come forward and provide that assistance should it be needed.  

Question: What do you think of the EU’s efforts to have China act as a mediator in the Russian invasion of Ukraine?  Does this represent a difference with Washington’s diplomatic approach? 

Ambassador Smith:  Well, maybe this would be a good time to say something about Jake Sullivan’s engagement that he had yesterday with Chinese officials in Rome.  You may have seen some of the reporting on this.  It was a lengthy meeting in Rome, I believe almost a full day.  I’ve heard it was very serious, very intense discussions.  They obviously were focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the National Security Advisor stressed the importance of maintaining an open line with the U.S. and China on this particular conflict.  

But I think the goal of that engagement was to really send a pretty clear message that the United States is keen to see every country around the world – and that includes the PRC – to make clear in this moment where they stand with respect to this conflict in Ukraine, and that they need to stand on the side of the rules-based order.  This is not a time for countries to sit on the sidelines.  This is not a time for countries to pretend like they can stay neutral on this particular conflict.  And so, I think the point of that was to send a very clear message to Jake’s, Jake Sullivan’s Chinese interlocutors on that particular point. 

Question: In 2014, NATO countries agreed to spend more for the defense, aiming for that 2 percent target of GDP.  Is it time for NATO to go beyond that 2 percent target?

Ambassador Smith:  Well, maybe we could back up for just a minute and think about how we got to this point.  So, after Russia went into Crimea, after its illegal annexation in 2014, NATO Allies came together and sketched out a plan to reinforce its – our collective defense.  And over the last years, the recent years, I mean really over the last eight years, the Allies have come together and they’ve done just that.  We have put multinational battle groups in Poland and the Baltic states, and also in 2014, Allies came together at the Wales summit and issued the Wales Pledge to move towards spending a minimum of 2 percent of GDP, and 20 percent of their annual defense spending on new equipment.  And it’s generally a good-news story.  I mean, Allies have made significant progress on that pledge.  You’ve heard the NATO Secretary General talk about this, the fact that really, since 2014, we’ve seen increased defense spending both across Europe and in Canada with a total of $270 billion spent extra – extra dollars spent since that moment in 2014.  

We’ve also put a number of tools in our toolkit to have a much stronger response to Russian aggression, and I think one of the ways that you can see that is the speed with which NATO was able to respond to Russia’s invasion or further invasion of Ukraine on February 24^th, is watching those tools come together.  We had plans in place in the desk drawer that we were able to activate.  We had the NATO Response Force ready to be activated, and we’ve since deployed elements of the NATO Response Force.  All of that came in the wake of what happened in Crimea.  And so generally, I think what we’re seeing here is the Alliance coming together after 2014, making these commitments to not only spend more but to have more force posture in Central and Eastern Europe and develop new policy tools, and all of this has come together to craft this NATO-wide response over the last couple of weeks.

On burden sharing more broadly, I would say this war in Ukraine has actually brought out – brought forward considerable change as well.  You’ve all heard the news about Germany now committing to spend 2 percent.  We’ve heard other Allies talk about possibly accelerating their plans to get to the Wales Pledge, and we applaud that.  We applaud those efforts.  We support them.  We’re excited to hear Allies taking another look at how they might accelerate those plans to make sure that in this moment, burden sharing is not an issue for this Alliance and that by 2024 we will see the majority of Allies hit that target.  

Question:  Are you willing to consider a humanitarian air lift to Kyiv and to Ukraine?  And second question:  There are three prime ministers of NATO member states that are going to Kyiv.  Would you consider, if they are targeted, a violation of Article 5?

Ambassador Smith:  Well, I guess all I can say on the humanitarian air lift is, look, we are collectively – both in our cooperation with the EU and both in cooperation with our Allies here at NATO and in other forums, whether we’re talking at the United Nations with Allies or whether or not we’re talking in the G7 with Allies – the U.S. is continually looking for ways to find humanitarian corridors, safe passage for those looking to leave the violence.  

Now, Russia has indicated a few times that it’s interested in looking at specific proposals.  Sadly, we’ve seen no commitment on their part to help the people in need right now.  Quite the contrary, we’ve seen very troubling reports about these indiscriminate attacks on civilians, making it more difficult for people to leave these areas where the violence is the worst.  And so we will continue looking for ways to assist people and work through multilateral forums and institutions to see how collectively we can come together with our Allies to ensure the safety of folks looking to exit.  

So this is something that again is a broad goal on the part of the United States and its Allies, and we will continue calling on the Russians, first and foremost, to stop the attacks – stop the attacks on civilians, to put a ceasefire in place – and hope that they will respond to those calls from the international community.  

And with the three heads of state headed to Kyiv, certainly support all of the engagement we’ve seen with Allies in recent weeks to either indirectly, through virtual channels or now an in-person visit, offer concrete support to our friends in Kyiv.  

Ambassador Smith:  Not really, just thanks again to everybody for joining us, and always happy to do things like this, and we will no doubt try to get another one of these on the calendar in the days and weeks ahead.  Thanks so much.  

Cold Response 2022, planned long before Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aims to test how Norway would manage Allied reinforcements on its soil, in line with Article 5 of NATO‘s charter which requires member states to come to the aid of another member state under attack, Al-Jazeera reported.

“It’s a defensive exercise,” said General Yngve Odlo, in charge of Cold Response, on Monday.

“It’s not a military operation with an offensive purpose,” he told television channel TV2.

Organised every two years, the naval, air and ground drills are held over vast swaths of Norway, including above the Arctic Circle.

They will, however, stay several hundred kilometres away from Norway’s border with Russia. Russia declined Norway’s invitation to send observers.

“Any build-up of NATO military capabilities near Russia’s borders does not help to strengthen security in the region”, Russia’s embassy in Norway told the AFP news agency last week.

Russia “has the capacity out there to follow (the exercise) in an entirely legitimate manner”, Odlo said. 

“I really hope they respect existing agreements,” he added.

As during previous editions of the exercise, neighbouring Sweden and Finland, which are militarily non-aligned but increasingly close partners of NATO, will also participate in Cold Response.

Russia’s invasion has renewed debate in the two Nordic countries about possible NATO membership.

About 200 aircraft and 50 vessels are also taking part in the manoeuvres, which last until April 1.

The exercise began on Monday with naval operations and the deployment on land of part of NATO’s rapid reaction force.

NATO and its partners will launch exercises in Norway on Monday aimed at coming to the rescue of one of its own—and just a few hundred kilometers from the border with Russia, AFP reported.

Some 30,000 troops, 200 aircraft, and 50 vessels from 27 nations will take part in the Cold Response 2022 exercise, the largest exercise involving NATO troops this year.

Kicking off on March 14, the maneuvers will enable Western nations to hone their combat skills in Norway’s cold climate, including in the Arctic, on the ground, at sea, and in the skies.

The exercise will be held just a few hundred kilometers from the Russian border, and while it was planned long before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, it now has added significance because of the ongoing war there.

Sweden’s position on not joining NATO remains in place, the prime minister said, adding that the Nordic country will decide its own security policies.

Sweden does not plan to join NATO, Magdalena Andersson said and noted that Russia does not have an alarming threat and military activity on the Swedish borders.

“It is obvious that the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which is primarily … a military bloc, would have serious military and political consequences that would require retaliatory steps by our country,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said at a weekly press briefing in Moscow on Friday.

Finland’s Prime Minister Sanna Marin said on her part that the discussion of her country’s NATO membership changed after Russia attacked Ukraine.

“NATO is as united and resolute as it’s ever been, and NATO will maintain its Open Door to those European states who share our values and who one day may seek to join our Alliance,” said the US President Joe Biden, according to a White House statement on Friday.

Sweden and Finland, along with EU representatives, attended Friday’s extraordinary NATO leaders’ summit.

Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine entered its third day Saturday with the latest reports indicating that Russian troops clashing with Ukrainian forces in the streets of the capital Kyiv throughout the night.

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the military intervention Thursday, days after recognizing two separatist-held enclaves in eastern Ukraine.

He claimed that Moscow had no plan to occupy the neighboring country but wanted to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of trying to install a puppet government and said Ukrainians will defend their country against Russian aggression.

NATO defence ministers are expected this week to set in motion a plan that could establish four multinational battlegroups in southeastern Europe in response to Russia’s military build-up in Ukraine, four diplomats said.

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told reporters that ministers would discuss “additional enhancements” but declined to give more details. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said: “We’re also going to consider a more long-term adjustment of posture, including considering the battlegroup in Romania.”

They spoke as Russia said some troops near Ukraine were returning to their bases after military exercises, easing concerns over a potential invasion. But Stoltenberg also said that while he saw signs for optimism, he had not seen yet seen any sign of de-escalation on the ground.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador Julianne Smith , U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Ambassador Smith: Good morning to anybody who’s on the other side of the Atlantic.  It’s a pleasure to be here doing this today.  As I think all of you know, I’m pretty new to my position here in Brussels still, so I’ll just take a minute to offer a couple of quick impressions from my first few months on the job.

First let me say I’ve been profoundly impressed by the unity that we’ve seen inside this Alliance in recent weeks.  Of course, every member of the Alliance always brings a different perspective to NATO by virtue of their history, their geography.  But I think what’s been very clear to me is that we all are united in our purpose at this moment and our commitment to collective self-defense.  And when I sat in the NATO-Russia Council a couple of weeks ago, what was very clear to me was that every Ally was intent on delivering a crystal-clear message to Russia in that meeting, and the message essentially remains the same, and that is that we remain open to dialogue with Russia.  We are urging Russia to de-escalate through diplomacy and dialogue, but we’ve also been clear that Allies are ready to impose serious consequences should Russia further invade Ukraine.

Question:  The United States is deploying thousands of more soldiers to the European theater.  Some NATO countries have committed to rotating more forces in and out of the Baltics as well as some fighter jets and warships.  Would the U.S. like to see a stronger European commitment to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank?

Ambassador Smith:  I think it’s been pretty impressive in recent weeks to see how many different NATO Allies have made the decision to reinforce our Allies in Central and Eastern Europe.  Of course, as you mentioned, the United States has moved some of its own force posture both from Germany to Central and Eastern Europe – we moved forces from Germany to Romania – but we’ve also moved some troops from the United States to Central and Eastern Europe, including in Poland, as you’ve seen in the headlines.

But if you can bear with me for a minute, I think it’s worth mentioning how many other Allies have taken similar decisions.  You mentioned Denmark.  I believe the question came from Denmark.  Denmark decided to send a frigate to the Baltic Sea and is deploying F-16 fighter jets to Lithuania.  In the Baltic states we’ve seen the UK deploy additional troops to Poland.  Germany has deployed additional troops to NATO’s multinational battle group in Lithuania.  France has expressed readiness to send troops to the eastern part of the Alliance under NATO command.  Spain is sending ships to NATO Naval Forces.  And the Netherlands is sending F-35 fighter jets to Bulgaria.

So, “Is this all?” I guess is the question, and we don’t know the answer to that.  I think defense ministers will be meeting here in Brussels over the next two days, and they’ll no doubt be assessing the situation in and around Ukraine and looking at any additional requirements that might need to be met on NATO territory, and they’ll look at whether or not additional enhancements might be necessary.  But we’ll have to stand by and see where those discussions go in the next few days.  

Question:  One of the obvious questions that we all have is, what is your response to the Russian claim this morning that they are moving some troops back?  Some of the independent analysts I speak to believe that some of those troops were on the southern coast of Crimea, and wondering if you’ve seen that.  And overall, obviously, one of the messages that you and others have been sending is reassurance to the eastern flank and almost like a warning to Russia of how serious you take Article 5.  Just wondering if you think at this point Russia has received the message from the U.S. and the West that NATO will defend itself should any conflict in Ukraine spread. 

Ambassador Smith:  I think I’ll take your second question first.  So I hope that Russia has heard the message loud and clear that the Alliance is prepared to undertake all necessary measures to protect NATO territory.  That message has come through multiple channels, notably the NATO-Russia Council that I mentioned at the top, but also, as you’ve noticed, several leaders have been visiting Moscow in recent days and weeks, and I think they’ve heard that message coming from the United States and other NATO Allies.

One of the really interesting things that we’ve tried to help the Russians understand is that they have spent many years complaining about NATO troops coming closer to their border, and unfortunately it is their actions – Russian actions, Russian aggression – that has resulted in more posture moving into Central and Eastern Europe.  As you know, we enhanced NATO’s presence in Poland and the Baltic states in the wake of 2014, when Russia went into Crimea, and now, in light of what we’re seeing Russia do on the border of Ukraine and in Belarus, individual members of the Alliance have already taken steps to reinforce Central and Eastern Europe.  

So hopefully they’re getting the message and understanding how seriously both the United States and all NATO members take their commitments to Article 5 and understand that those commitments are ironclad.  

And then on your second question about the reports that the Russians are putting out, their claims that they’re now de-escalating, all I can say is that we’ll have to verify that and take a look.  You may remember in late December there were some similar claims that came out of Moscow that they were de-escalating, and in fact, facts on the ground did not support that claim.  So we want to make sure we understand what they’re talking about when they say de-escalation, and we want to verify that that is in fact what’s happening.  So stand by.  We’ll obviously take a look at that.  It just kind of hit us today.  And we’ll know more, I hope, in the next day or two.  

Question:  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has told President Putin that he recommends diplomatic dialogue continue to be pursued.  Is the U.S. assessment that invasion could be imminent?

Ambassador Smith:  We do not understand what is inside President Putin’s head, and so we cannot make any guess about where all of this is headed.  But we have done our very best to message to them in very clear terms that, number one, we believe the best path is through dialogue and de-escalation, and we have urged them at every turn to come back to the table.  We could have another NATO-Russia Council.  We could meet at the OSCE in Vienna.  We could meet in another city in the framework of the SSD.  

So that message has been crystal-clear and repeated over and over in recent weeks, but at the same time we have had to message them with another message, and that is that we are prepared to respond if Russia chooses to go in and further invade Ukraine, that they will face severe economic consequences and that NATO will also be looking at ways they can move additional posture into Central and Eastern Europe – again, something they claim they don’t want.  So when Lavrov talks about another round of dialogue, of course we are open to that and prepared to sit down.  So I hope – I think we all hope it’s genuine, and we hope that that is what President Putin is opting to do in this moment.  

Question:  I wanted to ask about the Russian forces in Belarus.  There has been widespread concern that they might remain there.  And would you think if that happens, should that mean shifting NATO’s posture on the eastern flank accordingly and permanently?  

Ambassador Smith:  It’s hard to get into hypotheticals.  Again, we don’t know where this is headed.  We’ve been troubled by the forces moving into Belarus at a pretty rapid clip – upwards of 30,000 troops.  We’ve noted how close they are to Kyiv – about two hours away from Kyiv, in fact – and NATO has monitored this situation closely.  We discuss it regularly, not just the forces in Belarus but obviously all of the forces that they’re amassing in and around Ukraine or close to Ukraine’s borders.  

In terms of what would happen in the future, again, you can’t really answer hypothetical situations, but I will note that per my last comment, the last question I was answering, NATO is preparing for a variety of contingencies, and we do meet regularly here at 30, here in NATO Headquarters, and think through what those contingencies could be.  What will be the security requirements of Allies like Poland and the Baltic states, really across the entire eastern flank?  So that’s something we’ll continue to examine and spend a great deal of time on, no doubt, during the next two days with defense ministers.  

Question:  My question regards the future of the LPR and DPR, because there was a Russian parliamentary call today for Russia to recognize those republics.  Do you think that one realistic scenario is this kind of Georgia scenario, where they recognize LPR/DPR and move their regular forces into there under some defense pact? 

Ambassador Smith:  Well, we have noted the movement through the Duma and this desire to recognize these, quote, “People’s Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the secretary general actually just spoke to this recently in his press conference, and really it’s worth repeating because I think that’s where all NATO Allies are right now, and that is that if they proceed with this, then I think it’s a clear violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty, and it’s also a violation of the Minsk Agreement.  And so that would obviously be a new shift in the escalation, and I think we would monitor that very closely and try to determine what we would need to do in terms of additional messaging towards the Russians on how concerned we are about that type of recognition.  

Question:   While the U.S. and NATO have said combat troops won’t be sent to Ukraine and NATO won’t fight in or for Ukraine against Russia, are you concerned that potential hostilities near NATO’s borders raises the prospect of engagement between NATO and Russia?

Ambassador Smith:  I think what we’re concerned about is, first and foremost, the buildup of Russian troops close to Ukraine’s border and all of those troops moving into Belarus and then on the eastern side of Ukraine.  We’re obviously working very closely with each member of the Alliance to determine if they have additional security requirements that need to be met.  And as I mentioned at the top, individual Allies have already taken steps to assure and deter by moving additional posture into NATO’s eastern flank. 

We don’t know what’s going to happen in the coming days and weeks.  We don’t know if Russia is going to go into Ukraine.  But what we do know is if they opted to do that, obviously NATO would have to then consider what possible adjustments it would make in response to that.  So we will take it day by day and watch and see what decision President Putin ultimately takes.  

Question:   Has there been any response by Russia to the letter offering mutual inspections of missile sites or any other points?

Ambassador Smith:  Well, both NATO and the United States originally received these two treaties from Russia with a long list of demands, and as I think everyone knows, both the United States and NATO then sent back their own letters outlining some of the things they were not willing to discuss, and then opening the door to dialogue in other categories, including on things like transparency or arms control or risk reduction.  We have not had a formal response to what we raised specifically in those letters, and we will wait to see if a letter will be forthcoming.  

But most importantly, what we need to be saying and what we say regularly to Moscow is that, look, we can spend the rest of the year going back and forth exchanging letters, but really what’s important is the best way to proceed would be for us to sit down at the table again.  We had the four-hour NATO-Russia Council here at NATO Headquarters, and NATO is open to doing that again.  And so let’s come back to the table and go back through where both sides believe there could be some areas where we could collectively focus on reciprocal commitments to European security.  And we have stated that both in bilateral channels and in multilateral channels, and that, I think, is the best way to proceed.  

Question:  Ambassador Smith, recently the United States announced that they are sending additional troops to Romania.  Can we expect more U.S. or NATO troops to Bulgaria, which also lies on the southeastern flank of NATO and is also part of the Black Sea region?  And if so, how much and when? 

Ambassador Smith:  Well, you’re right: the U.S. just recently took a decision to take about 1,000 personnel from a Stryker squadron in Germany and move them into Romania under the rubric of assure and deter.  That is a multi-mission force that can address some of the security needs that Romania has at the moment, and it supplements existing forces, U.S. forces that are already there.  

In terms of future decisions, I don’t have anything to share today.  I think what I can say is that we are continually evaluating and assessing the situation.  It’s important that defense ministers are meeting here tomorrow and Thursday – very timely meeting – and I think NATO will continue to determine whether or not additional enhancements might be necessary.  

Question:  Just to be explicit, what is the U.S. reaction to Russian announcements that some troops are being pulled back from the Ukrainian border?  Is this real, a feint, or something else?

Ambassador Smith:  We just heard the claim today, so, as I noted, what’s important is that we try to verify based on the fact that we’ve seen other instances in the past where Russia has claimed to be de-escalating and in fact, facts on the ground didn’t prove that to be true.  So I can’t say yes or no; I can’t say really anything about it at this moment because this is something that we’ll have to look at closely and verify in the days ahead.

Question:  There are plenty of calls from Baltic leaders for the U.S. to deploy additional U.S. forces in the Baltics.  Does Washington consider such action and what type of forces it could be?   

Ambassador Smith:  Again, the United States has sent about a total of 5,000 personnel to Central and Eastern Europe over the last couple of weeks, both from Germany to Romania and then from the United States to Poland and Germany.  We also have 8,500 troops in the United States that are assigned to the NATO Response Force that are now in a heightened alert posture.  

Whether or not the United States is going to be taking additional steps is not something that I have any details on.  But again, I don’t think that at the moment anyone believes that this is stagnant.  I think we’ll continue to assess, we’ll continue to look at what Russia is doing around Ukraine’s borders, and we’ll have to determine if additional steps might be necessary.  

Question:  Today we learned that the White House has alerted that some websites in – here in the United States but also in Europe are spreading misinformation.  And I’m asking because some parties, politicians, even members of government – like in Spain, where I am from – have been advancing ideas about, like, neo-Nazis being in the Government of Ukraine, about how this doesn’t have to do with democracy but a strategy, and even, like, again, one of the coalition members in Spain opposed the government’s decision that you referred at the beginning of this briefing about sending a ship to territorial waters in the area of Ukraine and Russia.  And I wanted to ask you: Is this a point of concern?  Is this – is there a concern within NATO of this type of arguments, this type of ideas getting into the public sphere within the NATO countries?  Thank you so much.  

Ambassador Smith:  Well, the good news is that over the last couple of years, we’ve all become deeply familiar with the Russian playbook.  And the Russian playbook can often involve conventional military forces and the movement of those forces, as we saw in the Donbas and Crimea, but we’ve also seen in Georgia, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  But Russians also rely on other – what we call hybrid or gray-zone tactics, and that includes disinformation.  And so as an Alliance working both with the 30 Allies represented at NATO and with other institutions, including the European Union, I think all of us are much smarter about, first and foremost, identifying when Russia or other countries rely on disinformation.  We’ve gotten smarted about how to deter or detect the use of disinformation, and hopefully we’ve gotten smarter about preventing it.  

One of the ways that we can address it is by sharing information and sharing lessons learned in countering it and coping with it.  And there, I mean, it’s hard to name a country that hasn’t experienced this particular tool in one form or another.  

So in the case of what’s happening between Russia and Ukraine, certainly here at NATO we’ve talked about the use of disinformation.  We’ve all shared what we’re seeing and hearing.  We’ve spoken with our friends in Kyiv about the threat of disinformation.  And I think to answer your question about are we concerned, yes, we are concerned about how Russia uses this tactic, and again, are doing our very best to try and counter it.

Ambassador Smith:  No, just thank you very much for everybody joining.  I hope you’ll tune in and watch events unfolding in the next 48 hours with defense ministers here.  This is an important gathering not just because they’ll be talking about Russia-Ukraine, but we’ll also be focused on a lot of other things that NATO’s doing right now to enhance its defense and deterrence posture, and it’s having a lot of important partners meetings with Ukraine and Georgia; it’ll be engaging other partners like Finland and Sweden and even the European Union.  So this will be a busy couple of days, so do tune in and, again, come back to us at any time with any questions you might have.  Thank you.  

The U.S. is ready to participate in a genuinely open, honest dialogue with Russia, Ambassador Michael R. Carpenter, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said during a special online briefing, Trend reports.

He recalled that the Polish chairperson-in-office of the OSCE, Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau, has launched a renewed European Security Dialogue at the OSCE, noting that “we were at a critical juncture in European security”.

The United States was represented at these talks by Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman and myself. The Deputy Secretary expressed gratitude to Poland for its leadership and vision at the OSCE, and thanked Foreign Minister Rau for his leadership in kicking off this high-level dialogue. The dialogue represents an opportunity for all 57 OSCE participating states to walk the path of diplomacy together with an aim of achieving concrete, practical results that enhance our mutual security.

“The OSCE is a critical forum. It’s the largest regional security organization in the world. It is an inclusive organization that has every country in Europe and Eurasia represented at the table. It has the political-military expertise to discuss confidence and security-building measures, concerns about conventional forces, military transparency, and risk reduction. It’s an organization that is rooted in a comprehensive concept of security that includes military, economic, and environmental and human security. And it’s an organization, importantly, that’s grounded in a set of fundamental principles as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Charter for European Security, and other key documents,” said Carpenter.

The ambassador said no one thinks this is going to be an easy discussion, but it’s a necessary one, and “if we wish to avoid conflict, it’s essential”.

“The Russian Federation has made clear that it wishes to discuss indivisibility of security, and frankly, we’re ready and willing to have that discussion. As President Biden has directed us, though, we are offering Russia the opportunity to pursue the path of diplomacy and de-escalation. We’re ready to participate in a genuinely open, honest dialogue that hopefully produces concrete results by lowering tensions, providing more transparency, and building greater confidence. We’re willing, together with our partners and allies, to explore creative new ideas. But everything we do has to be grounded in respect for our core principles – the principles that all 57 OSCE states signed up to repeatedly over the last five decades and, in fact, more: sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, peaceful settlement of disputes. These principles cannot be revised or renegotiated,” added Carpenter.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador Michael R. Carpenter  U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Ambassador Carpenter:  Good afternoon.  Today the Polish chairperson-in-office of the OSCE, Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau, launched a renewed European Security Dialogue at the OSCE, noting that we were at a critical juncture in European security.  The United States was represented at these talks by Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman and myself.  The Deputy Secretary expressed gratitude to Poland for its leadership and vision at the OSCE, and thanked Foreign Minister Rau for his leadership in kicking off this high-level dialogue.  The dialogue represents an opportunity for all 57 OSCE participating states to walk the path of diplomacy together with an aim of achieving concrete, practical results that enhance our mutual security.   

The OSCE is a critical forum.  It’s the largest regional security organization in the world.  It is an inclusive organization that has every country in Europe and Eurasia represented at the table.  It has the political-military expertise to discuss confidence and security-building measures, concerns about conventional forces, military transparency, and risk reduction.  It’s an organization that is rooted in a comprehensive concept of security that includes military, economic, and environmental and human security.  And it’s an organization, importantly, that’s grounded in a set of fundamental principles as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Charter for European Security, and other key documents.   

So no one thinks this is going to be an easy discussion, but it’s a necessary one, and if we wish to avoid conflict, it’s essential.  The Russian Federation has made clear that it wishes to discuss indivisibility of security, and frankly, we’re ready and willing to have that discussion.  Deputy Secretary Sherman made clear indivisibility of security does not mean one country can threaten force against another; indivisibility of security does not mean one country can invade another country’s territory; indivisibility of security does not mean one country gets to veto another country’s choice of alliances or dictate its foreign policy.   

So our message to Russia is clear:  Let’s engage in dialogue and diplomacy, not conflict and confrontation.   

The context, as I think all of you know, for today’s extraordinary OSCE meeting, it’s not lost on anyone.  Russia has amassed well over 100,000 troops on its border in one of the largest mobilizations in Europe in decades.  It is armed to the teeth with combat aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks, artillery pieces.  It’s surging ammunition and blood supplies to the border.  Russia has locked and loaded its guns and it’s pointing them at Ukraine.   

As President Biden has directed us, though, we are offering Russia the opportunity to pursue the path of diplomacy and de-escalation.  We’re ready to participate in a genuinely open, honest dialogue that hopefully produces concrete results by lowering tensions, providing more transparency, and building greater confidence.  We’re willing, together with our partners and allies, to explore creative new ideas.  But everything we do has to be grounded in respect for our core principles – the principles that all 57 OSCE states signed up to repeatedly over the last five decades and, in fact, more: sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, peaceful settlement of disputes.  These principles cannot be revised or renegotiated.   

Question – “Recently, permanent representative of Russia to the OSCE, Mr. Lukashevich, said that this organization is, and I quote, ‘an amorphous structure without international legal status, and it is unable to influence the situation in the Euro-Atlantic space,’ end quote.  What do you think?  Is the OSCE still capable of impacting processes in the region?”   

Ambassador Carpenter:  I think it’s a little bit disingenuous of some of our friends to argue that the OSCE is an amorphous structure when the Russian Federation has, at the head-of-state level, I should note, signed up to numerous OSCE declarations, starting with the Helsinki Final Act, including the Paris Charter that I referenced, the Charter for European Security, the Astana Declaration, and many, many others.   

The OSCE is a platform that is inclusive, everybody gets a voice.  Sometimes it produces results, sometimes it doesn’t.  But in the past, even at the height of tensions during the Cold War, the OSCE has been able to even spin off legally binding treaties that have advanced all of our security such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.  It has produced the pillar of European military transparency in the form of the Vienna Document.   

And so my view is the OSCE has the potential to de-escalate tensions and even produce new forms of conventional arms control.  It takes everyone sitting at the table, demonstrating political will and the desire to de-escalate and to agree on new measures that would advance their security.   

So that’s the criterion for moving forward, but the organization itself is, in fact, ideally suited to have this conversation.     

Question :  After French President Macron’s visit to Russia, there’s been talk about how the revival of the Minsk 2 agreement could help ease tensions in Ukraine.  How could the OSCE help to facilitate the proper implementation of the Minsk Protocol, and what can we learn from OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in eastern Ukraine considering the current state and shortcomings of Minsk 2 on the ground?”   

Ambassador Carpenter:  Well, that’s a great question, David.  The Minsk agreements in their totality, including the Minsk agreements of September 2014 and February 2015, offer a pathway to resolving the conflict in Ukraine between Russia and Ukraine.  And let’s remember that Russia is a signatory to those Minsk agreements, as is the OSCE.  And so it is incumbent on Russia to implement the portions of the agreements that speak to its responsibilities, but the OSCE also has a role to play, as does, of course, Ukraine.   

I would note that the Minsk agreements call first and foremost for settling and stabilizing the security situation on the ground.  So they call for a durable ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from proscribed zones, and then unfettered access for the Special Monitoring Mission that is an OSCE mission throughout the territory of Ukraine.  Those key first conditions are currently not being met because the forces that Russia leads and that Russia supplies are continuing to fire on Ukrainian positions, and now we’ve got well over 14,000 lives lost as a result of this conflict.  We have heavy weapons in the proscribed zones, and we have blockages on the ability of the OSCE’s SMM mission to monitor the full entirety of the region of Ukraine, not to mention the fact that one of the key provisions of the Minsk agreements which called for monitoring – excuse me, monitoring of the international border between Russia and Ukraine, that mission on the border was vetoed by Russia last year. 

And so we’re walking further away from implementation of the Minsk agreements rather than walking closer.  And so I’m glad that President Macron raised this issue with President Putin when he visited, but we firmly believe and we support Ukraine’s position that the resolution of the conflict lies in full implementation of those agreements.   

Question :  What areas of common ground on European security are emerging between the U.S. and Russia?  Has there been progress on agreeing rules of the road on military exercises, missile launcher deployment, troop deployments, locations of military bases, or other areas?

Ambassador Carpenter:  Well, we, the United States, have put on the table a number of proposals both in our bilateral channel at the NATO-Russia Council and now we’re launching this dialogue here at the OSCE.  And we’ve addressed a wide range of possibilities of reciprocal transparency measures regarding offensive weapons systems in Ukraine as well as measures to increase confidence regarding military exercises and manoeuvres in Europe, potential arms control measures related to missiles in Europe; and then we’ve also tabled, of course, our interest in a follow-on agreement to New START that covers all nuclear weapons, as well as ways to increase transparency and stability.   

So we’ve put quite a bit on the table.  For now, we are waiting for the Russian side to show whether it is interested in engaging on those issues or not.  And we are open, again, to having this discussion bilaterally at NATO and at OSCE.  We believe that all those issues that impinge on the security of the other 56 OSCE members should be discussed in the OSCE.  We should have that conversation where everybody is able to sit at the table.  And so right now we’re waiting for Russia to engage.    

Question :   Mr. Ambassador, when do you expect the next round of talks on Russia’s security proposals to take place at the OSCE?

Ambassador Carpenter:  Well, What I would say is that this extraordinary launch of a renewed European Security Dialogue today was at the initiative of the chairperson-in-office, Foreign Minister Rau.  Now, obviously Russia has made a number of proposals and has tabled texts in the recent past, the last few weeks.  But this proposal was done after extensive consultations with other OSCE participating states, not just Russia but including Russia, of course, but many others as well.   

And the Polish chairpersonship has focused on three broad clusters in which the discussion is going to be oriented.  The first has to do with confidence-building measures, military transparency, and conventional arms control.  The second has to do with conflict-resolution processes, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.  And then the third has to do with nonmilitary and comprehensive aspects of security, to include energy security, to include environmental security, and human security, importantly, including human rights.  And so we plan to have this discussion in all of those three clusters or all of those three tracks, if you like, going forward.  And Russia is certainly invited to come and put all of its concerns and all of its ideas on the table together with everybody else, and we will move forward.   

Question :  U.S. officials say that Russia has two paths.  Secretary of State Antony Blinken describes a path of diplomacy and dialogue or massive consequences.  After this statement and from yesterday’s and today’s meeting, what is your impression?  Which path has Russia chosen?  For example, French President Macron said there are crucial days ahead after the Putin summit.  Thank you.”   

Ambassador Carpenter:  Well, thanks for the question.  As I noted earlier in my opening comments, Russia has amassed an unprecedented force on its border with Ukraine as well as in Belarus – well over 100,000 troops on its own border with Ukraine and up to 30,000 troops, if not more, inside Belarus.  It’s armed to the teeth.  It has everything from artillery and attack helicopters to combat aircraft and every manner of enablers that’s poised and ready to attack if the order is given. 

So you’d have to ask President Putin what he intends to do next.  We have made clear that we are sharpening the choices for the Kremlin.  We’re offering our preferred path, which is the path of diplomacy and dialogue, including here at the OSCE, but also, as I’ve said earlier, at NATO and bilaterally, and we’re willing to engage on all the concerns that Russia wants to put on the table.  We’re of course going to put our concerns on the table too, together with those of our partners and allies.  But we’re willing to have that conversation in an honest and open manner.   

Now, on the flip side, if Russia chooses the path of military escalation – God forbid, but if it does – then we’re prepared to impose what have been described as massive and unprecedented consequences.  And by “we,” I mean not just the United States but the entire G7, the entire North Atlantic Alliance, NATO, as well as the European Council, which has also coordinated very closely with the United States.   

So the choice is President Putin’s to make, and I don’t – I can’t tell you what choice he’s going to take.  But that is, roughly speaking, the sharpened choices that we have presented going forward.   

Question :   Do you believe Hungary’s deference to Russia in recent weeks has empowered the Kremlin?  And do you expect the OSCE’s recommendation of an election observation mission to Hungary to affect that government’s actions with regards to Russia?

Ambassador Carpenter:  I’ll take your second question first, which is that no, I do not expect the OSCE’s recommendation to have a full election observation mission in Hungary will have any consequences with regards to our Hungarian allies’ orientation vis-à-vis Russia.  I think they have said they will welcome the OSCE mission and we hope it does its job just like OSCE election observation missions do in every country where they deploy.   

As for the first part of your question, I will note that Prime Minister Orban did travel to Moscow and had an extensive meeting with President Putin.  We believe that our Hungarian allies would be very concerned if Russia was again to violate borders in the heart of Europe, meaning specifically the borders of Ukraine.  They have said that they support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and today at the renewed European Security Dialogue they have endorsed the process that was launched by Foreign Minister Rau.   

So we hope that they continue to forcefully advocate for dialogue and diplomacy, which we also believe in.   

Question :  How long is this discussion within the OSCE scheduled to endure?  What kind of OSCE resources will it require?  And has Russia already committed to supplying the OSCE secretariat with the resources required to conduct these discussions? 

Ambassador Carpenter:  Well, this is an open-ended dialogue.  There is no specific end date to this process.  We’re willing to sit down and have these discussions for as long as it takes, and we’re ready to dive in and drill down very deep on the specific issues.  One of the reasons why the OSCE is an ideal format in which to have these talks is because we have, as I said earlier, the military and political-military expertise to be able to discuss military transparency and confidence building and risk reduction.   

And that expertise, most of it is resident here in the forms of our arms control delegates and our delegations that participate every week in discussions on these topics.  And so we don’t need additional resources to be able to pursue this dialogue; this is essentially what the OSCE was created to do in the first place, beginning with the CSCE process that was launched in the mid-1970s with the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act all the way through to today.  So we’re prepared to extend this offer to have the dialogue for as long as it needs to happen so that we can hopefully have some space to arrive at common ground.   

Question :  President Biden said that most of those demands are non-starters, and he also reflected that right now that has generally been the view of much of NATO and OSCE as well.  So what is there for Moscow and Washington to talk about today?  

Ambassador Carpenter:  Let me clarify.  So what we have said consistently for many, many weeks and months now is that there is no trade space on the core principles of the international order, and that means no trade space on sovereignty, on territorial integrity, on no allowance for spheres of influence, no ability of one state to veto another state’s foreign policy or its decision whether to join or not join alliances.  That’s all off the table.  

But what is on the table is a discussion in detail on issues like missile placement in Europe, which we’re prepared to have in a bilateral context, of course in consultation with our allies and partners; also a discussion of military transparency, which we think the OSCE is the right forum to have that discussion; also confidence-building measures, which could be discussed both in NATO or at the OSCE.  There’s any number of ideas pertaining to conventional arms control writ large in the broadest meaning of that term that we would be happy to discuss with Russia if they want to get down and have a serious discussion of specifics.   

As I said earlier, we’re willing to drill down on those topics, but we’re not willing to entertain dilutions or renegotiations of our core principles.   

Question :  Thank you very much.  And I believe we have time for one more question, and we have two questions on this topic so we’ll go to Paul Shinkman from U.S. News and World Report again.  And the question is this:  “How can the U.S. be so definitive that Nord Stream 2 will be shut down if Russia invades since Germany itself has not stated definitively that it would do so?  And have you seen any indication that President Biden’s assertions yesterday about the pipeline have had any effect on the Kremlin?”   

Ambassador Carpenter:  Well, I can tell you that the President was extremely clear that if Russia invades Ukraine, one way or another, Nord Stream 2 will not move forward.  And we – he had very good meetings with the German chancellor in Washington, and we have had extensive consultations with our German allies over the course of the last many, many weeks and months, in fact since July of last year where we arrived at an agreement in terms of Russia’s use of energy and how that impacts European security.  And we’re going to continue to have those consultations as we go forward.   

Ambassador Carpenter:  Thanks.  I don’t have much in the way of closing remarks.  Let me just reiterate what I repeated earlier on a couple occasions, which is that this is a critical inflection point, and we believe there is a path forward that is a diplomatic path and that will entertain serious conversations about European security and how we can lower tensions and strengthen confidence-building measures and strengthen transparency and find ways potentially to have reciprocal restraint.  But we hope that Russia joins this process because the alternative, frankly, is a disaster for European security; it’s a humanitarian disaster; and it’s a strategic catastrophe for Russia because it will set Ukraine even further and more staunchly against Russia for decades and generations to come if there is, in fact, a Russian military escalation in the near term. 

And so we’re prepared either way, but we are offering this path of diplomacy and dialogue as an alternative, and it’s a serious one.  Thanks very much for joining.   

Moderator:  Thank you very much, Ambassador Carpenter, and thank you to all of our journalists for their questions.  Shortly we’ll be sending the audio recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists and we’ll provide a transcript as soon as it is available.