The US-Ukraine co-hosted multinational Sea Breeze-2020 military exercises, which started on July 20, were completed on Monday in the Black Sea after all the planned maneuver tasks were fulfilled. 

About 2,000 servicemen from nine countries, more than 20 warships, as well as aircraft and helicopters, participated in the naval drills.

US Captain Joseph Gagliano said during a press conference that was held via phone that over 50 countries were invited to take part in future drills in a move to broaden foreign participation in the exercises.

Below is a full rush transcript of the Briefing with Captain Joseph A. Gagliano Commodore, CTF 65 and CDS 60 and Captain William C. Pennington Commodore, CTF 67 Sigonella and Captain Oleksii Doskato Exercise-Conducting Officer for the Ukrainian Navy.

Captain Doskato: I am Captain Oleksii Doskato, deputy Ukrainian naval commander and officer executive exercise from Ukrainian side. I would like to congratulate everyone and everybody on successful finishing up of Sea Breeze exercise 2020. Summing up the results of our one-week exercise, I would like to pay your attention on the following positions. Exercise – Ukrainian-American exercise Sea Breeze, which we have been conducting starting from 1997, is the main and extremely important sector of our – of strengthening of our cooperation and regional security. All exercise – all trainings and tasks that we have conducted showed to the world that we are ready for ensure the security, the maritime security; our unity in our opinions for stability, for security, and for the peace in the Black Sea.

It is extremely important, especially today while the situation in the region is very strained, and Russian Federation is showing an aggression according to Ukraine, and occupied Ukrainian Crimea, and is trying to ignore all maritime rules at the sea. Our response to its aggression was very strong. Our crew, our COs, showed our readiness to stop this aggression. And this is the main aim of our success.

Unfortunately, world pandemia has changed our plans, but we are all together, alongside, we overcome this challenge. We changed the format of our exercises but we – but we leave the main aim: the maritime security, the ensuring of maritime security in the Black Sea region. We also conducted our experience – we also received an experience of this distance planning, which showed a high level of our interoperability and readiness for conducting mutual training. All participants successfully conducted exercises on tactical maneuvering, IW, air defense, replenishment at sea, and so on. This year also, during exercise, it was first time when we conducted our distance air assault, also by helicopters. We also successfully conducted escorting by helicopters.

Fully and totally, we conducted more than 1,471 by our ships, 50 hours of flying, and we conducted all our tasks according to the plan. More than 2,000 personnel participated in the exercise, about 23 ships and boats, and about 19 aircraft.

I would like to thank each and every one for high level of work and mutual training and for  conducting this exercise. Thank you for your attention.

Captain Gagliano:  I’m calling in from Rota, Spain, from our headquarters at Task Force 65. I am the Commander for Task Force 65, which is the Commander of U.S. Surface Forces in Europe. During Sea Breeze 2020, I oversaw the exercise from the U.S. side and I provided advice and guidance to our Ukrainian partners during the exercise, who were leading the exercise from Odessa.

I’m happy to join you on the call today to discuss Sea Breeze 2020. We had a great opportunity on this past Friday to review the success of this exercise with the leaders from all eight participating nations, and it’s a pleasure to share the good news here with you as well. Thank you.

Captain Pennington: Good morning, this is Commodore Bill Pennington. I am the Commander of Task Force 67, headquartered in Sigonella, Sicily, in Italy. We are responsible for the command and control in operations of all expeditionary naval aviation assets for the U.S. Navy in the European and African theaters. That mainly is in support of maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.

We provided support to CTF-65 and our Ukrainian partners for exercise Sea Breeze this year, and we look forward to discussing a lot of the great accomplishments that occurred in this very robust exercise. Thank you.

Question: In the last 23 years, what remained the same and what parts of the exercise changed or evolved? And the second question: Did Russia’s annexation of Crimea change the planning of the Sea Breeze and the real execution of the exercise? And the third question: This year, the number of non-Black Sea participants is lower than usual because of COVID-19. What effects – or what effects the number of non-Black Sea countries participating from year to year?

So maybe we could start with Commodore Gagliano.

Captain Gagliano: Thank you. We’ve certainly seen a lot of change over the last 23 years of the execution of Sea Breeze. Most notably is the number of participants. Before COVID set in, on this exercise, we had the most number of participants we were ever going to have, including Japan that was going to participate for the very first time. So I think the complexity of the exercise increases every time you add new nations, new navies, and in some cases new coast guards to the mix.

Regarding the Russian annexation, when we operate or we plan for Sea Breeze, we don’t design our plans around a specific threat, and our approach is that we’re trying to establish stability and security in a very dynamic security environment. And what we mean by “dynamic security environment” is that we don’t know how threats may change over time. We don’t know what might be a threat to security and stability, in this case in the Black Sea. So what we try to do is we set out a series of exercises that will improve our interoperability and our ability to fight together so that whatever the threat to security and stability is, we can respond to it together and we can maintain our commitment to defending Europe as a whole.

Lastly, on the question on COVID, it certainly changed how we’ve done it in the past. For our staff here, we are accustomed to conducting Sea Breeze from inside Ukraine, from Odessa and on board the ships, and in this case, like everyone else, we were running this exercise from a distance, which, on one hand, had us further away from the exercise, which is something we were not looking forward to; but on the other hand, it put us in a position where we had to get better at managing forces from afar, and in our effort throughout Sea Breeze to increase interoperability between forces, that was in fact the silver lining to all this – is that we demonstrated that we don’t have to be co-located with our Ukrainian partners to have an effective exercise. We were able to do it from a distance. So we appreciated that aspect of it.

Question : Do you have any remarks to make about how this exercise has evolved over the last 20 years and the effects of COVID-19 on this year’s exercise?

Captain Doskato: I would like to mention that during these 23 years, we have a great progress in the planning of this exercise and conducting it. From, so to say, serial Sea Breeze – we started from, so to say, serial Sea Breeze and we come to larger exercise , training of our operational HQ as well as technical HQ and our personnel. Unfortunately, as I have mentioned before, world pandemia has changed our plans. We have changed the format of our exercise Sea Breeze this year, but our mutual cooperation gives gives us the opportunity to operate with this exercise distantly. And I think that it is the main achievement of this year’s Sea Breeze exercise.

As for the less participants of this exercise, it had been planned for more countries to participate, but as I have already mentioned, due to pandemia , it was a kind to stop seeking. 

Question : As Sea Breeze progresses into the next decade, what are the goals for future iterations of Sea Breeze?

Captain Gagliano: I think our biggest hope for the next decade is that we can expand the number of participating countries. Last year we had 22 countries participate; this year, before COVID set in, we had planned for 27; and next year we’ve invited more than 50 countries to participate. I think what that demonstrates is that – is that we have a shared global interest in the international community to security and stability in the Black Sea, and the more countries that we can have participate, the more we can align behind that idea and build interoperability between all of us and increase the capacity of our partner nations.

So the more complex the exercise can become, the more efficient we can become as an international community responding to any type of threat to security and stability in the Black Sea.

Question : Commodore Pennington, do you have anything to add?

Captain Pennington: The increased participants and getting behind the concept of maritime security in the Black Sea is incredibly important. Increasing the complexity and the interoperability between our forces – I think we will see that continue on a trajectory where it increases the complexity. And you can say, this year, the challenge that COVID presented, we’ve been able to capitalize on the Sea Breeze exercises in the past to be able to conduct this from distance, and it really just goes to show how important exercises like these are for the units to work together and to have that shared understanding as we get after that cooperative maritime security in the Black Sea.

So I think going into the future, that increased complexity and increased participation is what we’re looking for.

Question : Thank you very much. Captain Doskato, do you have any comments about the future of exercise Sea Breeze?

Captain Doskato: I would like to support the previous speakers and also, I would like to mention that we have to prepare [inaudible] plan of Sea Breeze exercise in order for our forces to to prepare our forces to be ready for any challenges in the future.

Question : Have there been any Russian disinformation activities surrounding the exercise that you can share? The Russian MoD tweeted videos last week of a purported intercept of an American P-8 over the Black Sea that was apparently old footage, So why don’t we ask Commodore Gagliano, do you have any comments on Russian disinformation?

Captain Gagliano: No, our role in executing the exercise wasn’t disrupted by that at all. It’s not something I track very closely just because I was working with the forces that were in the exercise, so any external noise that’s coming from Russia really didn’t have any impact on us.

Question : And, Captain Doskato, do you have any comments on possible Russian disinformation connected to Sea Breeze?

Captain Doskato: I totally agree with the previous speaker that the Russian Federation had no impact on our training and conducting of our exercise.

Captain Doskato: I would like to share my thanks with the 6th Fleet U.S. commander and to the government – U.S. Government, as well as all governments of all exercise participants which participated in this exercise Sea Breeze 2020. Alongside, we successfully prepared our forces and achieved all goals, so that the success of this year’s exercise is the achievement of everyone and each one.

Thank you very much for your support of Ukraine. I wish all participants safe in coming back home. Thank you for your attention and I am looking forward to seeing you next year for Sea Breeze 2021. Thank you.

Captain Gagliano: Just one final thought on Sea Breeze. The power of this network of allies and partners that we’ve built in Europe over the last many decades is really borne out every time we can arrive together and operate together. This network of allies and partners are able to bring forces together when required, and then spread them out when not required, and this is just one more example of how we can bring forces together in a combination of both NATO allies and Partnership for Peace countries into one area where we’re committed to stability and security in the Black Sea.

I look forward to continuing this exercise, I look forward to Sea Breeze 2021, and I look forward to bringing even more nations together next year as we work together towards this goal. Thank you.

Captain Pennington: I, too, echo the comments of the previous speakers. I think we’re looking forward to Sea Breeze 2021 to build off of what we accomplished in 2020, and I think it’s something not to lose sight of to be able to conduct this type of exercise with allies and partners that have that shared vision of peace and stability in the Black Sea during a global pandemic. It just speaks to the relationships and the importance of that. And it was a fantastic exercise from our perspective, and we look forward to next year.

Hafez Bashar al-Assad, the eldest son of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, is named in the latest list of 14 senior Syrian regime officials and entities sanctioned by the US State Department under the so-called Caesar Act.

The designations, focusing on the “barbarous First Division of the Syrian Army”, are the second wave of sanctions to be applied under the act following the first move by the US State Department on 17 June.

The first wave attacked the businessmen that have bankrolled Assad, with secondary sanctions designed to discourage any other external actor having any dealings with the Assad business circle.

No sanctions were imposed on Russia or Assad supporters in the Middle East outside Syria, but the US urged everyone to wind down all connections with the Syrian regime.

The US deputy assistant secretary of state, Joel Rayburn, said the sanctions were timed to be introduced in the week of some of the worst atrocities committed by the Assad regime in 2011 and 2019.

Asked why Assad’s teenage son had been added to the list – he was born in 2001 – Rayburn said: “There has been a trend of senior Syrian regime actors and business people who have been active in the regime to do business through their adult family members to evade sanctions.

“It seems very clear that the immediate family of Bashar al-Assad and their in-laws are attempting to consolidate economic power inside Syria so that they could use this to further consolidate political power.”

He said: “Assad would only use such power to strengthen the killing machine against the Syrian people”. He denied that the sanctions would have any impact on humanitarian trade or on the economy of Lebanon.

The steady drumbeat of sanctions, mimicking a US policy long adopted elsewhere in the Middle East notably Iran, reveals a determination in Washington to use non-military leverage to force the Assad regime to negotiate the terms of a political settlement with the largely routed opposition.

Syria is stuck in a stalemate with Assad’s Iranian and Russian backers unable to destroy the last opposition stronghold in Idlib, but Assad himself is adamant that he will not cooperate with the UN-led peace process, including on a new constitution for the country.

The UN security council has most recently deadlocked about the number of humanitarian cross border crossings into Syria with Russia and China insisting that only one could be allowed. The deadlock came as coronavirus started to creep into refugee camps in and around Syria.

The Caesar sanctions, passed into law in December 2019, are named in memory of the Syrian code named Caesar that smuggled photos out of Syria showing the scale of atrocities in Assad’s prisons.

Rayburn vowed “this is a campaign that will continue. This is going to be the summer of Caesar.”

He insisted the sanctions were having a chilling effect on expected external investment into Syria.

Below is a full rush transcript of the Briefing with Joel D. Rayburn, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Envoy for Syria, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

DAS Rayburn: I appreciate everyone being with us today. Just a few minutes ago, Secretary Michael Pompeo released a statement announcing that today the State Department and the Treasury Department are continuing the United States sanctions campaign against the Assad regime by releasing 14 new designations under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act and other authorities. This is a campaign that began last month with the first round of Caesar Act designations on June 17th. I want to highlight that today, within the United States Government, we have named today’s tranche of designations the Hama and Maarat Al-Numan sanctions, and these names are meant to memorialize the victims of two of the Assad regime’s most notorious atrocities, both of which occurred in this week in 2011 and 2019, respectively.

Nine years ago, Bashar al-Assad’s troops carried out a brutal siege of the city of Hama, killing scores of peaceful protesters in a shocking sign of what was to come. And this week one year ago, the Assad regime and its allies bombed a busy marketplace in Maarat Al-Numan, killing 42 innocent Syrians.

The Department of State and the Department of Treasury together are committed to increasing the economic and financial pressure on the Assad regime, and one of the ways we are doing this is through our various sanctions regimes, to include the Syria – the Caesar Act, which was signed into law by the President in December 2019. As you have seen by our announcement on June 17th and this morning, we have now designated since June 17th more than 50 of Bashar al-Assad’s key supporters and their businesses, as well as some key military units that act either in or on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Regardless of whether these actors are designated pursuant to the Caesar Act itself or under other executive orders, we view them all as in-line – all these designations, I should say as in-line with the goals of the Caesar Act given that the legislation imposes sanctions on anyone who engages in significant business with people who are sanctioned with respect to Syria in other words, secondary sanctions. This steady drumbeat of designations on persons or entities that support the Assad regime will continue until Bashar al-Assad and his regime cease obstructing a peaceful political resolution of the conflict, as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

The Caesar Act seeks to deny the Assad regime the financial resources that his regime uses to fuel its campaign of violence and destruction that has killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, and it’s meant to send a clear signal that no external actor should enter into business with or otherwise enrich such a regime.

None of our Syria sanctions targets the humanitarian sector nor the legitimate trade of food or medicine that the Syrian people need or that regional neighbors export to the benefit of the Syrian people. We have clear waivers and general licenses in place that support the efforts of the humanitarian sector. And as we have also said in the past, the Caesar Act sanctions are not directed at harming Lebanon’s economy or the Lebanese people, and we believe they will not have a significant impact on legitimate economic activity in Lebanon.

Today’s State Department designations highlight the corrupt duplicity of the Assad regime. We have designated Bashar al-Assad’s barbarous First Division of the Syrian Arab Army. And instead of protecting the Syrian people, the First Division and other units of the Syrian military have attacked civilians with ruthless disregard for human life, and at the same time some of these military entities have developed extensive networks to divert assistance away from the Syrian people, to impose taxes on all goods, and, put simply, to enrich themselves off the misery of the Syrian people, and the First Division is certainly a prime example of that kind of behavior.

Today the State Department also designated Bashar al-Assad’s adult son Hafez Bashar al-Assad. The Assad and Akhras families should not enjoy the right to do business with anyone involved in the U.S. or EU financial sectors, or consider visiting the U.S. or Europe, while they arbitrarily detain, torture, and murder thousands of civilians.

Question: How do you view the sanctions’ effect on the Syrian regime and its supporters so far? And to what extent can these sanctions push the regime to engage in the peace process in the future?

DAS Rayburn: We think of course it’s early days to see the overall effect of the sanctions, but we do believe that the sanctions under the Caesar Act are already having an effect on the thinking of those inside the regime and those who are supporters of the Assad regime. We do believe that they are getting the message loud and clear that these economic sanctions will continue until they accede to a political solution, as called for by UNSCR 2254.

Question: The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus over a year ago. What level of business are you seeing between the UAE, which is an important U.S. ally, and Syria, and does that concern you? And then to talk about secondary sanctions, what about the assets of sanctioned individuals who have bank accounts and et cetera and businesses in the UAE, and will you start targeting banks who do business with these sanctioned individuals outside of Syria?

DAS Rayburn: There’s no exemption based on where people reside. There’s no exemption to the Caesar Act based on where people reside. And we have been – we have been sending very strong messages through diplomatic channels, and now obviously in our public statements, to tell our friends that everyone should respect the Caesar Act, the provisions in the Caesar Act. 

We can make no exceptions. And we’ve also urged our friends in many places around the world to wind down their business if they are involved with sanctioned individuals and entities or those that are likely to be sanctioned, and to not put us in the position of having to sanction them instead of spending our time sanctioning the Syrian regime and its associates. We’ve made very clear that we will not hold back from doing that, but we’ve really urged everyone not to put us in that position.

So far, we think that the sanctions are having a chilling effect on what was expected to be outside investment coming into Damascus, and we are – we are watchful for any such violations, and we will enforce the provisions in the Caesar Act no matter upon whom.

Question: You mentioned that you’ve already been discussing this with other jurisdictions and allies. Has there been any tangible impact? Have bank accounts been closed? Have banks or businesses or governments in other jurisdictions – I’m particularly thinking the UAE – taken any action that you can make us aware of?

DAS Rayburn: I think the thing that we would look for most is, has the investment happened? I mean the investment that I think people were expecting to come, I mean, not just from the Gulf region but from elsewhere. And it’s not materializing in the way that the Assad regime and its friends had hoped it would, and we think the Caesar Act and the other authorities that we’ve been able to – that we’ve demonstrated we will enforce have a big part in that.

Question: The comprehensive military agreement between Iran and Syria violated the UN arms embargo on Iran as well as the Caesar Act. Will the U.S. allow such agreement between Syria and Iran? What are you going to do to stop it?

DAS Rayburn: Iran’s only contributions to Syria – the Iranian regime’s only contributions to Syria so far have been violence and instability. And it’s not just that such activity, such military aid to the Assad regime, violates the Caesar Act; it’s pledged to – the Iranian regime’s pledge to export military equipment to Syria is in blatant defiance of the UN arms embargo under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and it’s a further demonstration of why we in the United States think it’s an imperative that the Security Council must act to extend the arms embargo on Iran.

Iranian regime support to the Assad regime has enabled Assad to commit mass atrocities against the Syrian people, it’s prolonged what is a brutal, needless war, and it’s contributed to the deaths of more than half a million people and the displacement of 11 million more Syrians. If Iran were truly concerned about the wellbeing and safety of the Syrian people, the Iranian regime would support the UN-led Syria political process under UNSCR 2254. 

The Iranian regime would withdraw the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hizballah, and other Iranian-backed terrorist forces that are under Iranian regime command from the entirety of Syria, and would embrace a political solution rather than a brutal military victory.

So it’s certainly not constructive for the Iranian regime to be seeking to deepen its military involvement in Syria through a military agreement with the Assad regime.

Question: If you can elaborate on the Lebanon part. Does Wassim al-Qattan have any investment or links in Lebanon? And on that same topic, the Lebanese Government seems to be seeking exemptions for the Caesar Act when it comes to electricity imports from Syria. Is that something that the U.S. is willing to consider?

DAS Rayburn: Okay, for Wassim Qattan, any specific Lebanese involvement, I don’t have that, Joyce. I can speak with the Treasury Department and get you a detailed answer on that. I know that the – I know the companies that we designated today that Wassim Qattan is involved with, whether he has any other overlapping interests maybe in companies that are not his own, I would have to check on.

In terms  of the Lebanese Government and any requests for exemptions, of course we have an established process to review requests for exemptions or licenses. we are looking at a number of those from different directions, and we haven’t made a decision on those. I would say that the bar would be very high for us to consider allowing a waiver or a license for activity that significantly benefited the Assad regime. We also in terms of Lebanon’s electricity situation, as I’ve pointed out in the past, the Assad regime is not the answer to Lebanon’s electricity difficulties. We know those electricity difficulties in Lebanon are extensive, but also, I mean, the Lebanese electricity sector, I think everyone recognizes that it’s going to have to undergo some significant head-to-toe reform if it’s to be put in a position to deliver basic electricity needs to the Lebanese people.

Question: How will the U.S. administration deal with Russia in light of its refusal of the sanctions imposed on Syria, and are you having talks with Moscow about this? And in light of the multiple sanctions imposed on Syria, how will Caesar sanctions affect the Syrian regime without harming the Syrian people?

DAS Rayburn: What’s harming the Syrian people, overwhelmingly, is the – is Bashar al-Assad and his regime’s atrocities against the Syrian people, not sanctions. And the sanctions that are being imposed on the Assad regime are actually meant to protect the Syrian people by trying to defer Bashar al-Assad – deter Bashar al-Assad and his friends from carrying out the atrocities against the Syrian people. But let’s be plain: the author of the Syrian people’s misery is Bashar al-Assad, that overwhelmingly he and his regime are to blame for the more than nine years of attacks that they have carried out against the Syrian people.

Now, we on the U.S. side, and I know our European allies are the same, we are conscientious about the suffering of the Syrian people, and that is why the Caesar Act has already written into it, in the law, the exemptions for humanitarian activity, for agricultural products and medical products and so on, so that those can continue to flow to the Syrian people in spite of the Assad regime’s behavior toward the Syrian people.

it’s a lie that the regime and its friends are promulgating that sanctions are the cause of the misery inside Syria right now. Very clearly, it’s Bashar al-Assad’s choices and the behavior of his regime. Since – Bashar al-Assad, since April 2019, made the decision to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a campaign to attack the people of Idlib instead of using that money to provide basic necessities for the Syrian people. That’s where the resources have gone, in addition to that vast corruption that takes place inside the Syrian regime, which diverts aid away from the Syrian people, which attempts to move money illicitly and to have illicit business empires, many of which we’re trying to shut down, both in the past and now. That’s why there are shortages inside Syria. It’s the regime, it’s Bashar al-Assad who is the author of all this.

And the first aspect of the question, of how will we deal with Russia in light of the sanctions. We are in very close consultation with our Russian counterparts all the time, and we continue to urge them to use the influence that they have on the Assad regime and we believe that that influence is quite extensive to use that influence to press the Assad regime to accede to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and to a political solution to the Syrian conflict.

Question: Are Iraqis going to be affected by these sanctions? Are they dealing with Syria in a way that is illegal, in your judgment?

DAS Rayburn: I think the answer is that we have seen for a long time the Iraqi militias, the Iraqi militant groups that are sponsored by the Iranian regime, have been dealing with the Syrian regime in a way that would clearly violate both the letter and the spirit of the Caesar Act as well as UN Security Council resolutions. So the answer is yes, there is some of that activity that goes on back and forth, and the Caesar Act is a tool that we will look at to try to deter that activity.

Question: I wanted to ask if the U.S. administration plans to intensify its diplomatic engagement with – with all partners, essentially, to look for that political solution that you mentioned before; or, alternatively, you are going to only intensify the sanctions – you’re going to only strengthen the sanctions regime as – and use it as the only tool in your toolbox?

DAS Rayburn: The sanctions, the U.S. sanctions, the intention of them is to enable diplomacy; it’s meant to enable a peaceful political solution to be achieved by diplomacy to the Syrian conflict. So sanctions are not a standalone tool. Sanctions can raise economic pressure on the Assad regime and its allies, but we also will continue to seek to raise political pressure. We will seek through intense diplomacy, which we do have, to try to press the Assad regime and its allies to come to the table in a meaningful way and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2254. It’s very straightforward. There are no hidden plans. it’s United States policy is to implement 2254.

Question: Can you please elaborate on the logic behind sanctioning Hafez al-Assad?

DAS Rayburn: There has been a trend among senior Syrian regime actors, both officials and businesspeople who are acting on behalf of the Assad regime, to do business through their adult family members to try to evade sanctions in that way. It’s also clear that there has been a rise to prominence among the war profiteers of Syria of the Akhras family. So we intend for today’s designation of Hafez Bashar al-Assad – it’s as a part of that. You would see in the past, for example, that we have designated the adult family members of Mohammed Hamsho and a few others. That is the trend because it has been such a prominent trend among Syrian regime actors to use their adult family members, whether those are siblings or children, to try to continue business in their place after being sanctioned.

Question: Related to Hafez Bashar al-Assad. I mean, the 17th of June you sanctioned Asma al-Assad, and now you’re sanctioning Hafez al-Assad. Is there any political message behind this or is it just related to economic and to the – just to the economic dimension? Is there any political dimension to that?

DAS Rayburn: we view them as one and the same, Ibrahim, the political and the economic, because it seems very clear that the immediate family of Bashar al-Assad and the in-laws together are attempting to consolidate economic power inside the Syrian regime, which they then would no doubt use to try to further consolidate political power. So for us, the point of the sanctions is to try to prevent the Assad regime from consolidating that kind of economic control, which it would then use to perpetuate the war and to perpetuate the killing machine against the Syrian people. So we view very much that, just as I think you would probably find with the Syrian regime’s inner circle view, that economic power and the political aspects are very closely, closely related.

DAS Rayburn: I would just like to say that as we’ve said before, this is a campaign that will continue. This will continue to be the summer of Caesar. We will continue these kinds of sanctions designations in the coming weeks and months and there will be no end to them until the Syrian regime and its allies accede to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2254 and put a stop to their attacks against the Syrian people so that the Syrian people can begin to heal from this conflict.

“In terms of flights, I really should redirect you to the airlines. They are the ones who make these decisions. In terms of admitting citizens – we are constantly re-evaluating and studying how this relates to the latest developments with the COVID-19 pandemic. In terms of travel restrictions, visa restrictions that we have introduced,” Free News reports the words of acting assistant Secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Reeker.

On Thursday, US Acting Assistant Secretary of State Philip Reeker said during a telephone press briefing in response to a Media question that air carriers themselves will make decisions on the resumption of air service between Russia and the US. Meanwhile, the US government will estimate the prospects of canceling the border restrictions introduced earlier.

Below is a full rush transcript of the Briefing with Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of European and Eurasian Affairs.

Ambassador Reeker: It’s really great to be back in Brussels. I guess I always say that, but this time I really mean it. This is my first trip since March the 12th, when I went back to Washington thinking we might go into a lockdown, like so many countries, as we faced the COVID-19 pandemic, and of course this ended up now being four-plus months, and we’re able now, traveling with Secretary Pompeo to London.

We flew in Monday, and it was the Secretary’s first overnight trip since COVID, taking all the appropriate precautions, but a chance to engage with our UK colleagues, counterparts. Of course, the Secretary met with Prime Minister Johnson and Foreign Secretary Raab. I think you would have seen the press conference that the foreign secretary and Secretary Pompeo held. We also had a chance to meet, of course, with our embassy team.  And the FCO, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, hosted a roundtable with British and American businesses which was a very useful chance to hear about their concerns, their priorities in terms of COVID recovery, economic recovery, and reopening being a priority for all of us, trying to do that safely and securely, working on travel restrictions and easing of those in terms of some of the waivers and exceptions, on both sides of the Atlantic, we’ve been able to do to start up again travel possibilities as part of our economic recovery. So I think it was a very successful and useful visit in London.

The Secretary then went on yesterday morning, Wednesday morning, to Copenhagen. This, of course, was a chance to visit after our earlier visit last year had been postponed, but a great opportunity to engage with our Danish allies, partners. We have a tremendous partnership with Denmark in so many areas: security, the prosperity agenda, also, of course, talking about COVID-19 and how we – steps we can take to recover our economies, and talking about the Danes’ preparation to take over leadership and command in Iraq of NATO operations there. There’s just a whole list of things that we work on together with Denmark.  And, of course, we talked about the Arctic, which, as you know, has been a strategic priority for us in terms of Arctic security.  And we had a really interesting and useful quadrilateral meeting with the foreign ministers of Denmark, of Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, so those three parts of the Kingdom of Denmark coming together with Secretary Pompeo to talk about engagement there. You may all be aware that we recently reopened, after many years, our consulate in Nuuk, in Greenland. We have now a presence there. It’s something that the Secretary helped spearhead for us. We had a good chat with the Faroese as well, a dialogue there, and, of course, doing this all in conjunction with our Danish colleagues. So, really, a great visit there.

The Secretary headed back yesterday to Washington and today he’s headed to California. You will have seen that he’ll be giving a speech at the Nixon Library there, talking about China.

I took the opportunity to come on down here this morning to Brussels and had some bilateral meetings with Belgian counterparts today, and then tomorrow I’ll meet with a long list of EU counterparts. It’s great to be able to do this in person again, although we’ve kept up good diplomatic contacts and connections over these months through the various platforms, just as we’ve tried through things like these calls to continue our engagement with you, our colleagues in the press. I hope to have a chance to discuss a whole range of issues with EU counterparts, but that will include the U.S.-EU dialogue about China, which High Representative Borrell proposed and the Secretary of State accepted. We’re excited about being able to do that. It’s a good opportunity to exchange views and thoughts as we all look at the concerns we have regarding some of the Chinese activity. You know we’ve talked about 5G, we’ve talked about human rights, Hong Kong, so we’re going to be working on the agenda and the plans for that dialogue, and it’s really a chance to review a whole set of transatlantic engagements that we carry out with the EU.

Let me stop there. I will be flying back then Saturday morning to Washington, but I do hope this is the beginning of more opportunities to travel. Of course, we’re watching very closely how things evolve with COVID. It’s one of the things that we spend a lot of time with our EU counterparts on, is making sure that we can restart more travel but do it safely, according to epidemiological information and working closely not only on the transport side of things, but the broader economic recovery plans as well.

Question: What Turkey is doing against Greece and Cyprus. President Trump and Secretary Pompeo asked, as I understand, Can you tell us what is going on there?

Ambassador Reeker: Well, I would note, as you’ve heard, that the United States has been deeply concerned by Turkey’s stated plans to survey for natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. We’re concerned about actions that are provocative and raise tensions in the region. Resource development in the Eastern Med, I think, is something that should promote cooperation. This is something that can provide a foundation for durable energy security and economic prosperity throughout the region. You know as well as I do that this is a complex strategic space. We want our friends and allies – and let’s remember, we’re all, Turkey, Greece, and the United States, all NATO allies – we want friends and allies in the region to approach these issues in a spirit of cooperation. And I would just echo the message that we’ve given before from Washington as well as elsewhere in Europe, urging Turkish authorities to halt operations that raise tensions, and we’ll continue to urge that message.

I think you may have seen comments today from Ambassador Pyatt in Alexandroupoli as well. So we keep in touch with both of our embassies in Athens and in Ankara, monitoring this situation very closely.

Question: Albanians respect you a lot. Prime Minister Rama broke the election reform agreement, which was signed in the U.S. Embassy. Is State Department going to tolerate ?

Ambassador Reeker: We think it was an important step in the right direction. We’re pleased that Ambassador Kim has been able to help, and help Albania move in that direction. Albania is a NATO ally, a candidate for EU membership, and has come a long way in many years. As you know, I’ve been involved in that part of the world for a long time, and we want to see positive developments in Albania, and it’s important that we see the election reform. It’s important that all sides of the political spectrum participate in the institutions. That’s what democracy is all about and that’s what we’ll continue to engage in and to monitor and to encourage from all parts of the Albanian political spectrum.

Question: According to the Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2021, 15 percent of the funds that was made available under assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia for direct assistance to the central Government of Georgia may not be obligated until the Secretary of State determines and reports to the committees on appropriations that Georgian Government is taking effective steps to strengthen democratic institutions, combat corruption, and ensure that the rule of law in the private sector is consistent with internationally recognized standards. Ambassador, this is a very unprecedented event when it comes to the Georgian Government, and your answer will be very much important on this. How serious is this cutting 15 percent of the foreign aid to Georgia? And what Georgian people should expect from the State Department to report to the relevant committees?

Ambassador Reeker: Well, thanks for the question because, certainly, we pay a lot of attention to the Caucasus. We have strong relationships there, and that includes, of course, with the Republic of Georgia, which is an important partner in so many ways and has been for many years. I don’t want to delve into congressional views and legislation and get ahead of any steps that may be taken or determinations that may be made, but what I can tell you is that we continue to work very closely with Georgia. Our embassy there, under Ambassador Degnan, remains extremely active and we’re in close touch with them. I’d hoped to travel to Georgia and the Caucasus just when the COVID pandemic brought all of that travel to a standstill, and I’d like to resurrect those travel plans. So we’re watching conditions closely and hope to get back out there and continue that.

But regardless of travel by senior officials, it’s what happens on the ground that is important, and certainly our embassy remains in very close contact on that and we will continue to monitor the situation and also, of course, keep in close touch with Congress, which has a great interest in the region as well.

Question: My question about relations between Kosovo and Serbia. What is the state of play in terms of American engagement now that the European Union has taken again, as they claim, the driver’s seat? Is there any cooperation or coordination between Washington and Brussels, or you’re going to continue with two separate processes, as it was the case until June 24th? And on that note, has U.S. administration had any kind of contact with Kosovo President Hashim Thaci since the confirmation that he is being charged about war crimes and crimes against humanity? 

Ambassador Reeker: As you know, I have a long history on that region and, indeed, on that process, having supported, when I was deputy assistant secretary some years back, the European Union’s very robust and important activities through the dialogue toward normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. That still remains an important priority for us. We think they need to work to find solutions, so we certainly welcome that opportunity. As you know, the Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell worked on an economic track to help the two countries find ways where they could improve their economies – in other words, improve the lives of their people. As neighbors, that’s going to be inevitable and an important part of helping them find direction in terms of normalization and moving ahead on their longer-term goals and priorities, and continuing to encourage greater stability and security in the region.

There were some big steps taken in terms of agreements toward air and rail links, and we would still encourage them to work on those. I think it’s great that the new EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak is working. He’s gotten down to – Miroslav is a good friend and colleague who knows the region and the issues extremely well. I will have an opportunity to meet with him tomorrow here in Brussels. I look forward to that. And we will continue to be engaged and supportive of the process and to see through progress in that direction. We think both countries can make big steps in that regard. Our embassies both in Belgrade and in Pristina remain active and in close contact with the respective governments to encourage them to find ways forward, and we’ll continue to talk to the EU and other interested parties about that process, and I’m just glad to see that there is a return to the dialogue and we’ll continue to support that as well.

Question: Your trip includes planning for the U.S.-EU dialogue on China, and I’m just wondering what the goals are from the U.S. side on that. Is there a consensus between the parties on the structure of that dialogue? Will there be a formal decision-making body, for instance?

Ambassador Reeker: This is a great opportunity to sort of do it in person. We’ve been in touch over the – through the different contacts, all of these new-fangled platforms that we all use in terms of communication. You’ll recall that the Secretary announced last month – I think it was June 25th – that he was pleased to accept High Rep Borrell’s proposal and establish this dialogue on the People’s Republic of China. It just gives us a new mechanism for discussing and analyzing the concerns that the transatlantic community has about the threats that the PRC poses to some of our shared democratic values, the threats to the international rules-based order, some of the things we’ve begun to realize and speak out about. Certainly, you’ve seen the Secretary’s remarks; it was on our agenda both in London and in Copenhagen this week in talking about that.

We are going to work to develop a sort of framework for how we do this. I know the Secretary himself and High Rep Borrell look forward to launching this. We don’t have an exact date yet. Some of it, of course, still ties in with limitations of COVID, but we’d like to do that in person. So more news to come on that, but I think that it’s a chance to talk about COVID and recovery and the role of China in that, and then look at our resilience, perhaps talk about things like supply chains, certainly talk about human rights, what’s been going on in the west, the Uyghurs, Chinese treatment of its Muslim populations; Hong Kong is an issue that’s right at the fore right now. And so we’ll have a full agenda, and this week I do hope to be able to sort of work out a little more in terms of the details of how we’ll do that, pull together a plan.

So we will hope to offer more on that as it comes out. I would expect that we’d get underway after the August break, and this will be, as I said, a mechanism that can meet over time, perhaps have a level below the minister – ministerial level that can work on various issues just to share ideas, viewpoints. I think we are very successful when the transatlantic community does this, looks at challenges we have and shares information on how we can move ahead and deal with some of these challenges, and help China to see that they need to be a part of the international rules-based order, and we can analyze our concerns about that together. We hope this will be sort of action-oriented and lead to some more coordinated policy outcomes that can advance our shared interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

Question: I was hoping you could update us on where things stand in relations to, with regards to U.S.-Russian relations. And I also wanted to ask you if Secretary Pompeo has plans to reciprocate and travel to Russia anytime soon considering the fact that Minister Lavrov was in Washington, D.C., in December? And lastly, do the two sides currently engage – are currently engaged in any talks about a resumption of regular commercial flights in light of what’s going on with the pandemic?

Ambassador Reeker: I certainly don’t have any travel to announce for Secretary Pompeo. As I said, he’s been in Europe, in London and Copenhagen. He’s in California today. I know he’s able to speak to Foreign Minister Lavrov among the many, many calls he has with foreign leaders and counterparts.

In terms of flights, I’d really have to refer you to airlines, who are the ones that really make those decisions. In terms of admission of individuals, we are constantly reassessing and looking at how that fits in with the latest developments in the COVID pandemic in terms of travel restrictions, visa restrictions that we’ve had. It’s not something that the Secretary himself would be directly involved in.

And of course, we’ve made very clear the areas of concern we have with the Russian Federation on a number of issues, from interference in our elections, their invasion of Ukraine, and occupation of Georgia. These are areas that certainly restrain our relations, and a series of other challenges we have bilaterally. But we will continue through our embassies to maintain those contacts and continue to call upon the Russian Federation to act in a responsible manner.

Question: I would like to know, in terms of China, if you have received any indication from the Italian Government about the decision they have to make about Huawei and 5G. And the second question, if possible, if there is any progress in the talks to let the Schengen Area citizens to travel back to the United States? 

Ambassador Reeker: We have undertaken ,  you may have seen some of the announcements in the last week or so – to implement some additional waivers and exemptions to the travel restrictions that were put in place because of COVID-19. We certainly have appreciated the transparency and efforts of our European partners to do the same. The Secretary spoke about this on these stops in London and Copenhagen. We’re really trying hard, working closely with friends in Europe and the EU proper, to determine how we can best safely reopen international travel and make sure that all the elements are in place to do that appropriately. And I think – I’m confident that in coming weeks we are going to figure out even more ability, ultimately to be able to lift the various limitations and restrictions that we have. But for now we have been able to restart a significant amount of travel for economic and business purposes, for students and others, and we’re continuing – the State Department, but along with other partners, the Department of Transportation and Department of Homeland Security – to develop full plans and methods by which we can get travel back into place.

Your first question was regarding Italy and its decisions in terms of the 5G networks and Huawei. I’ll let the Government of Italy speak to any things they want to announce and decisions they want to take. We’ve made very clear our concerns. The security of our networks is paramount. This is the challenge with China; one of the challenges is how over a period of years – and the Secretary spoke to this – that we were not attentive as China stole and scooped up our intellectual property, developed new technological systems, used their state-linked enterprises then to market these back to us. And our data is what’s at stake. Our data, your data, the data of Americans, Europeans, our friends and allies is what we’re concerned about here, and having the Chinese Communist Party be able to store and access that data. That’s really what this discussion is about, and finding trusted vendors for our high-tech and IT infrastructure. That’s the crucial thing here. We’re confident that the Italian Government will make the right decisions for the Italian people to make sure that their data, their security, is fully protected.

Question: The United States have recently blacklisted, put sanctions on various companies that are connected to the crimes in Xinjiang, and this is interesting because we still have a lot of European companies who right now are doing business with these blacklisted Chinese companies, they are collaborating with these blacklisted Chinese companies. What’s your recommendation to European companies that are doing business with these blacklisted companies in China?

Ambassador Reeker: Well, certainly as those announcements made clear, we are trying to bring to the fore what is going on there. This is an important human rights question. What’s been carried out by the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Republic of China against their own citizens is something we should all be concerned about, and what our announcements have made clear is that those who are doing business there should be aware of exactly what they’re doing and what it means, and I think they speak for themselves. Those announcements are quite clear, and we’re watching this very, very closely.

You mentioned that you are based in Hong Kong, and we, of course, are very concerned about what’s happened in Hong Kong as well. This was a topic of the Secretary’s conversations in London as well as in Denmark, and it certainly will be something I discuss here with counterparts at the EU. So we’re going to continue to make clear that these are important issues, and as the Chinese Communist Party, the regime, People’s Republic of China, has been committing actions against its own people that we find particularly intolerable, and we’re going to continue to speak out about it.

Ambassador Reeker: It’s always difficult on these things to cover the whole range of issues, but I hope we can do this again and I hope I can get back to Brussels again soon, and just to wish all of you a safe and healthy summer. I hope you’re doing all right as we continue to all together deal with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. So, wishing you all the best. Thanks. Thanks, Justin.