“We’re not going to increase our footprint on the ground to conduct these patrols because as we see it right now, this is directly linked to our defeat Daesh [the Islamic State] mission. Ensuring the security and the stability in the security mechanism zone contributes directly to fighting Daesh, and we have sufficient resources on the ground now,” Brigadier General Scott Naumann, the director of operations for the Combined Joint Task Force Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’, told reporters during a 19 September call. He confirmed that the US has approximately 1,000 troops operating throughout northeastern Syria for both defeating the Islamic State and safe zone operations, but several military officials have declined to detail the number of troops working on the latter.

Despite Brig Gen Naumann’s troop level assertion, Washington has asked coalition partners to provide additional support in Syria, and some former military officials are questioning if the US is taking on more than it should.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference with Brigadier General Christian Wortman, Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. European Command, and Brigadier General Scott Naumann, Director, CJ3, on Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve.

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  My name is Brigadier General Christian Wortman and I am the U.S. Director for the Combined Joint Operation Center, or CJOC, in the Şanliurfa Province of Turkey.  My role is to serve as the lead U.S. military representative in coordinating with our Turkish allies to implement a security mechanism for Northeast Syria.  I execute my responsibilities in close coordination with my Turkish Army one-star counterpart. 

The intention of this security mechanism is to address Turkey’s legitimate security concerns and to preserve the conditions that support continued operations to defeat ISIS while fostering conditions that reduce the risk of violence and instability that would be counter-productive for all parties.

It is important to note that we are implementing this security mechanism in close coordination with Turkey, an important and longstanding NATO ally.  The security mechanism is specifically focused on addressing conditions that have the potential to be threatening to Turkey such as military fortification, certain categories of weapons, and fighters with heightened potential to threaten Turkey. 

Brig. Gen. Wortman: This is hard work and addressing these conditions effectively will take time.

The United States is fully committed to addressing the conditions of concern to Turkey.  We are working aggressively to support full implementation of the security mechanism agreement and also working deliberately to limit negative impact to civilian populations in the near term or long term.

As always, it is essential to the United States that our activities adhere to widely accepted principles for the treatment of civilians.

To date, Turk and American forces have meticulously planned and conducted five combined aerial reconnaissance patrols over Northeast Syria and conducted a combined ground patrol in Northeast Syria as well.

The purpose of these air reconnaissance missions and ground patrols is to monitor implementation of the security mechanism.  The patrols also support maintaining security in Northeast Syria so ISIS cannot reemerge and allow coalition forces to remain focused on achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS.

We expect that these activities will accelerate gradually over time as U.S. forces are postured to conduct these operations.

I am constantly impressed by what the CJOC has accomplished in such a short amount of time and what it continues to accomplish.  It is the strong military to military relationship between Turkey and the United States, sealed by our common commitment inside the NATO alliance that allows for the effective coordination and operations between our militaries.

Our common NATO standards give us an important advantage as we conduct these challenging and complex operations.

I would like to complement our Turk allies for their high levels of professionalism.

I will pause here for Brigadier General Scott Naumann to provide an opening statement.

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  Thanks for the opportunity to talk to you all about the security mechanism zone.

My name is Brigadier General Scott Naumann, and I’m the Director of Operations for Combined Joint Task Force, Operation Inherent Resolve.  My role is to work by, with and through our Iraqi and Syrian Democratic Force partners to plan and execute operations to defeat Daesh in order to provide a stable and secure environment.

With the territorial defeat of Daesh our campaign in Northeast Syria transitioned from major combat operations to enabling local security and preventing resurgent Daesh networks.

Daesh does remain a threat, and while their capacity to hold ground is gone, they still demonstrate the capability and the intent to plan and execute attacks, kidnapping and other nefarious activities.  Our task force is working very closely with Brigadier General Wortman’s team and our Turkish allies to expand security in Northeast Syria through this security mechanism.  Our continuous dialogue and coordination ensures we secure the border area in a sustainable manner that ensures the campaign continuity in the global coalition’s effort to defeat Daesh and it limits any uncoordinated military operations that would undermine this shared interest.

We’re rapidly implementing the activities my colleague Brigadier General Wortman just highlighted in a transparent and public manner.  Both regional and international media have witnessed the joint patrolling aerial overflights and the efforts of the Syrian Democratic Forces to reduce fortification jointly identified by our ally Turkey and the United States.

We believe these actions demonstrate the Syrian Democratic Force’s commitment to implementation and more broadly, the best way to maintain our focus on defeating Daesh while addressing the security concerns of our NATO ally Turkey.

With that, I’ll hand it back over to Justin.

Question:  General Wortman, you talked about the treatment of civilians in your opening statement.  Recently the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report that drew attention to, quote, “Large-scale operations by U.S.-led international coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces causing widespread destruction of towns and villages, leading to the displacement of thousands of civilians.”

I’d like to hear your comments on this.  Were towns and villages destroyed?  Were thousands of civilians displaced?

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  Thank-you very much for your question. I’m, unfortunately not familiar with the report that you’re referencing, but I can tell you that we’re working very, very carefully to structure our operations and activities in a manner that limits any negative impacts to civilian populations and that adheres to widely accepted international standards for the treatment of civilians.

Question:  Turkish Defense Minister gave an interview today to Turkish Daily saying that the United States and Turkey would establish joint patrolling bases in Northern Syria.  Do you confirm this would occur?  That Turkey and the United States would have joint bases in Northern Syria?

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  This is Brigadier General Wortman again.  I’m not going to comment on future operations.  But what I will tell you is that we are working in very close partnership with our Turk allies and our OIR counterparts to plan and coordinate all of our operations.  We’re working to expeditiously implement the security mechanism agreement, but we’re also working very deliberately to ensure that any negative impact to civilian populations are limited.

Question:  Regarding the EU contributions to the security mechanism in the region, the Netherlands was recently asked by the U.S. government to contribute.  What kind of contribution does the U.S. need, and what kind of role could the Netherlands play?

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  This is Brigadier General Wortman.  I’m not in a position to comment on the intentions of the Netherlands government or in a position to comment on any ongoing discussions at higher levels between our governments.

Question:  Can you perhaps tell us where the removal of YPG fortifications, will it be necessary to complement the forces that are there with additional troops or additional resources?  And how would you, just to ensure stability and security, and how would you go about doing that?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  This is Brigadier General Naumann.  There’s been no change in our policy and we’re executing it in accordance with the guidance that we’ve been given from our commands.  We’re not going to increase our footprint on the ground to conduct these patrols because as we see it right now, this is directly linked to our defeat Daesh mission.  Ensuring the security and the stability in the security mechanism zone contributes directly to fighting Daesh and we have sufficient resources on the ground now.

Question:  Turkey calls it a secure zone even though using that word, you call it a security mechanism.  Turkey wants a 20-mile zone which would be controlled by Turkish Army and the [RMC] Opposition, and no YPGA assistance.  Is that what the U.S. is aiming for with these talks with Turkey?  And if it’s not, is Turkey openly talking about the details of its plan to operation in Northeast Syria during these talks with Pentagon? 

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  I’m not going to comment on the specific details of the parameters related to the size of the security mechanism zone, but what I will highlight is that we are currently focused between Tal Abyad and [Rosalein] and that the depth of the zone is carefully tailored to reflect the conditions on the ground with significant consideration given to concentrations of the civilian population.

I can also confirm that we are working to address fortifications, heavy weapons and fighters of particular concern to our Turk allies.

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  I would just add that the air and the ground patrols that General Wortman referenced earlier are all being planned conjunction with our Turkish allies.  So the concerns and the prioritization is really done in a combined manner to ensure that we’re addressing the security zones.

Question:  Is the U.S. going to continue to send logistics support to SDF even though no significant ISIS activities have been recorded in the past?  Isn’t this a point of contention between U.S. and Turkey?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  We are, and we continue to provide, very tailored arms and equipment to the Syrian Democratic Forces, but it’s specifically for the defeat Daesh mission.  I think that’s very common knowledge.  We’re continuing to advise and assist the Syrian Democratic Forces because there does remain a Daesh threat.

The Syrian Democratic Forces continue to conduct operations to detain Daesh leaders, to reduce financial sales, and to cease illegal smuggling throughout the area.

Question:  U.S. officials previously pledged to retrieve weapons given to Syrian affiliate of PKK terrorist organization, People’s Protection Unit (YPG), once the war against Daesh is over.  Since the U.S. President announced that Daesh no longer exists and it lost all territories, does the U.S. military have any plans to start processes to retrieve heavy weapons?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  We continue to provide assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces as we continue to fight Daesh throughout Northeast Syria.  They do remain, despite not being able to hold any territory or to govern.

And I would point out that every month we provide specific information to our NATO ally Turkey so that they understand specifically what support we are providing to the Syrian Democratic Forces as they fight Daesh.

Brig. Gen. Wortman: I will add that as part of the security mechanism zone the U.S. is fully committed to the removal of heavy weapons from the area designated as part of this zone or area.

Question:  Firstly, do either of you have any idea as to how many Western members of Daesh are in some form of captivity with the SDF?  Especially the numbers of British ISIS detainees.

Secondly, what would you, the U.S. authorities, like to see happen to these Western detainees that are in SDF captivity?  Whether they be in the Al-Hawl and Al-Roj camps or in actual prison conditions?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  What I would point out broadly speaking is Syrian Democratic Forces have detained more than 2,000 foreign terrorist fighters from over 50 different countries.  We continue to work with the Syrian Democratic Forces every day to verify their national identities.

As you point out, though, these prisons are vulnerable to ISIS ideology and this really won’t get better with time.  So repatriating Daesh fighters and their families to countries of origin now is important to the enduring defeat of ISIS.  And I think we’ve been very clear that returning foreign terrorist fighters to their countries of origin is the best way ultimately to mitigate their reengagement in terrorist activities here and in our homelands.

Question:  I wanted to follow up on Lara’s question a bit.  What is the estimate that you have right now of U.S. troops that are actually contributing to the security mechanism? 

Also, what role or contribution potentially could a partner and ally country have in contributing to the security mechanism?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  We have around a thousand U.S. forces that are operating throughout Northeast Syria to execute our defeat Daesh and security mechanism zone missions.  Currently, the security mechanism zone is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey.

Question:  Turkish President Erdoğan has said he’d like to resettle as many as three million Syrian refugees in the joint zone.  Can you comment on the Americans’ position on this, as well as the likelihood that it could happen?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  I won’t comment on President Erdoğan’s statement.  You’d probably have to ask Turkey or their ministries for more information.

What I would say is that the principles that we look for with refugees is that we’re looking at safe, voluntary and dignified movements of refugees so that individuals are either moving back to their home or to a place of their own choosing.

Question:  If such a plan was implemented to return Syrian refugees to the security mechanism zone, how would this affect U.S. military operations in Syria?  Or would it affect it?  And if so, how?

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  I don’t really want to comment on hypotheticals, but I would say we are committed to moving forward with further implementation of the security mechanism zone because this is the best way to provide security and stability in Northeast Syria while ultimately allowing us to focus on our defeat Daesh mission and assisting our Turkish allies with their security concerns.

Question:  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan this week declared Turkish forces will unilaterally intervene against the YPG if the safe zone is not created by the end of the month.  What will the consequences be of such an action on the ground?  And will U.S. Air Forces allow Turkey to use Syrian airspace to carry out such an operation?

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  I can’t comment on Turkish timelines or decisions, but I can tell you that the United States is fully committed to addressing Turkey’s legitimate security concerns.

This is a highly challenging and complex environment, so full implementation is going to take time.  

We’re working deliberately with our Turkish allies to limit potential impacts to civilian populations and to address the conditions of greatest concern to Turkey.

Brig. Gen. Wortman:  I want to highlight the fact that Turkey is an important and longstanding NATO ally.  Our strategic relationship with Turkey and their security concerns are important to us.  

The United States is fully committed to addressing the conditions of concern to Turkey and to fully implementing the security mechanism.  This is hard work and it’s a complex and challenging environment, so doing this properly and effectively is going to take time.

Brig. Gen. Naumann:  Again, our goal in establishing a security mechanism in Northeast Syria is to ensure the enduring defeat of Daesh while simultaneously addressing the security concerns of our NATO partner Turkey.  A strong ally for decades.

The Syrian Democratic Forces are aggressively moving out to accomplish this task.  They’re reducing fortifications.  They’re participating in all of the tasks that have been agreed upon in a combined manner moving forward.  And we believe that this shows the total commitment to this agreement and our continuing coordination as we build on the positive momentum that we’ve achieved together.

This is the best way to secure the border area while continuing to focus on the defeat of Daesh. 

The United States raised concerns with Gulf allies over a possible security risk in Huawei technology for their 5G mobile infrastructure US officials said.

Washington has warned allies against using the Chinese company’s equipment, which it says presents a security risk, but has so far has largely made public comments to European states.

Huawei repeatedly denies the allegations, raised last week during a visit by Federal Communications Commission Chair Ajit Pai to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, all of which use its equipment.

“We shared a message about the importance of securing 5G technology and applying risk based security principles,” Robert Strayer, US State Department deputy assistant secretary for cyber, international communications and information policy said.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by  Ajit Pai Chairman, Federal Communications Commission and Robert Strayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Cyber & International Communications & Information.

Chairman Pai:  Thanks so much, In mid-April I was at the White House with President Trump to highlight American efforts to promote the development and deployment of 5G technology.  5G being the next generation of wireless connectivity.  And when Presidents and Prime Ministers get personally involved in a communications issue, the message is clear.  5G is a critical subject with major implications for economic growth and national security and our quality of life.  And we believe that 5G networks will be much faster and will carry much more data than current networks.  And in time, they will bring applications and services we can’t even imagine today.  Transforming the entire industry from transportation to agriculture, education to manufacturing.

Here in the United States our 5G approach is private sector driven and private sector led.  As the regulator in the United States, the FCC has adopted what I have called our 5G fast plan.  A plan to expedite the private sector deployment of 5G technologies.  

This has three basic parts.  Number one, pushing more spectrum into the commercial marketplace.  Number two, updating our infrastructure policy to promote the wireless infrastructure of the future.  And number three, modernizing outdated regulations to promote the fiber deployment that will be necessary to carry all this 5G traffic. 

We’ve been executing on each one of those parts of our plan with some substantial results.  American 5G deployments are proceeding, investment is increasing, and applications and services are being developed.

But as important as these regulatory policies are to giving companies the tools they need to invest in 5G, the overarching issue for us is, at the U.S. government, how can we make sure that these networks are safe and secure?  Network security is not only a priority, but a necessity for 5G and no country can lead in this area without addressing first the security challenges.

Over 30 countries recognized this imperative when they gathered in Prague this past April and they agreed to what were called the Prague proposals set of consensus practices for 5G security.

In the United States many agencies have important responsibilities when it comes to ensuring the safety of our networks, and at the FCC we are playing our part.

One of our top priorities has to be protecting the security and the integrity of our telecommunications supply chain, and that is why the FCC has proposed to prohibit the use of broadband funding that we administer to purchase equipment or services from any company that poses a national security threat to the U.S. supply chain.

Now stepping back and looking at the bigger picture, and my colleague, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State will amplify on this, but we believe that 5G security issues need to be addressed up front.  Making the right choices when deployment is beginning is much easier than trying to correct mistakes once network construction and operation is well underway.  This is not an area where we can simply take a risk and hope for the best.

Moreover, decisions that impact 5G security have to be made with the long term in mind.  Focusing too heavily on short term considerations could result in choices that, as we say, are penny wise but pound foolish.

Additionally, when making these decisions we have to remember that the implications are very wide-ranging.  Again, 5G will have a transformational impact on our industries, on our public sector, agencies including our military, and our critical infrastructure.  Because of that generational impact, we think the time to address the issue is now.

With that, I would turn it over to my distinguished colleague from the Department of State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

DAS Strayer:  As we go around the world because of the incredible importance that 5G technology will have to our societies and to our shared prosperity in the long term, we talk to countries about the importance of adopting principles like the Prague Proposals that will ensure that there’s a risk-based security framework to the deployment of 5G technology.  We think it’s important not just to have the best of cyber security best practices employed, that it’s looking at the practices that will address vulnerabilities. But it’s critical because we can have the potential for software updates that can instantaneously bring millions of new lines of code into our 5G networks that we also have a trust relationship, the most trusted types of relationship, with the supplier of 5G technology.

In the Prague Proposals as well as in the European Union Commission’s recommendations for 5G security that was released in March, there is a principle that the vendor should not be under undue influence by a third country’s government.  We think when you apply that principle worldwide, you can find that in China the vendors like Huawei and CTE are under the potential influence of the Chinese government and could be required to comply with mandates of the intelligence and security services.  That is the case because there’s no independent judiciary in China.  They are therefore subject to the extrajudicial control of the Chinese Communist Party over those vendors.  

Because there is no adequate way to protect or to monitor software updates through the review of source code or through equipment testing, the only way to truly ensure that we have software that is secure for the future, we must rely on trusted relationships between the vendor that is deploying that technology and our telecommunications operators.

So we look at that trust relationship.  We think it’s important, of course, to look at the legal regime in which that vendor company is headquartered.  It’s also important to look at other indicia of trust like the ethical practices that the company upholds.  The questions there would be does the company have a history of corrupt practices?  Does it have a history of intellectual property theft?  Does it have a history of compliance with export control laws?  We find with regard to a company like Huawei that all three of those fronts, that it does not comply with the best of ethical corporate practices.

In addition, it’s important to look at the ownership structure of the company.  Does it have a transparent ownership structure?  For Huawei, we know that one percent is owned by the founder, but the other 99 percent is owned by a trade union committee which is effectively the government itself.  So it’s very easy for the Chinese government to exert its pressure over the company.  It also has members of the Chinese Communist Party on its board.  Therefore, there’s no effective distinction between the company and the government in China.  That raises very serious concerns for us about the ability for the government to cause the vendor company to have the software that was running on its network systems in our countries to be compromised into doing the bidding of the Chinese Communist Party.

We know that over time, the Chinese Communist Party and Huawei have been involved in the mass surveillance of the Uyghur population in the Xinjiang Province.  We know that now more than a million Uyghurs are in reeducation camps.  That is in part done by the use of technology and surveillance. 

We’ve also seen Huawei employees complicit in the surveillance [state] in other countries.  They’ve exported that to other countries around the world.

With that kind of intent about the use data to deprive people of fundamental human rights as well as the past history of Huawei in intellectual property theft as well as the Chinese government’s activities related to intellectual property theft for the use of its own commercial enterprises, that is a massive campaign of industrial espionage over the years, it’s clear that China will use any capabilities it has to further its goals in this area when it has the further capability of a 5G network that will provide massive amounts of new data and would be able to undermine our critical infrastructure through disruption or through the exfiltration of data from a wide variety of sources.  

Therefore we are encouraging countries to apply a risk-based security framework that includes both cyber security best practices but also must examine very closely the trust relationship that must exist in order to protect our networks from software updates that are malicious.

Question:  First, South Korea being one of the U.S. key allies has been taking a hesitant stance opposing to Huawei’s 5G network.  There is a key U.S. Force Korea base in South Korea.  What is U.S. concern?  And how are they, how is the U.S. addressing this issue?  

The second is, you mentioned about the export.  A couple of months ago Huawei’s inside document was revealed that they were helping installing North Korea’s network infrastructure.  How serious is the U.S. dealing with this issue? 

DAS Strayer:  We are talking with all of our partners around the globe including with the Republic of Korea.  We are sharing our views about how we can adopt security practices for our 5G networks, and we continue to share those views.

With regard to the use of technology in authoritarian regimes, it really comes as no surprise to us that Huawei is supplying technology to authoritarian regimes.  They’ve supplied their technology to Iran, and it would be no surprise to us that they’re also supplying it to North Korea.

Question:  You cited security concerns, so my first question will be why do you think that Europe still hesitates to actually buy Huawei technology?  Because not a single European country or European member state has actually outright said that they would not use Huawei.

And then we’ve also seen obviously this is a different technology, but from a European point of view, there’s a number of U.S. companies including Amazon to name a few.  So why should we trust other technology more than the Chinese technology? 

DAS Strayer:  Firstly, I would point out that two weeks ago Vice President Pence signed a memorandum of understanding with Poland regarding our cooperation on security in 5G.  We’ve signed similar agreements with a number of other countries including Romania.  So there are a number of countries in Europe that are understanding our message and taking public stances on it.

We’re also seeing in our discussions with other countries acknowledging the security concerns with Huawei.  They’re talking about additional security measures.  That was not where they were, I think it would be fair to say, more than a year ago.  There was not a serious discussion about security, cyber security as well as supply chain security in the need to protect 5G networks.

With regard to other technology companies, I think the critical distinction that we should start with is that it’s the role of the government in this.  The role of the government in China is what concerns us, without the independent judiciary standing between the government and the technology companies in order that it can be forced to do the bidding of their intelligence and security services.

With regard to data protection, I would point out that in the United States, for example, when Facebook violated a consent decree related to its uses of data, it received a $5 billion fine from the Federal Trade Commission.  So we will take action consistent with the rule of law to enforce data rules against our tech companies. 

Our tech companies, generally speaking, have their own privacy policies and terms of service in place that are open and transparent.  I think that is quite a distinction from what you will see from the Chinese tech companies.

Chairman Pai:  I agree completely with what the Deputy Assistant Secretary has said.  And [the source] I would observe as well.  The fact that we saw such a consensus this past spring in Prague surrounding the Prague Proposals indicate that there’s a common understanding of the need for a risk-based framework.

Secondly, I would agree with the Deputy Assistant Secretary and amplify that message that there’s a major difference between a content provide that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission and has in fact been subject to investigations from multiple U.S. government agencies as opposed to a company that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Chinese government, which of course under the National Intelligence Law is required to comply with any request from the intelligence services and is forbidden from disclosing the fact of those requests to any outside party.

So in our view, this is not just a case of apples and oranges; it’s a case of apples and chairs.

Question:  First of all, you mentioned that you’re encouraged by the fact that more and more people are looking at this in terms of a risk-based framework.  I mean what seems to be emerging as the picture where perhaps countries don’t name Huawei or indeed China or anywhere else, but phrase their framework in such a way that is would clearly exclude Huawei and other Chinese companies.  Is that sufficient from a U.S. point of view?  Or does it need to go further?

And secondly, if you feel that European countries aren’t going as far as you want, what would be the U.S. reaction in terms of possible countermeasures?  Will it mean exclusions from business in various sectors in the U.S. or sanctions or what?

DAS Strayer:  Thank you for that question. Yes, the approach you outlined is in fact our approach that we encourage countries to adopt principles that can be applied to any supplier, any vendor around the globe.  We’re not asking them to implement an exclusive ban.  We want it based on these principles of security.  But as I mentioned earlier, the security principles have to include a trusted relationships that will ensure that the software updates are secure as well.  They cannot just be security measures that only look at the testing of equipment and the review of source codes.  That will be inadequate by itself.

If countries do include untrusted vendors that would potentially insert this malicious code in software updates through the improvement of their software over time, we will have to consider how we share information, very valuable information with those governments, and we also will have to consider how we’re going to work together in NATO because it could interfere with troop mobilization if we have untrusted vendors in our 5G networks.

Question:  Both the two of you were in the Gulf I believe last week, and there was [a meeting] in Bahrain and I think you were also in the UAE.  Could you tell us about your visit to the region and what was the message with regard to using the use of Huawei here?  Because Huawei technology is building 5G in the Emirates, in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia, all places where you guys have a military presence or will.

DAS Strayer:  Again this is Rob Strayer.  I’ll start fielding that question and see if Chairman Pai wants to add anything.

We shared a similar message about the importance of securing 5G technology and applying risk-based security principles.  I think it’s also important to note that it’s not just Huawei that’s involved in building out 5G networks in those countries.  There’s also other vendors like Ericsson and Nokia that are building out 5G networks in the Middle East.  So there’s not just the one vendor.  We think that when you apply a security-based framework, one would end up excluding Huawei from deployment of 5G.

Chairman Pai:  I would agree with that and I would add that we conveyed the consistent message that we were there because we prize the relationship with each of those countries that we visited including the security relationship we have.  For example, the 5^th Fleet of the United States is stationed in Bahrain.

Additionally, we made the observation that the United States is embracing the security framework that the Deputy Assistant Secretary described, and it is also leading the world in the development and deployment of these 5G technologies.  For example, by the end of this year it is estimated that we will have approximately 92 commercial deployments in the United States; where China currently has none.  Additionally, the number of small cells that have been deployed is estimated to be approximately 200,000 in the United States by the end of this year.  That number is much greater than the number estimated for China.

Additionally, we see all of our national mobile carriers investing billions of dollars in both the spectrum and infrastructure necessary to deploy these 5G technologies here in the United States, and they’re doing that using trusted vendors.  

All of which is to say that we conveyed the message that one can have the best of both worlds.  One can lead in the deployment of 5G technology and rely on trusted vendors.  And I think that’s the message that it was important for our close allies in the Gulf to hear.

Operator:  We have a question from the line of Bojan Pancevski.  Please go ahead.

Question:  I’d like to press you on the measures that you might take with regards to countries that are not willing to go the way of Poland, as you mentioned, because I’m based here in Germany, and I think it’s pretty certain that Germany will take equal or similar measures and eventually Huawei will be allowed on the market.

A second question if I may.  Is there any particular reason why you’re doing this briefing today?  Is there anything in the pipeline?  Or is it just part of a regular communication strategy? 

DAS Strayer:  To the latter part of your question, we just returned from a trip together visiting a number of countries, and it’s part of our regular update process to make sure that countries as we’re talking to them in direct conversation as well as the public around the world is aware of our concerns about the need to have a risk-based security framework applied to 5G technologies.

As I said before, with regard to countries that do include untrusted vendors in their 5G networks, we’re going to have to reassess how we’re sharing information.

I’m a perpetual optimist, so I think that over time we will continue to have discussions with governments and continue to educate the public around the world about the very critical risks that they are facing potentially by having untrusted vendors that can be called to take action by Beijing.  We’ve seen that Beijing has deprived people of their human rights, both in the country and the companies they work with have taken authoritarian measures to suppress internet freedoms, to enable surveillance [states] against political opponents around the world.  So that kind of activity is something that should cause citizens around eh world to be concerned about embedding technology that can be abused by the Community Party in their country’s networks as well.  

Chairman Pai:  With respect to the second part of the question, we are very open and transparent about the policies we are advocating for and the fact that we’re advocating for them.  That’s part of the reason why we held multiple press availabilities during our time in the Gulf.  In Bahrain, for example, as well as in the United Arab Emirates.  We’re continuing that with this current press conference as well.

Question:  Chairman Pai, you mentioned the SEC’s proposal to ban [USF] funding from companies like Huawei that pose national security threats.  Do you have any updates on that front?  Does the FCC plan to hold a vote on that in the near future?

Chairman Pai:  We are still evaluating the effects of the President’s Executive Order earlier this year on our supply chain proceedings.  What I can say is the FCC is still actively pursuing that proposal and we intend to take the necessary steps to secure the integrity of our supply chain.  I don’t have a specific time frame that I can offer you as this time, but I can say that since we’ve issued that proposal what we have found is widespread support from Republicans and Democrats on Capital Hill as well as the members of the private sector who understand that the security aspects of our communications networks are critical, just as critical as the connectivity that those networks support.

Question:  A question from me about, there’s a conference coming up next month in Sharm El Sheikh on the WRC, World Radio Congress, about spectrum.  I’m just wondering if that’s an important venue at all for your efforts against Huawei and the Chinese.  Are there any concerns, for example, about Huawei developing technology surrounding radio spectrum?

DAS Strayer:  The World Radio communication Conference couldn’t be more important to the United States relative to ensuring that we ensure that there are updates to the global rules related to the uses of spectrum that will empower our 5G technologies as well as ensuring that the legacy or existing systems that use all kinds of spectrum including satellites and new types of emerging applications have adequate spectrum use.

So it’s very much a policy conference.  It’s dominated, it’s a multilateral conference, so it’s dominated by nation states and that’s who signs the treaty that’s done at the end of the conference, the update to the radio regulations that are international.

So we are looking forward to the conference that starts at the end of October.

Chairman Pai:  Thank you, DAS Strayer. We too, the FCC, have been actively involved in this, both on a bilateral basis advocating with other countries for forward-looking spectrum policies, as well as entire regions.  The United States was very much involved in the Region of the Americas coming up with proposals that would advance the ball, so to speak, with respect to 5G policies.  

And we are very hopeful that at the end of October the results of the WRC will be spectrum policies that allow everybody in the space to innovate and invest, and we are confident that we will strike the right balance in time in both the supply of spectrum that’s available for 5G development as well as the security protocols that enable our citizens to use 5G applications and services safely and securely.

FLIR Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ: FLIR) announced it has won a competitive proposal for contracts with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and Oslo Police to provide more than 20 of its PackBot® unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), as well as spare parts and training.

The rugged FLIR PackBot supports a wide range of operations that otherwise put humans at risk, such as bomb disposal, close-in surveillance, and situations involving hostages or hazardous materials. The latest PackBot model will allow Norway’s defense and Oslo’s police forces to upgrade and expand their ground robot inventory, supplied by FLIR’s legacy UGV business.

“These new ground robots will give our men and women in uniform the latest technology in unmanned platforms to keep them out of harm’s way while performing dangerous missions,” said Brigadier Ivar Halset, Commander General Materiel Division, Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency. “We’ve relied on the PackBot for many years and look forward to benefiting from its new features and capabilities.”

“For over a decade, we’ve proudly partnered with Norwegian military and police to supply advanced unmanned ground systems that bolster their security readiness,” said Roger Wells, Vice President and General Manager of FLIR’s Unmanned Systems & Integrated Solutions Division. “Our newest PackBots offer enhanced communications, a tablet-based controller, and a common architecture that allows cameras, sensors and other attachments to be quickly connected to suit different mission needs.”

The first PackBots were fielded with US troops in Afghanistan in 2002. Adaptable with an array of payloads that deliver real-time intelligence, the PackBot can perform sensing of chemical, biological, and nerve agents, radiation levels, explosive traces, and toxic industrial gases. More than 4,500 PackBots have been deployed to military and other security forces worldwide.

Deliveries of the PackBots will be completed in Q4 2019.