“There are several areas where the training is really overlapping,” U.S. NATO envoy Kay Bailey Hutchison told reporters.

NATO agreed in 2018 to launch a training mission in Iraq involving around 500 troops with the aim of building up the country’s armed forces so they could better combat extremist groups. Only the anti-IS coalition fights extremists.

But the NATO operation was put on hold last month after a U.S. missile strike at Baghdad airport killed Iran’s top general, and the Iraqi government and parliament demanded that foreign troops leave its territory. As tensions mounted, Trump insisted that the alliance should do more in the region.

However, there is little appetite among European allies and Canada to deploy troops, even though the U.S. is by far the biggest and most influential of the 29 NATO member countries.

While she didn’t mention numbers involved in the troop swap, Hutchison said that NATO’s plan is to expand its training operation to more Iraqi bases. But officials said that over “a couple of hundred” troops are likely to shift into the NATO training mission and operate out of bases in central Iraq. Overall, the number of troops from NATO countries working in Iraq would stay the same.

Officials are confident that Iraq will soon let the military alliance resume its training mission, particularly after NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg held a series of talks with Iraqi and regional leaders.

“We will only stay in Iraq based on an invitation from Iraq,” Stoltenberg said Tuesday, but he underlined that “one of the weapons we have in the fight against terrorism is to train local forces, enabling them to fight terrorism themselves. 

Hutchison also said that NATO is set to task military commanders with looking at other ways for the alliance to boost its role in the wider Middle East.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by  Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO

Ambassador Hutchison:  I’m very pleased to be welcoming Secretary of Defense Esper tomorrow, where we will meet with the other 28 allies, defense ministers, and talk about the priorities that we have, especially from the Leaders Meeting in December in London.  And number one, of course, on that list this time is the request from President Trump to do more in Iraq.  He’s asking NATO to step in so that we can do more training and more capability building of the Iraqi forces, and help the Iraqis to be able to hopefully, in the near future, be able to defend their own country and create that security environment.

We’re also going to be talking about Russia and the deterrence that we are committed to with Russia because, of course, we have a European defense initiative as well as an enhanced forward presence that assures that we have the capability to keep any encroachment from Russia onto the borders of our NATO allies.

We will be talking about NATO-EU cooperation because we’re going to hope to be able to work with the EU on military mobility, and we hope to be able to bring in more of the efforts that EU can do that will augment our NATO defense and security policies.  

And then we will be having meetings with our allies and partners on the mission in Afghanistan.  It is very important.  We have 40 partners as well as our 28 allies in Afghanistan, where we are trying to come together with the Government of Afghanistan to create a peaceful environment, and, of course, that is something that Ambassador Khalilzad has been working on for many months and we will be informing our partners and allies of that, the – where we are, the status of that.

So those are the things we will be talking about.  Burden sharing is always an issue, and I will say that President Trump has asked our allies to do more not only in the missions as we have talked about in Iraq, but also more in defense investment, and our allies are stepping up and that is a good message that we can give that NATO is working, we are adapting, and we are creating a security environment for all of our citizens.

Question :  The parliament is ratifying the protocol for the membership of North Macedonia to NATO.  When do you expect the North Macedonian flag to be flying over NATO Headquarters?”

Ambassador Hutchison:  I think by summer we will have that North Macedonian flag that will be right out front with all of the other 29 flags that now fly at our NATO Headquarters.  We have almost every one of our allies has acceded to the access of North Macedonia.  One has a formation of government, so it’s only a process issue.  So I think that very shortly we will be able to welcome our allies in North Macedonia, and they’ve done a great job of reform and seeking this membership and being patient, and then creating the leadership on the name that was essential to begin this accession process.  So we’ll be very happy in the spring to welcome them to our table.

Question :  Due to their disagreement over language rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, Hungary has blocked Ukrainian participation at NATO ministerials since 2017.  What is the U.S. position on this, and do you support the idea of NATO as a platform for debating human rights?”

Ambassador Hutchison:  We do support having Ukraine as an enhanced partner that we believe that it is and having the capability to have ministerial-level meetings with the defense minister of Ukraine.  We hope very much that Hungary will work with us to allow that to happen.  We’ve always said that bilateral issues should not hold back the key efforts that NATO is making, and we want to make sure that human rights are respected by all of our NATO partners as well as members, but it is something that is a bilateral disagreement here, and we hope very much that Hungary will set aside this issue and we will work with Hungary to assure that Ukraine is respecting minority rights, but we also want NATO to be able to have high-level meetings with Ukraine who are very much in need of our help right now.

Question :  Any update on the President’s proposal to have NATO take a more robust role in the Middle East?  Have there been any more details sketched out?  And can you give us any details on ongoing discussions with NATO allies regarding this proposal?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Yes, we have been working with the secretary general and all of our allies are working to see what we can do more in Iraq to help stabilize that country and help train the Iraqi forces so that they have the capability to do their own defense.  This is going very well.  I think that the secretary general has really led in this effort, and I think our NATO allies are very willing to step forward, do more in counterterrorism, and now we’re looking at what the commanders on the ground say could take some of the burden off of the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which is there trying to assure that ISIS does not come back in Iraq – take some of the load off of that operation, move it over into NATO forces, and I think NATO has a great reputation for being able to give capabilities to foreign soldiers and military so that they can help themselves.  We’ve done that in Afghanistan; we’d like to do it in Iraq.

Question :  An investigation has found that the inner circle of Viktor Orban and a Hungarian-Russian nuclear company paid €4 million to fund a media operation against North Macedonia’s entry to NATO.  How can attacks against democracies and NATO memberships be prevented?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, that would be a hybrid or a cyberattack, and we are doing so much in NATO to try to prevent those.  And also, I have to say, unfortunately, sometimes we can’t prevent but we can go quickly out into the media to repel something that is coming in that is malign, that is not factual, that is an attack on the human rights or the government of a country.  We know that some of our outside adversaries have done that in all of our countries.  I haven’t heard of this specific incident at all, but we do try to put as many defenses up as possible against malign activity, hybrid or cyber.  

Question :  The Pew Research institute has published the results of a survey this week that showed declining support for NATO in key countries such as France and Germany.  What steps is the U.S. taking to ensure continued popularity of NATO in Europe?

Ambassador Hutchison:  That’s a good question, and we have, of course, seen the results of that poll.  And I think that some of our leaders have criticized NATO in different ways, and now I would say that the alliance is going forward, addressing those concerns, especially I think the European allies have stepped up their strengthening of their defenses, which President Trump asked them to do.  And so I think we’re going in the right direction.  I think allies are serious about making sure that NATO is strong, united, and resilient.  

So while I see that the polls are somewhat down, certainly in America we have bipartisan support in Congress and we need to always work on our message so people know what we’re doing.  We also need to message to our people that the world is not a safe place, that we can’t take security for granted, and I think sometimes it is the lack of awareness of the threats that we face that would make perhaps the public not appreciate the importance of NATO.  But we are 29 allies, we speak with one voice for democracy, for rule of law, for human rights respect, and this is something that we must stand for together and face our adversaries who do not have democracies, do not have freedom, do not have respect for human rights.  And we’re going to stand allied against those, and maybe we need to message a little more, but we will do that.  And especially as we show success in deterring and defending against these adversaries, people, I hope, will appreciate that 29 democracies speaking for our way of life is our most important unifying message.

Question :  What kinds of activity does Washington have in mind for its NATO partners, and where exactly – in Syria, in Iraq?”

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, I think what we’re trying to do is realize that there is terrorism in many parts of the Middle East now.  Somewhat Iran, with its militias and its terrorist support, has put terrorist groups into other parts of the Middle East, certainly Iraq and Afghanistan, but others as well.  So we want to be prepared with more NATO forces to train the people in these countries to be able to defend against terrorists who would tear their country apart.

Question :  What specific cybersecurity input has tiny Luxembourg contributed to NATO’s joint defense in the past two years?  And are – is digital security and cyber defense Luxembourg’s primary niche in the alliance going forward?”

Ambassador Hutchison:  It’s a very important niche for Luxembourg, and since Luxembourg has a relatively small armed forces, they do contribute in this technology area.  And this is so important because if you see throughout our alliance, every one of our countries has had cyber and hybrid attacks from Russia, some from China, and we need to continue to build our defenses and build our knowledge of how these malign influences are coming into our countries.  And sometimes we find that a Russian bot will end up talking on both sides of a controversial issue within a country, so they are fomenting more disintegration of trust in our countries’ governments, and now that we’re understanding better some of those methods and technologies, which Luxembourg is contributing to our knowledge base to do, then we will be able to repel better and hopefully, at some point in the future, we’ll be able to knock things out that would be misinformation before it gets widespread.

Question :  Over the last week Turkey has lost more than a dozen soldiers in Idlib to attacks by Syrian regime forces.  Does the U.S. support Turkey’s present force posture in Idlib, and would it support a more aggressive posture?  

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, certainly the Russian support of the Syrian dictator Assad is very troublesome in that they would attack and kill Turkish people in the military is unthinkable.  And they’re doing it, and we have come out strongly against that Syrian-backed-by-Russian activity.  Turkey is our ally, our partner in trying to curb terrorism.  We don’t agree with everything that Turkey has done in Syria, but we do think that these attacks by Russia, or Syria backed by Russia, are out of line and we hope that, of course, we can get back to a more peaceful situation with a safe zone for the Syrian people who are in the middle of all this.  And so many civilians – thousands of civilians in Syria have been murdered and even chemical weapons being used by Assad against his own people.  We’re standing against that.  We very much are going to back Turkey in this situation and ask Russia to back off supporting Assad so that we can go to a peace agreement for Syria so that the people can have some kind of a governance that will take care of them rather than attack them, as Assad is doing.

Question :  Is there any update on the ‘forward-looking reflection process’ under the secretary general that allies agreed to at London in the December meeting in the wake of President Macron saying that NATO is experiencing brain death?

Ambassador Hutchison:  Yes, there is a lot of activity.  Our alliance is talking about how we would like to give a mandate to a small group of people who have – representing many of our countries, but people who have experience with NATO and understand our strength and our unity and our transatlantic bond.  And what we want is for them to look at NATO today and if there are suggestions on how we could improve or strengthen our political dialogue, the contributions that NATO can make, that we will do that.  And we are very much in a process now of putting forth that mandate.  We’re talking about it with all of our allies.  We will have input from all of our countries to see what we can do to assure that we are adapting for the future, that we do have a political structure that will allow us to make decisions in a relevant timeframe, and to be able to address any kind of attack on any one of our countries.

Ambassador Hutchison:  Well, let me just say thank you for all of you who have decided to come in and ask questions and have an interest in our defense ministerial that will happen this week.  We are continuing to make progress on how we can create that security umbrella, whether it’s hybrid and cyberattacks, whether it’s the space domain, which we are now expanding into – both NATO and the United States – and as well, the actual conventional warfare, the arms race that we see happening that we don’t want proliferation to occur.  We are seeing all of these things and NATO is clearly trying to anticipate anything that will devalue our safety for our citizens and move forward to deter against any adversary, whether it be a big one or a small one or a hybrid or a cyber one.  We want to make sure that we’re doing everything we can to stay ahead of the curve and protect our citizens.  

“Counterterrorism is a very good example of where Washington and Moscow are working together.  This is very much a shared interest and a shared concern for all states, not just NATO states, but all states within the framework of the United Nations as we want to make sure that our institutions are not threatened and our people are not threatened.  We have worked with Russia to be able to identify threat networks and disrupt those threat networks, and that is certainly an amenable space that Moscow values, that Washington values ” explained Assistant Secretary Clarke Cooper of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on a call with reporters.

What would be useful is for the permanent representative from Russia to not be always disruptive or vetoing the work of the UN Security Council, and not take a coercive posture.  I would say if one is looking at it from the United Nations or if one is looking at it from the perspective of the Security Council, the P5 dialogue is there.  Take advantage of the institution, and the mechanisms that already exist and don’t seek to divide or bifurcate what is already present for a – what could be a fruitful platform for dialogue, he said.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by  Assistant Secretary Clarke Cooper Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  Many look at the Munich Security Conference as something that is tied or tethered to our history, and it is, but we’re looking forward.  And so – and the aspect of what is past is prologue, we are looking at the future of the alliance. 

One thing that hasn’t changed that is still relevant to the future alliance is that – states being able to protect their citizens to be able to deter threats, but also to be best ready and best available and have the full capacities to work with each other, be interoperable.  And when we look at a world where threats aren’t restricted to one particular geographic region, they are transregional, it is probably best for us to be not just pragmatic but forward-leaning on how to address transregional threats in a way that keeps them mitigated far afield from our homes, our families, and from our interests.

Question:  What was the content of the meeting today between Secretary Pompeo and Russian Minister Lavrov?  Did they discuss events around Idlib in Syria, and are there any plans of talks on the New Start Treaty, which expires in a year?”

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  I’m not going to be able to give a readout between Secretary Pompeo and Foreign Minister Lavrov.  But there are certainly shared interests.  I just had mentioned that threats can be transregional and do not respect geopolitical borders.  Counterterrorism is a very good example of where Washington and Moscow are working together.  This is very much a shared interest and a shared concern for all states, not just NATO states, but all states within the framework of the United Nations as we want to make sure that our institutions are not threatened and our people are not threatened.  We have worked with Russia to be able to identify threat networks and disrupt those threat networks, and that is certainly an amenable space that Moscow values, that Washington values.

Safe to say, though, that there remain challenges.  I mentioned institutions.  We look at Moscow to make sure that they understand they should not be disrupting institutions.  I would imagine that there is still room for honest, frank discussions to tell Russia to not impede upon free and open elections, not only in the United States, but not impede upon free and open elections globally, and that those kind of information operations or disruptive operations certainly benefit no one other than those who may be taking an adversarial standpoint.  So if we look at the scope of what could have been discussed today, there’s definitely room where we have been cooperative to counter terror threats to our populations, and there’s also room to have actually probably had an honest conversation about leaving alone free and open elections in the world.

Question:   Will there be any change in U.S. security policy and strategy in Eastern and Central Europe due to the upcoming elections?  Are there any U.S. suggestions on how to address the European migrant crisis?”

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  I’ll start with policy.  The national security strategy, as set by the Trump administration, focuses on making sure from a global power competition standpoint that we are addressing adversarial actions or adversarial actors not only to U.S. national security, but also to our partners’ national security interests.  With that requires the need to address readiness and interoperability with states, regardless if they’re a NATO state or an EU state.

What does that mean for Central and Eastern Europe?  It means that we do have to address things like physical capacities to ensure that sovereignty is maintained.  And we also need to be building a capacity on resilience to ensure that any kind of disruptive activities coming from a place like Moscow are not incurring upon or weakening democratic institutions.  So there is no change in that sense.

What I would offer is that not only in 2020 but in beyond is there is a very deeply rooted investment in the United States, not only in the executive branch, but also in our Congress, in the legislative branch, to build resilient institutions, and to ensure that there is not only readiness from a military standpoint, but readiness from a civil society standpoint to ensure that we don’t have what we value turned against us.  And there is certainly evidence of that in other election cycles, and we are certainly cognizant of that risk remains out there, and we would like to make sure that our friends and allies are eyes wide open.  So while we may not be able to prevent those adversarial activities or those disruptive activities, we can be aware of them and we can mitigate risk.

As to migration, I would offer that one thing that hasn’t changed and has crossed administrations is our commitment to the 1951 Convention on Refugees.  There is certainly recognition, and it’s incumbent upon states to know that if there is someone in true refugee status in extremis that is very much different from mixed migration and those legal requirements that are associated with mixed migration.

We also are very pragmatic as to how mixed migration may be used or abused by facilitators associated with terror networks or illicit trafficking.  But that is why sovereign states have migration protocols, and why sovereign states have legal migration mechanisms that allow for mixed migration.  But we should not confuse someone’s true extremis refugee status as something that is not to be addressed because there are people who are truly fleeing for their lives.  But legal migration and recognition of the sovereignty of neighboring states certainly factors across the board regardless of administration.

Question:  Which further steps is the U.S. Government planning to take in order to encourage Turkey to buy the Patriot SAM System and the F-35 instead of Russia’s S-400 and SU-35?  Which steps would we have to – have to expect should these steps prove unsuccessful and Turkey deploys the S-400?”

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  Right.  So to catch people up, many are clearly aware, as is the Der Spiegel correspondent is, is that Turkey is seeking to acquire the S-400 air defense system from Russia.  Why is that a problem?  There is an interoperability problem from a practical measure of having to integrate these significant systems.  It is not NATO-compatible.  That’s a problem.  It also encourages risk upon other NATO-compatible elements.  What did we have to do as an alliance when the United States took this first measure was we had to remove Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program and essentially compartmentalize them for now.  It’s not permanent, and Turkey knows this. 

If they’re able to reconcile their air defense systems, be it with the acquisition of the Patriot, which is NATO-compatible, or with some other integrated air defense program, we could find ourselves in a situation where the Joint 30 – the Joint – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter could be reintroduced to Turkey.  But for now, we’ve actually had to cleave Turkey away from the Joint Strike Fighter Program and actually put them in a place where they are anathema to this very significant part of interoperability amongst NATO member states.

What else is at risk?  Well, if they continue to go down the path of acquiring significant Russian systems, be it an air defense system like the S-400 or be it an air jet fighter platform like Sukhoi F-35, they are at risk at further isolation and they are also at risk of sanctions.  So a sanctions regime is certainly still on the table.  The United States has a number of sanction considerations for them, and it’s important for our partners in Ankara to appreciate is that just because sanctions haven’t been issued to date does not mean they will not be issued.

So there is certainly room to course-correct.  There is room to reconcile.  But the longer this is protracted, the greater they’re at risk of cleaving or extracting further parts of the relationship.  That said, we are working very hard to maintain the bilateral relationship on a military-to-military basis, and we’re working very hard to maintain that relationship as an alliance as well.

Question:   Does President Putin’s idea of a summit between leaders of the P5 UN Security Council members seem useful?”

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  Well, there’s always a line of communication through the national – I mean, through the UN Security Council.  The dialogue is there.  What would be useful is for the permanent representative from Russia to not be always disruptive or vetoing the work of the UN Security Council, and not take a coercive posture.  I would say if one is looking at it from the United Nations or if one is looking at it from the perspective of the Security Council, the P5 dialogue is there.  Take advantage of the institution, and the mechanisms that already exist and don’t seek to divide or bifurcate what is already present for a – what could be a fruitful platform for dialogue.

Question:  How far is the U.S. willing to go in its help with – for Turkey and Syria?  Will we witness a new level of escalation in Idlib?”

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  Well, Idlib is not just an escalation with states.  I mean, part of the challenge in Idlib is also the significant number of non-state actors, the long, growing list of enumerated violent extremist organizations, some associated with regime change for Syria, some not even associated with any kind of a development of any particular state.  What we would push for, as we have, is for resolution and reconciliation in that space, but not at the risk or not at the reduction of populations. 

And what do I mean by that?  Is we certainly don’t want to see the Kurdish population to be in a position where they are falling victim to the overlapping layers of battles that are occurring in that space for certain amounts of sovereignty, as well as the battles are taking place to regain areas that had been lost to what was then under the control of ISIS or Daesh.  This is concerning the shared burden, essentially, that Turkey would appreciate that the regime in Damascus would appreciate, and other populations would appreciate, is that without reconciling that space, there is the opportunity for growth or resurgence of ISIS. 

There is certainly the more internecine or the more conflict amongst state actors and those entities there that are seeking to find peace in that space – the more there’s conflict in those parties, the more opportunities provided for ISIS to reemerge in a posture that had already been degraded because of our joint counterterrorism efforts.  So again, if we’re not careful, we will find ourselves back where we were before, several years ago, and that is a risk I don’t think anybody in any capital would like to see reemerge.  And the only ones who would benefit from that would be your terrorists.

Question:   5G is a dominating topic at the Munich Security Conference.  What is the State Department’s role as partners and allies like the U.K. consider granting some – if the State Department – if U.S. partners and allies consider granting some access to Huawei?”

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  Right.  The important – the important aspect on 5G technology is making sure that partners, regardless if they’re in the NATO alliance or if they’re in any other kind of membership status, is being fully cognizant of the risks they’re about to incur.  If one looks at telecommunication systems as ecosystems, the question that needs to be asked is:  What is being introduced in a state’s communications or telecommunications ecosystem?

And we would offer, if one looks at the posture of Huawei, and we look at the posture of China, and how they’ve applied, and through coercion, particular tools, that risk is very high.  If we’re looking at how we share information, who we share information with, and what their role may be in either a shared defense or shared readiness, that certainly factors.  Understandably, some states in the European Union may not have the full capacity to fully assess and fully take into account what those risks are to either their government institutions or their financial institutions or any of their industry institutions. 

What we’re highlighting is the risks of exploitation and the risks of theft of either unique intellectual property, intelligence, or significant government data.  How can we help?  If a state has certain capacity issues, this is where a number of states are looking to commit, if not equities, then resources to protect them.  But I would say if a state is – thinks that they can simply compartmentalize Huawei and keep it compartmentalized away from their official communications or their intelligence communications or their military or defense communications, they need to look very carefully and think twice.  Because the risk is real, and it’s not that this is theoretical. 

There is precedence for this.  All one has to look, is to see what China has done externally without telecommunications access.  If one looks at incursions upon commercial sites for data mining, the Marriott Hotel system, Experian credit, online services in the U.S. government, the incursions upon our Office of Personnel Management, on that data – all those exploitive activities occurred without invitational access to these platforms and systems. 

And so again, to our friends, to our partners and our allies, we said, please, buyer beware.  Caveat emptor as to what you’re looking at because it may be harder to address after the fact.  Better to take an open-eyed view and at least address mitigating measures on the front end than trying to correct them on the back end.

Assistant Secretary Cooper:  Again, thrilled to be in Munich, and just to offer that our time here is forward-looking.  Earlier we were talking about the posture of violent extremist organizations and terrorist entities, not just in Syria, but the external operations threat and the transregional threat.  And now the time is right for NATO states and EU states to look beyond their own sovereign borders and look beyond Europe as to where they can provide further capabilities and further resources for partners in places like North Africa and like the Middle East to make them stronger and more capable, and appreciate that mutual benefit, not only for those partners in those locations, but for a furthering of security for Europe.

The US and Europe are stepping up their sanctions against the Syrian regime because of an assault on Idlib, according to Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, US Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL.

He said in a news briefing on Thursday that the US government was “appalled and horrified by the unrelenting Assad regime assault on Idlib” supported by Russia and Iran. “It indicates that the regime does not want a compromise solution but rather a military solution,” Jeffrey told the media.

He was asked if he had detected a change in the activities of Iranian-backed militias as a result of sanctions and replied: “US sanctions have hurt them, every dollar they do not have is a limitation to the mayhem that they can create mainly among Syrian people. In terms of these Iranian-backed militias and Iranian Quds Force they remain very dangerous in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They burrow into the fabric of society and politics.”

The militias infiltrated organizations and “blew up the monopoly of force” held by governments, he said.

“They try to become a state within a state that takes order from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. They are still dangerous but for the moment we took out their leader Qassem Soleimani. I cannot stress how vital he was for their evil campaign to expand Iranian influence throughout the region. They have been not quite headless but directionless to a degree that we have not seen for a long time. That will sooner or later change because they have a new leader of the Quds Force and will eventually reestablish their communication with their groups. But for the moment they have been knocked back on their heels and we are watching them closely and we are ready to act again if they threaten us.”

He said that EU and Arab League countries met in London to talk about next steps for Syria, and that the coalition’s political chiefs met in Copenhagen to discuss how to defeat Daesh and how to react to the call by the Iraqi parliament for a US troop withdrawal.

“We are seeing Daesh come back as an insurgency as a terrorist operation with some 14,000 to 18,000 terrorists between Syria and Iraq and Daesh considers both countries as a single front,” said Jeffrey.

“We are working with both the Iraqi government and the local authorities in Syria to combat this scourge. We had a setback temporarily in Syria last October with the Turkish incursion but we are back doing full operations with our local partner, the Syrian Democratic Forces.”

He added that in Iraq, with the assault on coalition facilities and calls for a US troop withdrawal, there was still a need for a coalition “including its lead country the US.”

The US was satisfied with the EU’s tough sanctions against President Bashar Assad’s regime, he said, and that there were discussions about improving the flow of humanitarian assistance. “We are being blocked by Russia in the UN from using certain crossings, but we are going to find ways around that. We are also talking with the EU about potential stabilization in the northeast where the region is basically at peace and where our allies are helping us fight against Daesh.”

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador James Jeffrey U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

Ambassador Jeffrey:  I’m here in Brussels at the end of a week-long trip to Europe on both the defeat-ISIS account and, in particular, the U.S.-Syria policy file.  

On Syria, we met with the Small Group – that is a set of leading European Union and Arab League countries – in London on Tuesday to talk about next steps.  And then yesterday, we met with the coalition political directors, sub-cabinet-level officials, in Copenhagen to talk about how we will further carry out our operations to defeat ISIS, and in particular, how we will react to the call by the Iraqi parliament for a U.S. troop withdrawal.

Let me start with Syria.  We are all appalled and horrified, as Secretary Pompeo and others in Washington have indicated, by the unrelenting Assad regime assault on Idlib supported by Russia and Iran.  This is a violation of the 2254 ceasefire accords and that resolution from 2015 as well as several more recent ceasefires that Russia has agreed to but is now ignoring.  It indicates that the regime does not want a compromise solution, but rather a military victory.  

Meanwhile, the fight against ISIS, of course, had a signal success back in March with the defeat of the caliphate along the Euphrates in Syria, but we are seeing ISIS come back as an insurgency, as a terrorist operation, with some 14- to 18,000 terrorists between Syria and Iraq and ISIS considers both countries as – as they have always done, as a single front.  We are working with both our – the Iraqi Government and the local authorities in Syria to combat this scourge.  We had a setback temporarily in Syria back in October with the Turkish incursion, but we’re back doing full operations with our local partner, the Syrian Democratic Forces. 

In Iraq, the situation is a little bit different with the turmoil, beginning with the assault on coalition installations by elements supported by Iran, the United States reaction to that, and then finally the decision by the Iraqi parliament calling for a withdrawal of U.S. forces.  And we’re working through this with Iraq and with our coalition partners now.  There is still a need for a coalition including its lead country, the U.S.  There is still a threat from ISIS.  Iraqis recognize that, and we’re looking forward to working for ways such as a possible troop reduction – President Trump indicated that may be a way to go just today – as well as a bigger role for NATO, which already has a NATO mission in Iraq and has been looking very assiduously at ways to expand its responsibilities there.

Question:  “According to what was reported last week, you were going to discuss with the EU sanctions and other economic procedures to continue the pressure on the Assad regime.  What is the outcome of those discussions?” “What are the outcomes of the meetings with the Syria Small Group especially regarding the stalled political solution?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Well, we haven’t finished our discussions with our EU colleagues, but we are very happy with the EU’s long record of tough sanctions against the Assad regime.  We’re happy that the EU has held the line against reconstruction assistance to that regime by either EU states or other countries who otherwise, if they do, would risk EU sanctions.  We’re also very, very pleased with the EU’s record of supporting humanitarian assistance.  That’s a big difference that we make.  Humanitarian assistance, even to regime areas, is important and necessary, but reconstruction assistance to basically rebuild the Syria that Assad has destroyed, that’s a redline for us and it remains a redline for the European Union.  So, we’re talking to them about ways to improve the flow of humanitarian assistance.  We’re being blocked by Russia in the UN from using certain crossings, but we’re going to find ways around that.  We’re also talking with the EU about potential stabilization assistance in the northeast where the region is basically at peace and where our allies are helping us, as I mentioned, fight against Daesh.

In terms of – in the Small Group, in the political process, Geir Pedersen was in the region – Beirut, Damascus – to talk.  He is the UN Special Negotiator for 2254, the relevant UN resolution, and he’s particularly focused on the constitutional committee that was inaugurated in Geneva at the end of October but has since been blocked by the Assad regime.  Pedersen is working round the clock to try to find a solution to that.  We’ll be working with him tomorrow to see where he is and what the next steps are.  We support him 100 percent.

Question: “What are you going to do specifically to stop Russia and the Assad regime attacks in Idlib against civilians?  Half a million people have already camped out near the Turkish border.  Will you take concrete steps to alleviate this humanitarian crisis?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  We are taking steps and we’ll take further steps.  First of all, we ourselves do not contemplate military action unless the Assad regime once again there uses chemical weapons, then all options are on the table and, as everybody knows, we have taken military action twice in response to chemical weapons use by that regime.  So that’s one thing.  

We’re also very supportive of Turkey’s efforts to shore up its line of outposts.  The Turks have a considerable number of troops in Idlib.  These are our NATO allies.  We want to be sure that nothing happens to them.  We’re watching that very closely.

Meanwhile, we are stepping up our sanctions efforts and our international diplomatic coordination to ensure that Russia and Iran, as well as the Assad regime, know that this is absolutely unacceptable.  It’s a humanitarian crisis.  It’s a devastating attack on civilians so massive that the secretary general has – of the UN has already called for a board of inquiry to look into the deliberate attack on civilians, particularly the deliberate attack on UN-protected areas that were identified to the Russians and the regime but have been hit, we think deliberately, in any case.  

So, this is a very terrible situation we’re facing.  We’ll do everything we can short of major military operations to try to bring some sense to Moscow, to Tehran, and to Damascus. 

Question: “President Erdogan reacted to the Syrian Government’s Idlib offensive, accusing Russia of not honoring Syria deals.  There are reports that the Turkish military is sending new military reinforcement.  Could this tension lead to a military confrontation?” 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  There is already a military confrontation in Idlib.  The Turks, as I said, have a set of outposts.  Several have been cut off by regime forces.  There’s a risk of further surrounding of Turkish installations.  Obviously, President Erdogan is a leader who has been through several conflicts.  He’s an experienced leader in terms of dealing with the situation in Syria, but he is our partner and our NATO ally and we stand with him.  We have made it clear to him, however, that his efforts to try to work deals with the Russians in the northeast, in the northwest, all the way to President Erdogan – we, including I, have told him you cannot trust Putin, and he’s seeing the results of that right now.

Question: “Focus has shifted from military activities to protecting Iraqi bases that host coalition personnel.  How prevalent are the attacks on those bases?” “Do the foreign troops – do you think the foreign troops will ultimately be forced to leave Iraq?  What would be the impact?  And then, in relation to Iraq, what impact has the pausing of military activities had on Daesh?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Well, the good news in Iraq is that the Iraqi military is continuing its counter-Daesh operations and they had a very successful one recently with what we call combined arms, using F-16s, using different kind of forces effectively to take down a set of Daesh units.  So, we’re seeing some of that, and that’s encouraging.  But nonetheless, there’s a reason that in numbers in excess of 5,000 U.S. troops and thousands more coalition forces are in Iraq – it is to make the Iraqi military more effective in the fight against Daesh.  Right now, we’re limited in doing that because our focus is on force protection and we’re very – we’re quite optimistic that the Iraqi Government and we will be able to end this period of force protection and a halt on joint or partnered operations, we call it, and that we’ll be able to get back into the field at 100 percent efficiency. 

Meanwhile, attacks on U.S. bases – they’re not U.S. bases, they’re Iraqi bases and we need to remind ourselves of that because Iraqis have been – several of them have been killed, more than coalition soldiers who have been wounded.  And we haven’t seen too many attacks on them in the last week, and these have been relatively desultory attacks.  Unfortunately, we saw two attacks, one of them injuring an individual, on the American embassy.  That has us very concerned in a bilateral context with the Iraqi Government.  We are demanding that the Iraqi Government take more action, and we’ll see what happens.

Question: “President Trump declared ISIS 100 percent defeated in Syria.  Does this mean the terrorist organization is no longer a threat in this country?  And the Pentagon said that the reason U.S. soldiers are staying in Syria is to protect the oil fields from ISIS.  So when do you expect the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  We’re not planning any withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria in the near future.  Their mission is ultimately the enduring defeat of ISIS, and that, as I’ll get to in a second, in response to the first part of the question, will still take some time.  A major part of our efforts to defeat ISIS in Syria is to first of all keep ISIS away from the oil fields that funded their terror for years, and ensure that the local communities who are working with us against ISIS have the wherewithal to continue the fight and to sustain themselves, because they’re not only under pressure from ISIS, they’re under pressure, of course, from the Assad regime. 

Now, President Trump was absolutely on target when he said last year that ISIS had been 100 percent defeated as a territorial entity, as a caliphate.  That was its claim, that was its mark.  It was a caliphate.  Unlike al-Qaida, it held territory and had an army of 35,000 troops.  It held sway over 7 million people.  We have taken that down.  However, ISIS as a insurgent or terrorist group is still very, very threatening.  In Iraq and Syria, between 14- and 18,000 people.  President Trump, when he spoke to the coalition ministers in February of last year, made very clear that he recognizes that particular threat emanating from ISIS is very much present, and he’s on the record saying so.

Question:   “How is your latest strategy going to change the migration crisis in Europe in the near future and in the long run?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  A good question but, frankly, dealing with migration is a extremely important, some would say existential, question here in Europe, but also in the United States.  It was a major reason or a major issue in the 2016 elections, of course.  So, it’s not my job or America’s job to fix Europe’s immigration crisis.  That has many causes, it comes from many sources, and Europe is seized with the necessity of doing something about it.

Now, in terms of Syria, what we’re doing first of all is a massive humanitarian effort for those refugees who have left the country.  We have provided $10.5 billion since 2011 for Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons, or IDPs.  That’s the largest of any nation in the world.  But I have to say the European Union as an institution and all of its nation-states have actually provided more money.  So, there’s a massive international effort to support the refugees basically where they are.  I think many of your viewers know about the negotiations between the EU and Turkey.  Turkey has done more than any other country to house refugees – over 3 million.  It’s a huge burden.  They’ve spent tens of billions of dollars and they’re getting some support from the EU.  That’s good.  

But at the end of the day, to solve the problem of refugees coming from Syria, we need a solution to the Syrian conflict.  The Assad regime, backed by Russia and Tehran, have been weaponizing refugees, massive flows of them, to put Europe, to put Turkey, to put us under pressure.  That’s unacceptable.  We need a solution now to that conflict.

Question:  “It’s been reported that you are pushing for increased sanctions from European partners on the Syrian Government.  Do you believe that this can be achieved in terms of affecting the Syrian Government’s behavior, and are you encountering any reluctance from European partners?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Our European partners have been very, very good on overall policy towards Syria.  That is, both individually – countries such as Britain, France, and Germany, who are with us in the so-called Small Group – and the EU as an institution, and the EU member-states in general.  So, we’re very happy all across the board with the EU.  

Of course, we always want more sanctions.  We’ve just gotten in the United States two new pieces of sanctions powers: one, an executive order that we used during the Turkish incursion, but is far broader on people who are blocking the negotiation process in Syria, and what is called the Caesar Act, named for the code name of that heroic individual who took pictures of tens of thousands of people being tortured in Assad’s prisons.  That is a very, very hard set of sanctions.  We are briefing the European Union on it.  We hope to work with them to see even more European sanctions decisions being taken by the institution.

Do sanctions work?  First of all, they make it harder for Assad and his friends to pursue their military victory strategy.  In and of itself, that’s enough justification for them.  But as we see with the total freefall of the Syrian pound right now and other indicators – shortages of gas and other fuels – the Assad regime is under tremendous economic pressure because it and its allies are putting all of their money into this awful campaign in Idlib and other efforts to essentially wage war on their own population.  So, we believe that the sanctions are eventually going to take money away from the war machine.

Question:  “Have you detected any change in the activities of Iranian-backed Syrian, Iraqi, or Lebanese militias in Syria?  Are they becoming more or less aggressive or provocative?  What role are they playing in the regime’s Idlib offensive, and are there any empirical indications that U.S. sanctions have hurt them?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  U.S. sanctions have hurt them.  Again, as in my answer to the last question, every dollar that – or every Syrian pound or Russian ruble that they do not have at their disposal is a limitation to the mayhem that they can create, mainly among the Syrian people.

In terms of these Iranian-backed militias and Iranian Quds Force people themselves, they remain long-term very, very dangerous in both Iraq and Syria, in both countries, as well as next door in Lebanon.  As we have seen, they burrow into the fabric of society and of politics.  They create their own alternative institutions that are answerable to Tehran, not to Damascus, Baghdad, or Beirut.  They infiltrate organizations, they blow up the monopoly of force held by governments, they try to become a state within a state that takes orders from Supreme Leader Khamenei.  

Are they still dangerous?  Yes.  But for the moment, because we took out their leader, Qasem Soleimani – and I cannot stress too much how vital he was for their evil campaign to expand Iranian influence throughout the region – they have been not quite headless, but they have been directionless to a degree that we have not seen for a long time.  That will, sooner or later I’m sure, change somewhat because they do have a new leader of the Quds Force and eventually they will reestablish their communications with their groups.  But for the moment, they have been knocked back on their heels and we are watching them closely, and we are ready to act again if they threaten us.

Question: “Moscow says that they were fighting against terrorists in Idlib – in Idlib, but as per Ankara, the fighters in Idlib are not terrorists; they are fighting for their freedom.  What is the U.S. stance on that?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Our stance is there are groups that are – been designated by us and by the United Nations as terrorist organizations in Idlib.  We have taken military operations against several of them, several al-Qaida elements, and, as everybody knows, ISIS’s leader, al-Baghdadi, several months ago.  So, we recognize that there are terrorists in Idlib.  

There’s also a very large group, the al-Nusra or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, HTS, that is an al-Qaida offshoot.  It is considered a terrorist organization, but it is primarily focused on fighting the Assad regime.  It itself claims – we haven’t accepted that claim yet, but they do claim to be patriotic opposition fighters, not terrorists.  We have not seen them generate, for example, international threats for some time.  

Nonetheless, none of them have been threatening the Russians or the Syrian military in any way out of Idlib.  We watch very closely the claims that the Russians say that these people are launching attacks and the Russians are only retaliating, or the Syrian regime is only retaliating.  That’s not true.  There are a few inconsequential attacks from time to time – drones and the like – coming out of Idlib, but extremely minor, rare, and doing little damage, creating little, few, or no casualties.  These are just used as an excuse for this massive thing.  

We saw 200 Russian and Syrian regime airstrikes in the last three days, mainly against civilians – as I said, the Secretary General is so alarmed that he’s created a board of inquiry into the attacks on civilians – and massive movements of troops pushing back hundreds of square kilometers and setting I think now 700,000 people who are already internally displaced on the move, once again, towards the Turkish border, which would then create an international crisis.

Question:  “Can you please explain in detail the role of the U.S. forces in Syria and discuss the last interactions with Russian forces near the Syrian city of Qamishli?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  U.S. forces are in Syria on orders of the President of the United States, carrying out the military mission as part of the International Coalition to Defeat ISIS, or doing exactly that: ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS in Syria, just as we’re trying to do the same thing in Iraq.  That’s their basic mission.  Now, the mission has certain elements.  We talked a little bit earlier about securing the oil fields.  We do think that they’re effective in this mission.  We cannot give a date for when they would be withdrawn.  Right now, they’re there; they’re carrying out their missions.

Question: “What is the U.S. Government’s current total count of Islamic State affiliates worldwide?  Can you provide a breakdown by geographic region?” 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  We’ve already handled the President Trump statement.  They have been 100 percent defeated as a caliphate, but they still exist as a terrorist insurgency.  No more – nowhere are we more concerned than in Western Africa and the area around Burkina Faso.  That was a major issue that we discussed at the coalition political directors meeting yesterday.  We issued a declaration at the end of it where we called attention specifically to that area of West Africa.  

What we’re doing is the U.S. is organizing a coalition meeting later on this year to look at how the coalition can help our French allies who are in the lead in the fight against Daesh, as well as al-Qaida, in that part of Africa.  The UN is also present there as are, of course, many other nations.  And we’re very, very committed to ensuring that we have our own troops there as well supporting the French and carrying out our own operations.  This is a big threat and we believe that it requires an international effort, and that that effort needs to be enhanced.

Question: “Could you please comment on the coordination with Russia on deconfliction in Syria?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Yeah, that actually was asked a second ago with our U.S. troops.  We deconflict every day with the Russians in Syria and have been doing so for a number of years since both U.S. and Russian aircraft began operating in Syria in closed areas.  

The deconfliction channels are very effective.  They work at each level.  People with language skills are in constant coordination.  We have had incidents where U.S. forces and Russian forces on the ground have come close.  The Qamishli incident was mentioned – that’s an area where we, Russians, regime troops, our partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces and, unfortunately, a few Daesh elements are all in close proximity.  It’s an active combat zone, so obviously there’s a need for deconfliction from time to time.  There are minor misunderstandings.  We are very pleased with the deconfliction mechanisms so far.

Question: “What would NATO’s expanded role be in the Middle East, and to take – would it be to take over command of the training missions of individual NATO member-states?”

Ambassador Jeffrey:  NATO is looking at the entire gamut of possibilities following President Trump’s suggestion that NATO play a bigger role not just in Iraq, but overall in the Middle East.  There are opportunities with several training or peacekeeping missions, monitoring missions, including in the Gulf, NATO and also, of course as we just discussed, West Africa – could NATO play a bigger role there?  

NATO is looking into all of this right now.  Right down the road from here we have Kay Bailey Hutchison, who is our ambassador to NATO.  She is seized with this issue, as is Secretary General Stoltenberg.  We’re working closely with them.  I have been in constant touch with the NATO authorities.

In Iraq, they already have a military training mission that focuses on high-level capacity building and training of staffs in the ministry of defense.  NATO is trying to expand its capabilities and the forces present to do its current mandate.  It’s also looking at taking over perhaps some of the mandates that the coalition is now doing, again, in response to the Iraqi call for American troops to withdraw.  But essentially, a more international face to the effort to defeat Daesh alongside our Iraqi partners.