The F-35 Lightning II will remain central to the Air Force’s fighter fleet for years to come, the service’s top officer said Friday, despite the mechanical troubles and cost overruns that have made the aircraft the most expensive in history.

“The F-35 is going to be the cornerstone of our fighter fleet and it will be for the foreseeable future,” Gen. Charles Q. Brown told reporters after visiting with troops at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany.

Though technical problems have resulted in the F-35 falling short on operational expectations, Brown said he expects those issues to be resolved.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Special Briefing via Telephone with General Charles Q. Brown U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff.

General Brown:  It’s a pleasure to be with you today and all the other journalists who are on the line.  Victory is only possible with preparation, and preparing together is critical.  And so in the past week I have been here in Europe, and I’ve witnessed the impact of U.S. and allied airpower and the strength of our relationships.  I met earlier this week with the French air and space force leadership, I attended the UK’s Global Air Chiefs’ Conference virtually, and visited with the United States airmen here in Germany.  I was impressed at our allies’ and partners’ efforts to ensure our collective airpower remains a decisive capability for future combat operations.  We share a common responsibility: to safeguard our collective security.

I will tell you that the global map security picture is changing.  We are returning to long-term strategic competition that challenges international norms and institutions and threatens our collective security.  And losing in strategic competition or a future conflict is not an option.  I expect we’ll be contested everywhere, on every level, and in every domain.  That’s why I published “Accelerate Change or Lose,” which explains why my Air Force must change, and change faster than before.  We must work together with allies and partners to look closely at the capabilities we need now and into the future so that we can balance risk over time and design our Air Force to be ready to compete and deter and, if needed, win.  

The U.S. Air Force provides our joint teammates, our allies, and our partners the assurance of air superiority, the advantage of global strike, and the agility of rapid global mobility.  Additionally, the Air Force’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities provide the ability to sense, make sense, and act.  Our mission is to fly, fight, and win – airpower, anytime, anywhere.  Not just sometime in some places, but anytime, anywhere.  And our future force must be agile, resilient, and digitally connected to continue generating near-instantaneous effects anytime, anywhere, and we must do so with our allies and partners.  

As I told you, I’m in Europe this week, and I’m actually at Spangdahlem Air Base today, and I’d like to take a moment to express my condolences to the German citizens that either lost their life or were impacted by the floods that occurred here just this past week.  

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I look forward to your questions.  

QUESTION: How confident are you that the F-35 will ever respond to the Air Force expectations?  And what’s going to happen with the early blocks of those fighter aircraft?

General Brown:  Well, I appreciate the question.  And I’ll tell you I’m very confident that it will reach our expectations.  And it’s the collaboration that we’re working with internal to the Air Force with our Joint Program Office and with our defense industry contractors that help us build and provide that combat capability by the F-35.  The F-35 is the cornerstone of our fighter fleet, and it will be for the foreseeable future.  

And so with that, the capability we have today, it does extremely well, but I’ve also got to think about the capability we require for the future as the threat evolves.  And so what I see with the earlier blocks is the aspect of those capabilities.  We’ll continue to upgrade the aircraft as we go forth and ensure we have the capabilities not only for what we need today but what I expect we’ll need for tomorrow as we look at the future.

QUESTION:  Can you give a broad perspective on some of the components of an over-the-horizon, post-U.S. Afghan presence to go after al-Qaida as necessary?  Just broadly, what will some of that over-the-horizon capability consist of?

General Brown:  Well, Tony, thanks.  Good to hear from you and thanks for the question.  And really the aspect – this is one of the aspects that the Air Force, United States Air Force, arrived in cooperation with our joint teammates is our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability.  And that’s the aspect that I see that the Air Force is really able to provide that will help the United States Central Command and others to make the perfect decisions.

I’d also say, as a member of the Department of the Air Force, our U.S. Space Force also provides – helps to provide that capability and provide that information or information to our decision makers, whether it’s United States Central Command or our national leadership.  So that’s kind of where I see our – the United States Air Force’s contributions and the rest of the joint team to how we look at violent extremist capability within Afghanistan.

Question:  Can I ask you a quick F-35 follow-up given the first question?  General Nahom this week – last week testified before a HASC panel, and he said it’s a good airplane and the crews love it very much, but unfortunately, we are paying for outstanding; we are not getting outstanding.  What improvements do you need to see from Lockheed so that you’re starting to get outstanding given what you’re paying for?

General Brown:  One of the things that we are looking at is our sustainment costs.  And I will tell you, I have personal engagements with the CEO from Lockheed Martin.  We’re also talking to Pratt & Whitney as well.  And it’s how we work together and how we collaborate, because when I think about it, it’s not only the United States Air Force, it’s not only the Joint Program Office with our defense industry partners; it’s about our national security.  

And we have to – we’re all in this together, and so the collaboration piece to me is important, and so that we are talking to each other, not past each other.  And we’ve got good dialogue, and I think we’re making great process, and I appreciate the cooperation and collaboration with our industry partners as we work to make sure that the F-35 provides the capabilities that we require and continues to be the cornerstone of our fighter fleet.

QUESTION: How has ISIS expansion in Africa affected your planning for responding to potential threats there?  Do you have the resources you need to meet the threats, especially in relation to the fight against ISIS or al-Shabaab?

General Brown:  Well, one of the things that when you look at the United States Air Force and our capabilities, we work very closely in this case with the United States Africa Command led by General Steve Townsend to meet his requirements to go against violent extremists.  And this is the aspect when I talk about air power anytime anywhere, it’s the combination of what we’re able to do with our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets as well as our strike capability as required by what General Townsend needs and his subordinate commanders.  

And so from that aspect I feel fairly comfortable that we’re able to support his requirement, and we do have the flexibility as an air force to move that air power anytime, anywhere to support General Townsend but the other combatant commands around the world.  And for that aspect, I think we – I feel pretty comfortable.  And I’ve watched this and how we’ve been able to operate as an air force for a number of years in the defeat ISIS campaign not only in Africa, but from you own experience when I served in the Middle East as the Air Component Commander for United States Central Command.

Question:  How a European or African partner will help with strategic competition with China and Russia in space?  And also, you’ve probably seen that the HASC has criticized Space Force acquisition.  How are those concerns being addressed?

General Brown:  Well, I appreciate the question.  I probably have to defer on the Space Force acquisition piece just because that’s General Raymond and the U.S. Space Force, and I don’t actually get involved in how he does his acquisitions, and I don’t want to speak for him.

But I will tell you from a broader standpoint, whether it’s space or other areas, it’s the dialogue we have with our allies and partners.  And the aspect of two – I’ll give you two examples from this week.  One, when I met with General Lavigne, who is the chief of the French Air and Space Force, I had a chance to talk to his leadership about their space capabilities and how they can work very closely with the United States and other partners.  

And then at the Global Air Chiefs Conference, one of the panels was about space, and the Royal Air Force has stood up their – in the past four months stood up their space command, and actually, the commander of space command is a personal friend who I’ve worked with in the past.  And so it’s the dialogue we have between our services, whether it’s space, whether it’s air power or other domains, that’s how we work together with allies and partners and really look at how we have some common interests, common capabilities, and then look at capabilities that may complement each other that may be different.  And so to me, it’s the dialogue that we have with our partners that helps us determine how best to use our respective capabilities.  

QUESTION: Recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called for an integrated form of deterrence designed for multi-domain operations and able to leverage ‘the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities.  How do you see the role of the Air Force as part of the integrated deterrence framework, and how should the integrated deterrence be understood and what it means for allies?

General Brown:  Thanks for the question.  And when I look at integrated deterrence, you talked about the concepts, technology, and capabilities.  The United States Air Force does use a fair amount of technology, but it’s those – it’s not just the technology itself.  It’s the concepts we bring together with the technology that provides the capability, and the most important of all that is really our airmen.  It’s the outstanding airmen we have.  And that’s the chance I’ve had this past week to spend time at both Ramstein and Spangdahlem to look at how our airmen use those concepts, those capabilities, and that technology to bring all that together in concert with our allies and partners.  And it’s – for us, it’s the complete package that provides that integrated deterrence as United States Air Force but, again, with our allies and partners. 

Question:  Yeah, General, with the types of multi-domain warfare that the U.S. is envisaging, ABMS, will this widen the gap between U.S. air from partner air forces?  How will allies plug into your alternated networks, and where would the – where would a partner air force have – be able to put a red card in that kind of architecture?

General Brown:  Part of when you look at the aspect of Advanced Battle Management System, or ABMS, it’s how we connect, but it’s really about data.  It’s how we move data and how we move information to make decisions.  And the aspect I look at is part of our dialogue internal to the United States Air Force but also as you look at joint all-domain and command-and-control, or combined joint all-domain command-and-control, is how we bring in our allies and partners. 

And it’s the exercise and events we’ve done with our various demonstrations here in Europe with – at United States Air Forces in Europe to bring in our partners, but it’s also what we do as we start making decisions about how we use multi-level security and using technology to do that, to bring in the data from our partners and at the same time be able to push data and information out to our partners.  It’s the aspect of being able, just like in our day-to-day life, being able to connect into a cloud and be able to pull out the data that you want or push out the data you want to our allies and partners.  

So it’s important that we are in good dialogue with our partners so we do not leave them behind, because that’s not my intent.  My intent is to make sure we, in everything we do, we think about our allies and partners.  And I’ll just tell you again, from my personal experience the past ten-plus years, I’ve been working very closely with allies and partners as a general officer, and it’s something that’s in the forefront of many of my decisions and my dialogue with my staff to make sure we don’t forget that we got to make it compatible with our allies and partners.  And we need to start, in some cases, with that in mind from the start to ensure we provide that capability.

Now, on the aspect of a red card, this is something we’re going to have to work through.  It’s not just the technology aspect of this; it’s really our processes that we have to think about, and we have to think about them differently.  Just like the aspect that – I think decisions will happen at a much higher rate of speed, because all of the information and how we’re able to use our technology.  And this is something that was actually discussed at the Global Air Chiefs’ Conference that we might have to do these things differently, and it may be an algorithm that helps us be able to determine that.  I don’t know that that’s the answer, but it’s something we’ve got to think about and we may have to do it differently than we do today.

Question:  If possible, on your engagement with the Russians on deconfliction and such.  I just wanted to know if the deconfliction line in Syria is still operational.  We haven’t heard about it in a while, I think.  And just, you know, the engagement with the Russians in general ?

General Brown:  Sure.  Well, I appreciate the question.  And my information is dated and – because I’ve been actually focused on the Indo-Pacific for the past couple of years before I came to this job.  As far as I know, I think the deconfliction line is still in operation, partly because both the United States and Russia are still operating in Syria and we – having had that line stand up when I was there as the air component commander from the very – I was there at the very beginning, it’s been a tool to help ensure deconfliction between our forces and it’s been an effective tool.  

From a Russian engagement standpoint, that’s where – that’s been my experience, one of engagement.  I haven’t had any broader engagement with the Russian forces or Russian leadership in the position I’ve held.  So, again, thanks for the question.

QUESTION: What is the current status of the plan to station F-35As at Lakenheath Air Force Base in the UK?  And if they’re going to replace the currently stationed F-15s, what will be the impact on the operational capabilities of U.S. Air Forces Europe and Africa given the obvious differences between the two types of aircraft?

General Brown:  Well, right now we’re going through the – our basing process there at Lakenheath.  We have a strategic base in process, and in that process we look at the – we do site surveys to look at what’s required as we make the transition from one platform to another.  And so with that, we expect that the first F-35s should arrive here within the next – within the year.  And when I look at capability, the F-35 is an outstanding multirole aircraft, and it’s a combination of bringing the F-35 on as we look at the F-15, and the F-15 has been a great platform as well – both the F-15C that does air superiority, the F-15E, which is [inaudible] multirole.  

This is the beauty of airpower in the United States Air Force, is that we have a great mix of capabilities, and I don’t look at one replacing another or one comparing notes.  It’s really how the complete set of capabilities all come together with the F-35 and the F-15s that we’ll continue to have at Lakenheath, in addition to the other capabilities that the United States Air Force brings, but also the capabilities that our allies and partners have in the region.  And it’s the exercises and the opportunity to work together, I think, that will be important.  And I think the F-35 will be a complement for the United States Air Force, but I’ll also tell you there’s a number of our partners here in Europe that have F-35s, and I just think that our relations will continue to deepen because of the F-35 capabilities we bring in but the F-35 capability that already exists here in the region.

Question:  So last year there was that announcement about sending some forces out of Germany, and part of that involved moving F-16s from Spangdahlem to Italy and some other areas.  I understand some of that has been put on hold or is getting a second look.  Could you talk about how you see basing going in Europe in general going forward, and if you see some of those plans coming back around?

General Brown:  Well, here’s what I’ll tell you, that the – without getting into specifics of various locations, one of the things that the department is doing is a global posture review to take a look at – completely down and across the Department of Defense, at the same time I’m looking at that aspect for the United States Air Force.  And as I do that, we look at where we place our capabilities, whether it’s in Europe, in the Indo-Pacific or whether it’s in the Middle East and what we do back in the United States; at the same time, it’s the mix of our – when we look at our total forces and mix of capability between our active, guard, and reserve and having the right mix between our stateside locations and our overseas locations.  

Question:  I was just wondering what plans there were for USAFE.  I mean, you mentioned – you’ve been asked about Germany and the UK.  I mean, are there any – is there any clarity about plans for other places for – Aviano, for example?

General Brown:  I’m not involved in the details of some of the global posture review and to be able to talk about specific bases.  But as I said before, we are – we’re looking at our laydown at each of the combatant commands in the different regions of the world for not only the United States Air Force but also for the Joint Force as well. 

Question:  In your meetings with European space agencies, what military capabilities exist in space that are complementary to those of the Space Force? 

General Brown:  Well, we talked in broad terms of their capability, and it’s the same capabilities that we look at.  It’s the – our ability to communicate.  It’s ability to do reconnaissance – intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and that’s where many of our space capabilities come together.  And then the last thing we – I would also highlight is we’re – space as a domain had been fully benign.  And we talked about how we need to – the aspect of how we need to protect our capabilities and the capabilities of our allies and partners.  And that’s an aspect that General Raymond spoke too as well.  So I think from that perspective, that’s where I see a little of commonality from a military standpoint between the U.S. Space Force and our allies and partners with their space capability.

Question:  The RAF has said this week at the Global Air Chiefs’ Conference that they intend to shift to go to mostly synthetic training, virtual mission rehearsal, maybe in a sort of 80-20 mix.  Do you think this is achievable, feasible?  Is it something that you see the USAF shifting to as well in the balance between live and virtual training? 

General Brown:  I don’t know that I would grade Air Chief Marshal Wigston’s approach, but I will tell you that we are all – have talked about the increase of synthetic capability because the technology can support it.  And from that aspect, there are certain things that would – we may not be able to do in physical airspace with replicating threats, having the numbers of aircraft that come together, and so there is the aspect of synthetic capability and the repetition you can have that may speed up the learning curve.  

At the same time, I think our air crew have to get airborne.  And there’s an aspect of actually not only getting airborne, but it’s also what our – the aspect for our maintainers.  And you can’t fix an airplane if it doesn’t fly and break, and understand that aspect.  And so it’s a combination thereof.  And we are already – we’ve already done some level of synthetic training.  I anticipate the opportunity for that to increase in certain areas.  I don’t know that I – right now I would tell you the percentage-wise, but it may depend on specific platforms that may have more synthetic than others.  

And the last thing I would say is that by using synthetic, it does maybe save you some money in operating costs, but at the same time there’s a balance between that operating cost and the readiness of our air crew and those that support – the support functions that maintain our aircraft and our supply chain as well, to have a good understanding of how all that comes together.  So synthetic training actually does have a role, I think maybe a growing role, but it’s really a balance between the synthetic and the actual live training that we will continue to work through.  And I look forward to seeing how the RAF progresses and how we dialogue back and forth and what we learn from each other as we both take our respective approaches. 

General Brown:  I do.  Thanks, Justin.  I really appreciate the opportunity to spend time with all of you today, and I’ve also appreciated the hospitality I received in this particular week of travel into Europe and spend time with our French partners and meet virtually with our partners from the UK and other global air chiefs.  But more importantly to me is then spending time with our airmen here that are serving and their families that are serving here in Europe.  It’s a real pleasure to be here, and the aspect of – when I always think about what we do as a United States Air Force and our mission to fly, fight, and win – airpower, anytime, anywhere.  And most definitely, it’s a pleasure to do airpower with our allies and partners.  So thank you.  Thank you, Justin, and thank you to all the rest that were with us today. 

The U.S. military’s Space Force is looking to develop partnerships with European countries to counter threats in orbit from the likes of Russia and China, according to General John W. Raymond, the Pentagon’s chief of space operations.

“We have seen what China and Russia have done in developing a suite of capabilities designed to deny our access to space,” Raymond told journalists Thursday following meetings in Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands aimed at building support for measures to provide “stability” in orbit.

Raymond said Beijing and Moscow had both developed jamming systems, targeted energy weapons and satellites installed with offensive weaponry, along with Earth-based missiles capable of taking out spacecraft.

“The space domain shifts from a peaceful, benign domain to [one] that is much more congested, much more competitive and much more contested,” he said.

He said the intention of the U.S. Space Force — launched at the end of 2019 — was simply to deter conflict from “beginning or extending into space,” but added that team-ups with countries are necessary to “stay ahead of a growing threat.”

France and the U.K. have also launched military space units over the last few years and Raymond said the U.S. already has a dialogue with both countries. The plan is to now widen that cooperation to include other friendly nations. 

This month, Germany also officially opened its own space military unit.

“Partners are important to us, and there are opportunities for like-minded nations,” Raymond said.

The U.S. Space Force currently has 6,400 active duty staff — all officially dubbed “guardians” — helping to operate and defend military satellites along with navigation and observation systems such as the Global Positioning Service.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Special Briefing via Telephone with  General John Raymond Chief of Space Operations U.S. Space Force.

General Raymond:   I want to start off by saying I’ve been in Europe throughout this week, and I know – I’ve obviously been watching the headlines – about the flooding that has occurred throughout the region.  And I just want to say that my thoughts and prayers are with those that have been impacted by these tragic events.  So again, let me just start with that. 

It’s been a really good week of meetings.  I am – as Justin said in the introduction, I’m the Chief of Space Operations for the United States Space Force, a service that stood up back in 2019, in December of 2019, committed to making sure that the domain is safe and secure for all to operate in.  And one of the key – one of our key priorities from day one has been to facilitate and encourage partners – partnerships with like-minded nations.  And so in this trip to Europe, I’ve had the privilege of being able to visit the Netherlands, Brussels, Luxembourg, and now I’m here in Madrid, Spain.

I think international partnerships are really important.  It is clear that we are stronger together.  But what we have seen is the domain, the space domain, shifts from a peaceful, benign domain to a domain that is much more congested, much more competitive, and much more contested.  And we want to evolve those partnerships with likeminded nations in ways that provide mutual benefit and provide stability for operations in this domain. 

We also are working very closely with NATO, and we continue to build on the already great relationships that we have with NATO and the NATO countries who we partner with.  NATO is absolutely essential to deterrence and to defense, and I was really pleased last year when NATO identified space as an operational domain.  NATO has also established, or named the establishment, of a space Center of Excellence, and also NATO has established a C2 center, a command-and-control center, a space center, in Ramstein.  And we’re working very closely with each one of those.

The conversations this week have been really good.  We have partnerships with each one of the nations that I visited.  We’re expanding those partnerships, and look to expand those partnerships in ways, again, that are mutually beneficial.  They’ve been focusing on space situational awareness, on the need to have – develop norms of behavior.  We’ve talked about development of personnel.  I’m really excited about where we are and where we’re headed.  It’s a really, really exciting time to be in space.  

And as I look at the challenges that we face, again with a very congested, very competitive, and very contested domain, I think there’s even more opportunities.  And the opportunities stem from a commercial industry that’s thriving, that’s innovative, with technology that’s developing rapidly, and with international partnerships that allow us to protect and defend this domain and to establish safe and professional ways to operate in this domain, and primarily to deter conflict and to make sure that the domain is safe for all so economies can flourish, information can flow, and our nation’s security remains intact. 

So with that as kind of opening comments, again, I’m really, really privileged to be here with you today.  I’m excited about the discussions we’ve had this week, and I look forward to your questions.

Question: I think a lot of people remember when Space Force was stood up, but obviously, in the intervening year and a half, the world has been focused on COVID and other things.  So could you just remind us of where Space Force is after a year and a half of its existence as a service?

General Raymond:  We’ve made incredible advances in that short year and a half.  And as you said, over the entire year and a half, largely over an entire year and a half, we’ve been under this global pandemic.  The United States, because of the changing nature of the domain, decided and took an opportunity to elevate space in a couple of areas, one on – by standing up U.S. Space Command in August of ‘19, and then a couple months later in establishing an independent service, United States Space Force.

And the first year of our existence has really been focused on building this service.  And so that’s – we’ve completely reorganized the national security space to be able to operate more effectively in the domain that we find ourselves in today.  It’s a very flat, very agile, very small organization that can go fast.  We’ve designed it purposefully to do that because the domain which we operate in requires that. 

We have developed all the processes to bring people into our service and to – and what started out with one person in the Space Force back in December of ‘19 now has over 6,400 active duty guardians that are a member of our force.  And we have about an equal number of civilians that are assigned to us as well.  We’ve written the first doctrine for independent space power, and we’re proud of that document and it’s generating great conversations across the United States space enterprise.

We also have worked very hard to develop partnerships, as we’ve talked about, that I talked a little bit about in my opening comments, partnerships with the Intelligence Community, partnerships with other interagency partners in the United States, partners with commercial industry.  And I think, as I mentioned up front, that’s a significant advantage that we have with an industry that’s flourishing.  And then partnerships with our allies, and again, I’ll focus more on that as we go through the discussion.

So where we find ourselves, then, after 18 months as an independent service, we’re up and running, operating all the space capabilities that we had in the Air Force.  And this year, the second year of our existence, we’re beginning to transfer capabilities in from other services, like the United States Army and the United States Navy.  We’re bringing other people in from the other services, like all the other services in our Department of Defense.  We now have individuals coming from the Marine Corps and the Navy and the Army into the Space Force.  We’re focusing on integrating – integrating in a more effective way with the Department of Defense, with our interagency partners, with our allies, and, as I said, with commercial industry. 

So I couldn’t be more pleased with the progress that we’ve made.  It’s hard to believe it’s only been 18 months, with the amount of work that we’ve gotten done.  And I’m convinced that we are better postured today than we were back in December of ‘19 to be able to operate in this domain, and to deter conflict from beginning or extending into space, and to respond to what it is that we see today and that we see on the horizon. 

Question:  You said there were 64 active duty guardians.  Did I get that number right on the call just now? 

General Raymond:   That’s 6,400, six thousand four hundred. 

Question:  You said that you’d visited the Netherlands, Brussels, Luxembourg, and Spain.  That doesn’t include France, which has also set up a space force, or the UK, which has also outlined plans for a similar initiative.  I wonder why that is the case.  

And the final broader question, General, is just when you come on a trip like this to Europe, what are you asking your European allies to do?  Do you need more from them to team up with the U.S. Space Force? 

General Raymond:  So first of all, we have very strong partnerships with the countries that you mentioned.  We work very, very closely with the UK.  We work very closely with France.  In fact, as you said, after the United States set up a Space Command in 2019, France stood up a space command.  In fact, France is now developing that Center of Excellence for NATO.  The UK has elevated space in their organizations.  I have visited those countries in the past – in this past year.  And so we have a very close relationship with them, and we continue to have that.

In addition, Germany just announced that they’ve established a space command this past week.  We see Japan elevating space in their country.  We see Australia elevating space.  And so we’ve got a broad set of partnerships.  The partnerships that I’m focusing on this trip are really new, emerging partners where we have a partnership, but we’re also eager to do more.  And so the focus on this trip were those countries that were NATO countries that are emerging partners with emerging capabilities.

The discussions that we have are looking for ways to take our partnerships to a new level.  We partner today in – for example, in allied communications.  We partner today in having space situational awareness.  We partner today with data-sharing, really looking now to develop those partnerships to other areas as well.  And so the conversations that we’ve had are sharing information about the domain that we operate in, talking about the capabilities that these countries have and are developing, talking about the capabilities that we have, and where we have synergies, where we may be able to partner even more. 

It is really important that we are stronger together.  We have a group of partners, of likeminded nations, and it’s probably the thing that I am most proud of as we look over the course of the first 18 months of our existence.  We have taken significant steps in elevating these partnerships from one-way partnerships to really robust partnerships.  It’s so important to deter conflicts from beginning or extending into space and to keep the domain safe for all.

Question:  This question has a couple of quick predicates.  One is obviously there’s a lot of innovation in the space sector with very little agreement on what, as that innovation unfolds, on what qualifies as a weapon.  Is a satellite that has those – that is capable or repairing, with a robotic arm that can repair another satellite a repair satellite or a hostile one?  And then we’ve also seen recently a lot of really interesting statements out of the Japanese defense ministry about Russian and Chinese coordination in various ways, naval exercises, et cetera, and their defense white paper also flagged that those countries are working in the electromagnetic domain.

So I wondered, with that in mind, do you think we’re functionally in an arms race already in space, and to what degree do you think or perceive Russia and China as coordinating in that?

General Raymond:  First of all, let me just say our goal is to deter conflict from beginning or extending into space.  We do not want to get into a conflict that begins or extends into space.  We want to operate in the manner – we want to deter that from happening.  That’s why these partnerships are so important.  We – it is clear, and in fact, we, the United States, have operated in a very transparent manner, shared data broadly across the globe, again, have global partnerships.  And so we see what others are doing.  I mean, it is clear.  We have seen what China has done with – and Russia – has done in developing a suite of capabilities denied to – or designed to deny our access to space, everything from reversible jamming of communications satellites and GPS satellites, to directed energy weapons, to satellites on orbit that are designed to destroy U.S. satellites on orbit, to missiles that are being launched from the ground to destroy satellites like China demonstrated – Russia has the same type of program – and to cyber threats.

And so the best way we know how to deter conflict from beginning and from extending into space is to do so from a position of strength.  We’re prepared to protect and defend our capabilities today, and I will – we will remain prepared to protect our capabilities into the future, and with partnerships that we enjoy with likeminded nations, like the countries that I talked about and like the other partners that we have, I’m convinced that we’ll be able to do so.

Question: Which new challenges is the Combined Space Operations Initiative facing amid the growing number and diversity of space actors?”  And then, second: “Azerbaijan is a member of the Space Club.  The country has already launched its third satellite and cooperates with its international partners for building a stronger space industry.  How can the U.S. and Azerbaijan cooperate in this sphere?

General Raymond:  Well, first of all, the Combined Space Operations Center is a command that we stood up – I’m sorry, the Combined Space – the Combined Space Force [sic] Component Command with the Combined Space Operations Center, we stood those – that organization up and that C2 center up back in August of 2019.  It is a really important center for the United States.  It’s the center where we provide command and control of – operational command and control of our capabilities.  Its focus, its main focus, is on keeping the domain safe for and having the awareness of the domain, the space domain awareness, necessary to keep the domain safe.  

We are also focused on making sure that our joint and coalition forces stationed around the globe have the space capabilities that they need to accomplish their mission.  There’s nothing that we do today as a joint or coalition force that isn’t enabled by space.  

The thing that we did back in 2019, we made it – we transitioned it from a joint force to a combined force, and that, again, is because it’s an organization that has partners embedded into it, and that provides us great advantage.  So although the challenges are great, the opportunities that we saw, as I mentioned earlier, was to make this a combined operations and to capitalize on the partnerships that we enjoyed, had shared data broadly across all of our partners, and it’s providing – it’s providing us great advantage.  I’m really pleased with the progress that they’ve made.  

So I see – I see way more opportunities than I see challenges.  But the domain is challenging.  I mean, obviously, as I’ve talked about throughout this conversation, the domain is changing.  It’s transitioned from a peaceful, benign domain – that’s based on the results of largely China and Russia – to a domain that is contested.  And this center provides critical capabilities to allow us to operate the capabilities that are so necessary for – and not just our military in the United States and around the globe, but also for the average citizen of the world who, for example, relies on GPS.  And so we’re committed to keeping this domain safe and the Combined Space Operations Center is a critical linchpin for us to be able to do that.

For countries that want – we want to work with likeminded nations.  As I said, partners are important to us, and there are opportunities for likeminded nations that are committed to the peaceful use of space and for operating in a safe and professional manner to partner with us.

Question:  Here.  Thanks, General, again for doing this.  I want to ask you a question about the budget process as that sort of rolls out.  Lawmakers have expressed some frustration with what they believe is a failure to deliver timely reforms to space acquisition, with one lawmaker calling it just – the Space Force’s efforts so far as just minor tweaks around the edges.  How do you respond to that and do you think the Space Systems Command that you’ve proposed will address their concerns?

General Raymond:  We’ve made significant – so first of all, let me just start by saying it’s really important, and one of the main reasons why we established the Space Force, was to go fast and to stay ahead of a growing threat.  We have – and what we’ve done over the course of the last 18 months is build a capability development process that includes much more than just acquisition.  It starts with force design.  We’ve established an organization to do that force design, and that work is seminal work that is really, really good and already delivering advantage for us.

We also then tackle the requirements, and we have the Joint Staff designated the Space Force as the department lead for requirements, for joint space requirements throughout the department.  Again, that’s elevating the voice of requirements and all of it to go faster.  On the acquisition side, we are very close to establishing the Space Systems Command, again, driving unity of effort across the department and having a tighter relationship with disruptive innovator organizations like the Space Development Agency and with other organizations that go fast, like the Space Rapid Capabilities Office.  We’ve also established the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, which has also had some great, great successes in moving fast this first year. 

Now, finally, we have brought unity of effort across the department inside the Pentagon.  We’ve established forums – one that was designated in the National Defense Authorization Act called the Space Acquisition Council, and one that we established on our own called the Program Integration Council – to bring organizations together in the Pentagon, and the term that I use is get everybody rolling in the same direction.  That’s paying dividends.  

We have also, over the course of this year, defined and designed a space test program, an integrated test program focused on integrating contractor tests, developmental tests, and operational tests into an integrated test capability, and that’s, again, been designed.  So I couldn’t be more happy with the work that is going on.  There is still significant work to do, but we’ve got the pieces planned out and in place, already making a difference.  And I will say that we are focused and committed to moving fast and developing the capabilities and the tactical timelines that we need to stay ahead of this growing threat and remain the best in the world.

General Raymond:  First of all, let me just say thanks again to everybody for coming up.  I do really appreciate the opportunity to talk about a – our Space Force, to talk about a really exciting and critical time in the space business and to focus our efforts on developing the partnerships.  We enjoy great partnerships today, and in the conversations that we’ve had over the course of the week and that we’ve had previously, since the establishment of the Space Force, with a number of our partners; we see great value in working together, we’re stronger together, and I couldn’t be more excited.  I think it’s one of the – I think as I said earlier: one of the most significant things that we’ve done is further the partnerships across the globe.  And so with that, again, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you and thanks, everybody, for taking time out, taking time from your day to be here.

General Raymond:  I mentioned I had been there this year – I think it was a little over a year ago when I visited.  I just wanted to get the timeframe right on that.  And we just had France came to the Pentagon and visited with me, as did the UK, here recently.  So we have routine dialogue with those, but I just wanted to clarify that.  I think the visit that I had to both the UK and France was a little over a year ago, but I just wanted to clarify that.

NATO’s annual Sea Breeze exercise is set to concluded in the Black Sea.

Hosted this year by the US and Ukraine, the multinational naval drills saw the participation of approximately 5,000 troops, 32 ships, 40 aircraft and 18 special operations and dive teams from 32 countries.

The 13-day exercise began shortly after Russia claimed on June 23 that it fired warning shots and dropped bombs in the path of the British destroyer HMS Defender to force it to change course from the Crimean city of Sevastopol. While the UK’s Defense Ministry denies that the British ship was fired upon, Moscow warned that it was prepared to engage any NATO vessels entering the territorial waters around Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.

Although Sea Breeze 2021 has proceeded without incident, tensions remain strained between Moscow and NATO. Moscow’s aggressive posture—claiming that it fired upon the HMS Defender and threatening the NATO exercise—is an indicator that it feels threatened by the bloc. 

Indeed, the HMS Defender incident was likely exactly what London called it, a Russian drill. Expect Moscow to continue to exaggerate its willingness to militarily confront NATO in the medium-term, speaking to its anxiety over its security in Crimea.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Special Briefing via Telephone with  U.S. Navy Captain Stuart Bauman , U.S. Navy Commander John D. John , U.S. Marine Corps Lt Col Mastin Robeson.

Captain Bauman:   I’m the exercise director on the U.S. side for Exercise SEA BREEZE 21, and we had a successful exercise.  We’re getting close to wrapping things up.  We’ve had the largest SEA BREEZE since we began over 20 years ago.  We’ve had up to 30 nations participating.  We’ve had over 3,000 sailors, soldiers, and airmen.  And we are – sorry, correction, that’s 5,000.  We have 30 ships and just a great amount of cooperation and partnership between all of the nations participating. 

The level of cooperation and integration is at its highest level that we’ve seen, and the Ukrainians are very capable as well as all of the partners that have joined in.  And we’ve covered everything from maritime components to air, to land, to special operations.  We’ve done an excellent job, and I’ve been very impressed and couldn’t be happier about the outcome of the exercise. 

Commander John:   This is Commander John D. John, commanding officer, USS Ross (DG-71).  We are home ported in Rota, Spain as part of Task Force 65 in the Sixth Fleet area of operations.  And our mission was to deploy and take part in SEA BREEZE 21, and this year were assigned as part of a five-ship battle group that incorporated a Ukrainian vessel, HRYHORIY KUROPIATNYKOV, the Bulgarian ship BODRY, the British ship TRENT, and Romanian ship MACELLARIU.  And together, our mission was to promote interoperability and enhance warfighting readiness for our collective of the Black Sea region to ensure safety and prosperity in this region for allies and partners.  

Lt. Colonel Robeson:  I’m the commander of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, also known as 1-6.  And I’m here in Oleshky Sands in Kherson Oblast, collocated with the 88th Marine Infantry Battalion as well as the 1st Separate Battalion, Airborne Marines, conducting training as part of Exercise SEA BREEZE.  I’ve got with me approximately 400 Marines from across the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, also known as II MEF.  And our mission was to deploy from Camp LeJeune, North Carolina to Oleshky Sands to conduct training with other nation forces, to include Ukrainian marines, Georgian soldiers, as well as Moldovan forces. 

For us the exercise consisted of multiple phases.  First phase was an opportunity to really get familiar with the other services that we were working with from other nations.  We had a transition period on the 4th of July where we paused to celebrate Naval Forces Day for the Ukraine and, of course, Independence Day for the United States, and then we moved into a final exercise.  This just concluded in the last 24 hours, and we’re in the process of cleaning up here.  So far, great exercise.  

Question:   What was the role of non-NATO  participant countries in the exercise?  And what was the level of cooperation between sea and air components?

Captain Bauman:   We had great participation from both our NATO and non-NATO participants across a wide variety all around the globe, including Asia, Africa, North America, obviously Europe, as well as the Middle East.  And some of the things that they participated in, we had folks come in to be mentors with the Ukrainian forces, we had teams participating in our diving exercises as well as being observers and across all of the different air, land, and maritime components. 

The – some of the cooperation that was – that we found wasn’t just sea and air, but also land as well.  We had air support of the maritime forces as they performed anti-submarine warfare.  We had maritime partnering up with land forces with amphibious assaults, and air assets supporting land forces in doing air assaults as well.  And so we had quite a bit of interoperability between many different nations across all of the domains of warfare, and they’ve all done an outstanding job. 

Question:  When will the ships from non-Black Sea region countries involved in SEA BREEZE reach the Black Sea?  And are there any plans of passing nearby Crimea while leaving?  

Captain Bauman:   Most ships that have participated in SEA BREEZE will also be participating in BREEZE, which is a Bulgarian-led exercise, so they will be remaining in the Black Sea for a period of time, obviously not to exceed the time limits of the Montreux Convention. 

Question:  Because also the military, as I guess, is not perfect and there can happen mistakes, what do you do technically or politically to prevent, let’s say, accidents or even misunderstandings, as it happened a couple of days ago, that can provoke or at least irritate non-participants like Russia or others along the Black Sea?  So what kind of signals, what kind of communication, you do have in advance of when it happens? 

Captain Bauman:   We have been performing and executing SEA BREEZE for many years, all the way back to 1997, and so we have a long history of establishing what our cadence is and the types of activities that we perform, and even well beyond that just a general level of professionalism and being able to conduct military exercises safely and without provocation.  

We are very transparent in our intentions as well as providing boundaries on where we will be and when we will be there.  So with the – and that is well beyond just the U.S. and Ukraine, but all of our partners have a very high level of professionalism such that the – we minimize any provocation and operate only in accordance with those well-established conventions in international waters and air space. 

Question:  Can you speak about the effect the Russian presence and interference had on the exercise?  What aviation assets do you feel have made the exercise better or more robust when it is next held?

Captain Bauman:   I’m going to give Commander John a chance to discuss the first part of it since he’s been at sea and has some firsthand knowledge, and then I’ll go ahead and take the second half of the question. 

Commander John:   This is Commander John, USS ROSS.  With regard to the first question about the presence of non-participating units at sea, there was no interference at all.  In fact, all vessels, both civilian and military, that were operating in the exercise area conducted themselves with professionalism in accordance with international law and maritime regulations with the most due regard for safety at sea. 

Question:  Great.  And Captain Bauman on the part about what aviation assets might make the exercise better or more robust? 

Captain Bauman:   Yes.  So we have had a very wide variety of different aviation aircraft – or, sorry, aviation assets.  We’ve had over 40 aircraft participate.  So the breadth of types of aircraft that we’ve had has been a significant benefit to us during this exercise, and next year I anticipate that we will – or in future years we’ll be able to increase our – the number and types of aircraft assets that will give us even more enhanced operational capabilities in the future.  A variety of assets such as our P-8s would be – increase our capabilities even further, the Typhoons from the UK.  We’ve also have other fighters and helos that we have used and we will continue to use and expand even further in the future. 

Question:  I wonder if you could add anything from your perspective on the report of confrontation between the UK’s HMS DEFENDER and Russian forces last week.  Thanks. 

Captain Bauman:   However, I will defer to the UK on responding to that, as it was completely outside the exercise and in their lane. 

Question:  I’d like to ask, are there any plans to increase American and NATO presence in the Black Sea in near future?  And could this exercise be the sign of future deployments? 

Captain Bauman:   SEA BREEZE is just one of many exercises that we conduct both around the world and in Europe and the Black Sea region.  We do very regular deployments with a variety of partner countries, and we will continue to do so to strengthen and stabilize the region.  

Question:  I mean, there are reports that Russians were exercising close to the – close to the SEA BREEZE participants.  I mean, wasn’t that considered to be harassment?  And was there any reaction by SEA BREEZE participants?

And the second question, I mean, there are some quite interesting-looking non-NATO countries involved.  But I’m wondering if they were actually involved with – all with ships there, for example, United Arab Emirates, Israel?  I see Egypt, Pakistan, South Korea.  I mean, how would these countries have been involved in the exercise?  

Commander John:  Yes, this is Commander John still here from USS ROSS.  I can answer the first part of that question with regard to any non-participating units, both civilian and military, operating in the exercise area.  As you recall, the exercise took place in international waters in the Black Sea, and therefore there was the opportunity for both non-participating units and civilian vessels to be in and around the exercise area.  And from all accounts, all vessels, all aircraft participated or conducted themselves in accordance with international law and maritime regulations and with due regard for safety, and no issues to report from that.

Captain Bauman:  We had great participation from a wide variety of countries.  The UAE we had participants here to observe and mentor, and then from Egypt we also had some participants performing a lot of the same functions.  And it was very – in my speaking with them, I believe that they were eager to participate as well as they were impressed with the level of interoperability and capabilities brought with SEA BREEZE, and I believe that they left feeling very good about the engagement.

Question:  I would like to ask a question about the situation in the area of exercises.  There is currently a civil war going on in eastern Ukraine, and those exercises are considered by many in Ukraine and Russia as an incentive for Kyiv to continue the war rather than pushing for peace solution in the eastern Ukraine.  Do you agree with this assessment?

And a small follow-up for the questions of my British and German colleagues:  During the exercises, did you have any kind of channel of communication with Russian military forces present on – in the region to avoid any kind of misunderstanding? 

Captain Bauman:  Regarding any Ukrainian confrontations in the east, that is outside the scope of SEA BREEZE, and so I’ll refer you to the Ukrainian Government for further comments on that aspect.  And as far as interactions and communications with Russians, I will defer over and allow Commander John to assess that and comment on that as he sees fit from the maritime perspective.  

Commander John:  As professional mariners, regardless of what nation, safety at sea is paramount for all vessels, and there were at least two interactions over bridge-to-bridge communication of VHF radios where both a non-participating unit and a participating unit communicated with each other effectively and professionally to ensure safe navigation of the exercise area and that all vessels would remain safe.  And all of those communications were conducted in a routine and professional manner.  

Question:  Would you consider territorially and maritime-wise such a dense exercise with so many ships participating, Black Sea as a tight place to operate in terms of territorial waters, navigational borders, was that a challenge for the exercise and its scope? 

Commander John:  No, thank you for that question.  And as you know, no nation can confront today’s challenges alone, and the Black Sea is no different.  While it may be smaller than other international bodies of water, it’s still quite large and provides an appropriate area for nations to come together to learn from each other, strengthen relationships, and also contribute to each other to ensure the continued success of the longstanding alliance with NATO and our partner nations.  

Question:  An anti-submarine warfare training was mentioned during the briefing.  I would like to know which nation has provided submarine ?

Captain Bauman:  This is Captain Bauman.  And for this year’s SEA BREEZE we did not have submarines participate, but in past years we have.  We did conduct training for anti-submarine warfare, but that was done without an actual submarine.  

Captain Bauman:  Thanks to all of the callers and for all of the questions.  Your engagement is well appreciated, and I think it reflects very similarly to how important this exercise is for the region as well as the fact that we have had the largest SEA BREEZE since 1997 when it commenced.  The Ukrainians and all of our partners, both NATO and non-NATO partners, as well as military and non-military agencies, have had a successful SEA BREEZE, and we are very much looking forward to concluding it here shortly and starting the planning for SEA BREEZE 22 next year.  

Commander John:  Thank you all for the opportunity to be a part of this panel and answer your questions.  SEA BREEZE, as you know, enhances our combat readiness amongst participating NATO and allied partner nations and allows them to – us to rapidly respond to any threats.  And this year was no different.  I believe that we proved that our ability to seamlessly operate together to maintain a stable and prosperous Black Sea region sends a message to the world that we are committed to enhancing stability and deterring aggression.  

Lt. Colonel Robeson:  Hey, so the exercise is a great experience for the Marines from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines and those from II MEF that accompanied us out here in Oleshky Sands.  So for us, the opportunity to operate in an expeditionary environment where we’re just living in tents and out training with partner forces, folks trying to establish and maintain decent stability in the Black Sea, is a great win for us and I think a great win for the partners we worked with.  

So at the end of the day, you quickly find when you’re working with these exercises that the – your partner forces you’re with are professionals, skilled, have a lot of pride in what they do, and great fraternity and team across the board, which is always one of the aim points of one of these events.  And so for 21 years the Black Sea has hosted SEA BREEZE and I think to great effect.  And so for the land component side, we on this SEA BREEZE side walked away with a great opportunity to exchange methods, exchange understanding of how we execute operations together, certainly tactical level skill exchanged with equipment comparisons between the marines from all nations, got to work with equipment and folks we don’t work with every day, and of course, really a great opportunity to exchange esprit de corps between the nations.  And for the record, a lot of rain out here the whole way through it.  

So it was a good chance to train, work together, and learn from each other, and I think do that in a way that demonstrated a good relationship and the ability to operate in a dynamic security environment.  So thanks for the opportunity to be here today.

The Sea Breeze 2021 multinational maritime exercise, organized by the Ukrainian Navy and the U.S. Sixth Fleet, began in the Black Sea region on Monday, June 28.

Exercise Sea Breeze in its 21st iteration, is a U.S. and Ukraine co-hosted multinational maritime exercise held in the Black Sea designed to enhance interoperability of participating nations and strengthen maritime security within the region. The routine, annual training exercise aims to strengthen maritime security and stability, information-sharing, and building teamwork and mutual cooperation.

The exercise is taking place from June 28 to July 10 in the Black Sea region and focuses on multiple warfare areas including amphibious warfare, land maneuver warfare, diving operations, maritime interdiction operations, air defense, special operations integration, anti-submarine warfare, and search and rescue operations.

This year’s iteration involves the largest number of participating nations in the exercise’s history, including 32 countries from six continents, 5,000 troops, 32 ships, 40 aircraft, and 18 special operation and dive teams.

Ukraine and U.S. are cohosting the exercise in the Black Sea with participation and support coming from 32 countries in total: Albania, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, France, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Special Briefing via Telephone with  CAPT Kyle Gantt, Deputy Commodore, Destroyer Squadron 60 and Deputy Commander, Task Force 65, U.S. Navy, And CAPT Cameron R. Chen Commodore, Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces Europe/Africa (NECFEURAF), Task Force 68, U.S. Navy, And CDR Jeremy Lyon Deputy Commander of Task Force 67, U.S. Navy

CDRE Chen:  I’m the Commodore of Task Force 68.  We are the Naval Expeditionary Force component for Sixth Fleet, so we provide EOD, divers, MCM capability, and naval construction force and maritime expeditionary security to Europe and Africa.  

For this exercise, for SEA BREEZE, we’re really excited about participating with our partners in the Black Sea region.  We’re going to be doing a number of different activities during the exercise, to include some explosive hazard clearance with our EOD divers, both ashore and afloat, as well as some construction work at various pier areas to improve the maritime infrastructure, and then really the highlight of our engagement is going to be a clearance operation where we’re going to work with the Ukrainians as well as Canadians, Poles, and Georgian divers to clear a wreck that is blocking the naval pier at Odessa.  This wreck sank in about 2016; it was a Soviet-era yacht, and it’s currently blocking a portion of the pier area.  So we’re going to be cutting this up and removing it and clearing it, and this really demonstrates how we can respond to damage in a crisis and clear areas quickly with our partners.

So looking forward to the exercise and we think this is an excellent opportunity for us to train together against things that we may be asked to do, and to make ourselves more ready for operations in this region.  And that’s all from 68.

CDR Lyon:  I am CDR Jeremy Lyon, Deputy Commander of Task Force 67, located out of Sigonella Air Base, a combined Italian-American airfield in Sicily.  Task Force 67 is composed of land-based tactical aircraft that operate over the waters of the Mediterranean in submarine warfare, anti-surface.  We provide our response, interoperability, and expeditionary combat forces throughout Europe and Africa.  

Our crews will be participating in SEA BREEZE 21, and our aircraft will operate throughout the Black Sea region and other designated locations for this exercise.  We regularly coordinate with NATO and allies around the theater to increase the capability of our collective partners.  SEA BREEZE 21 will allow us to demonstrate our ability , NATO allies and partners.  Our aircraft will refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures, anti-submarine warfare, coordinated operations with surface forces.

Last year during SEA BREEZE we were able to intercept fighter jets.  This year we have expanded that to have fighter jets.  This will serve to better prepare our crews as well at intercepting fighter jets, how to safely conduct air-to-air operations, and expose our teams to new methods, helping to secure airspace. 

The task force is excited for this opportunity to strengthen our interoperability and build relationships and to move [inaudible] been doing in previous exercises.  And that’s it for 67. 

CAPT Gantt:  My name is CAPT Kyle Gantt.  I’m the Deputy Commodore and the Deputy Commander of Task Force 65.  Task Force 65 is headquartered in Rota, Spain, and it is the U.S. Navy’s forward-deployed destroyer squadron in Europe.  As part of that, Task Force 65 executes all surface combatant ship operations in Europe and Africa.  We oversee four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which are stationed in Rota, Spain.  Additionally, we oversee the operations of all cruisers and destroyers deployed to the Europe and Africa theaters.

Specific to SEA BREEZE, CTF-65 represents the United States annually as the lead task force executing exercise SEA BREEZE.  SEA BREEZE allows allies and partners to come together and operate in the Black Sea and build capabilities and to conduct coordinated operations in international waters.  

Question:   What is your general assessment of the Ukrainian navy capabilities during SEA BREEZE to be interoperable with the NATO ships and troops?  Do you feel that there exists any mental or language barriers?  What should be done to improve command and control among the Ukrainian troops training?

CAPT Gantt:  I’ve been very impressed with the capability of the Ukrainian navy.  Just this morning we came from the pre-sail conference, which was led by the Ukrainian navy, and it was a very professional conference.  All of the exercises are conducted using standard procedures, which are common among our allies and we use when operating with our partners.  I am very impressed with the capability and look forward to continuing to build on what is a very strong relationship at sea with the Ukrainian navy.

Question:  It’s somewhat unusual, I think, that you’re doing this exercise around a hostile environment given that Russia has warned allies who participate in that exercise.  Does that imply a different setup or different routines to ensure the safety of participants?  

CAPT Gantt:  This is a long-planned exercise.  In fact, this is an exercise that has happened since 1997.  In fact, this is the 21st iteration.  This is in no way a reactive exercise.  This is a longstanding commitment to an exercise in the Black Sea co-hosted by the United States and the Ukrainian navies.  All nations have the right to operate in international waters, and this exercise will take place either in Ukraine or in international waters.

Question:  What sort of changes have been made to the SEA BREEZE scheduling, logistics, force deployment in response to that, since clearly that’s an indication that Russia is not looking at the presence of these ships very favorably?  And similarly, Russia is conducting somewhat serious anti-aircraft defense drills, I believe as of today, with some pretty advanced fighters and other weaponry.  Is there any concern of inadvertent hostilities, miscommunications that could result from the presence of such a large Western naval force in close proximity of the Russian forces?

LT Dixon:  This is LT Bobby Dixon, public affairs officer.  So what we’re going to do with this question, I’m going to break it up between CTF-65 who runs the ships and CTF-67 who runs the aircrafts for the exercise.  So we’ll start with CAPT Gantt and then go to CTF-67 after that.

CAPT Gantt:  I will refer you to the UK ministry of defense or the royal navy for any comment on interaction between Russia and royal navy ships.  I would say, though, that this exercise is long-planned; this exercise is an international exercise taking place in international waters.  All nations exercise the right to operate in international waters, and this exercise is no different.  Over.

CDR Lyon:  And this is CDR Lyon from the commander of Task Force 67.  And as I’d also say the same, it’s a planned exercise and previous exercises also familiar with throughout the Black Sea region.  It’ll be operating in designated locations approved for the exercise, and the aircraft will be flying in those certain areas during the exercises flight standard specifics with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Question:  What capabilities should the royal navy be focusing on to ensure that it remains a good partner during international operations and exercises like SEA BREEZE 2021?  How concerned was the U.S. Navy by the royal navy’s HMS Defender’s recent close encounter with Russian forces and the subsequent misinformation that was spread about that incident?  I know we’ve touched on it being in international waters, but it’d be interesting to hear whether it’s seen as a somewhat one-off kind of standoff between the two or is it going to be the case we might see incidents like this more regularly where international waters are seen as contested or there’s some debate over that, if that makes sense ?

CAPT Gantt:  For all comments on events happening with the royal navy or in the UK, I’m going to refer you to the royal navy or to the ministry of defense for comment.  As far as operating with the royal navy, the royal navy remains a consistent and very capable partner for the United States, but as well for allies and partners in Europe and around the world.  We have no concerns with our ability to operate with the UK and, in fact, are very much looking forward to continuing the longstanding relationship of operations with the royal navy during exercise SEA BREEZE.

Question:  Are participating ships in the exercise, are they going to avoid international waters that the Russians don’t recognize as international waters?  what kind of preparations are being made to deal with Russian harassment?  And then the second question is about these efforts to, I guess, clear or improve the port, Ukrainian port infrastructure.  Are those actually part of those projects to improve those ports or are they just preparations for those projects?  I mean, I know, for example, the UK is actually going to help Ukraine build or rebuild its port infrastructure.  And just out of curiosity, how did that yacht that’s blocking the pier sink? 

CAPT Gantt:  I’ll take the first part of that question and then I’ll pass it over to CDRE Chen for a follow-up on the second half of your question concerning diving operations and salvage operations here in Odessa.  

So to the first part of your question, all of exercise SEA BREEZE will be conducted in international waters.  We have a longstanding tradition, we have a longstanding process in place for communications with Russia, and that’s the INCSEA agreement.  It provides a standardized set of communications to make sure there is no question when ships communicate with each other how they are – what their intentions are, and it’s a longstanding process that, quite frankly, removes risk.  It allows and facilitates ships operating in the same water space.  And again, I would say that’s an important part of what we’re doing here with SEA BREEZE is we are demonstrating to the world that the Black Sea is an international sea; it is open and available for the free transport of commerce, of shipping, for all nations, and it is not owned by any one nation.  

CDRE Chen:  From the 68 perspective, with regards to the question of the yacht that’s blocking the pier at Odessa, this yacht basically sank due to neglect.  It was previously a part of the ministry of interior for the Soviet era, and it sat unattended for a number of years and then in 2016 it started to sink.  And we received a request from the Ukrainian Government for some assistance in trying to remove this, so we’re finally able to do it during this exercise.  We will be actually conducting the removal during the exercise, and it will continue a little bit beyond because it takes a bit more time to complete this action.  We expect everything to be completed by August 1st with regards to safely removing and clearing all of the pieces of this wreck.  

With regards to other facility improvements, we are doing some survey work at Ochakiv as well of the pier to see if there are any other additional repairs that can be made in the future.  And that’s all from 68.

Question:  Some military experts, like Gen. Ben Hodges and others here in the U.S., anticipate that Russia will increase their military activity in the eastern Ukraine and in Azov area by the end of summer.  How would SEA BREEZE exercise help Ukrainians to defend its waters considering their limited capabilities of their fleet? 

CDRE Chen:  I’m still on the line here.  I think the question was how are we preparing our Ukrainian partners for the future.  

CDRE Chen:  I guess from 68, really partnering, working together, I think, is really the way to strengthen the relationship, and I think through our training and coordination with partners that are here is going to help build and increase the capabilities of our Ukrainian allies.  So more iterations like this and more exercises and continued partnerships, I think, is the key to strengthening ties and improving capabilities in the region. 

Question:  What the U.S. Navy expects, I mean, as a reaction from Russia after this ?  And also, can we also say that this is a new normal now?  I mean more confrontation and engagement in the international waters, not only in the Black Sea but maybe also in the South China Sea. 

CAPT Gantt:  what we expect is that all nations will operate professionally at sea.  We expect that all nations will respect the international laws and norms that govern safe and professional operations at sea.  I expect that from Russia and I expect that from all of the forces here operating in SEA BREEZE.

Question:  As the exercise gets underway, I was curious what do you guys – what have you guys seen from the Russian military so far, any increased surveillance of allied or partner ships maneuvering in the Black Sea getting ready for events?  Maybe if you could describe that a little bit.  And then also, there was mention that there’s going to be sort of part of the exercise is going to involve training for intercepts and so forth, involving U.S., Ukrainian, I think British aircraft.  As part of that, are these planes also going to be prepared to possibly intercept Russian aircraft should they decide to buzz allied ships as they have in the past in the Black Sea? 

CAPT Gantt:  This is CAPT Gantt here in Odessa.  The first part of that question I’ll get to by saying I’m not going to certainly discuss any intelligence, but what I would say is we have seen that when we operate – we, the United States or our allies or our partners – we see that Russia routinely observes our operations, and it is their right to do so when they’re doing that in international waters.  They have just as much right to be in the Black Sea and operate in the Black Sea as any other nation.  The thing that we have to ensure is that everyone agrees that the Black Sea is open for safe and professional operations for all nations.  The Black Sea is not owned by any one nation.  It is an international body of water, and all the rights that accrue to nations to operate there are available to all nations.  

CAPT Gantt:  The main takeaway for us is we are looking forward to another iteration of SEA BREEZE, an exercise that we have conducted since 1997, now an exercise that we consistently experience safe and professional operations at sea, and we look forward to again demonstrating through our partnership with allies and partners here in the Black Sea that the Black Sea is open to all nations.

LT Dixon:  Just wanted to say for all the media folks on here that for exercise SEA BREEZE, you’re going to find all of the products and videos and photos or press releases on our Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram pages.  It’s just – you just search “Exercise SEA BREEZE” and we should be the top one.  It’s a verified account.  It’s co-hosted by the Ukrainians, so we work on it together posting in English, Ukrainian, and we’ll also distribute postings in French as well as we have a lot of African countries participating as well this year.  

The Baltic Region’s maritime-focused exercise BALTOPS 50, which includes defensive cyberwarfare tactics for the first time, has launched, the U.S. Navy said.

Air and maritime assets from 18 NATO allies and partner nations will participate in BALTOPS 50’s live training events, which kicked off on Sunday and will go through June 18, the U.S. Navy announced.

Participating nations include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Britain and the United States.

The events include air defense, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, maritime interdiction, and mine countermeasure operations.

“This year, we celebrate the 50th BALTOPS, an exercise that sets the foundation of interoperability across the Alliance,” U.S. Vice Adm. Gene Black, commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO and commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, said in the announcement.

“For the first time, exercise design incorporates defensive cyber warfare tactics, techniques and procedures as BALTOPS continues to adapt and train to ensure an asymmetric advantage in the era of modern warfare,” the Navy announcement added.

The exercise has been divided into two at sea training phases, the combat enhancement training and forced integration training portion, along with a final tactical phase as it was last year.

Also, similar to last year, Naval Striking and Support Forces ashore will command the exercise from headquarters in Portugal.

“II Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Expeditionary Strike Group 2 will command and control exercise Marine forces throughout the exercise from aboard USS Mount Whitney, demonstrating international naval integration and power projection ashore for an amphibious demonstration in Lithuania,” the Navy added in the BALTOPS 50 announcement.

Ships and aircraft will transit through the Danish Straits in the first six days, demonstrating the CET/FIT phase, and “focusing on maritime operations in critical chokepoints, ensuring access and freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea,” according to the statement.

The exercise will continue to move east during CET/FIT phase, and will end with the tactical “free-play” phase, which gives commanders more freedom and is designed to emulate “real-world situations,” the Navy said.

The maritime-focused exercise that brings together NATO allies and partners has been held in the Baltic region since 1972.

“BALTOPS stands as the keystone of our exercise season, demonstrating half a century of the unwavering commitment of our partners and allies,” Black said in the BALTOPS 50 announcement.

“Lessons learned in BALTOPS enable international strike group operations, advanced missile defense capabilities and seamless surface action group missions,” Black said.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Special Briefing via Telephone with Vice Admiral Gene Black Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO And Rear Admiral James Morley Royal Navy, Deputy Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO.

Vice Admiral Black:  Well, Good morning, Thank you for joining us as we commence BALTOPS 50.  I’m Vice Admiral Gene Black.  I’m the Commander of Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO; I’m the Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.  As Justin said, with me today is Royal Navy Rear Admiral James Morley, my Deputy Commander at STRIKFORNATO.  I’m calling in from Naples, Italy, headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, while Admiral Morley is calling in from our headquarters at Oeiras, in Portugal, from Strike Force NATO.  We will command and control BALTOPS 50 this year from Strike Force NATO’s operations center.  

Yesterday we began the 50 iteration of BALTOPS, an exercise that sets the foundation of interoperability across the alliance.  Eighteen nations with more than 40 ships, 60 aircraft, and 4,000 personnel will operate together in the Baltic Sea.  BALTOPS represents half a century of unwavering commitment to maritime security by our partners and allies.  Lessons learned during BALTOPS enable international strike group operations, advanced missile defense capabilities, seamless surface action group missions, amphibious operations, and mine warfare.  In other words, we will exercise the full range of maritime missions.

Last week the French carrier Charles de Gaulle and the UK carrier Queen Elizabeth operated alongside one another in the Mediterranean.  Two weeks ago, during exercise Formidable Shield, a Dutch ship passed ballistic missile tracking and targeting information to a U.S. Navy destroyer that successfully engaged an inbound ballistic missile threat.  These high-end international capabilities derive from exercises like BALTOPS, which routinely demonstrate the strength, commitment, and capability of our alliance.  

BALTOPS stands as a premier annual joint multinational maritime-focused exercise in the Baltic Sea.  The exercise continually adapts to meet current and emerging regional security demands, bringing together participating nations in a realistic training environment to ensure maritime security and stability.  Through 50 iterations of this exercise, generations of allied and partner nation sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen have growth together in operational experience and built lasting relationships based on mutual respect.  

I am pleased to give the floor to Rear Admiral James Morley, Royal Navy, who will provide you with an overview of the execution of BALTOPS 50, and then we will take your questions. 

Rear Admiral Morley:  I’m Rear Admiral James Morley; I’m the Deputy Commander of Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, and I’m speaking to you from Portugal.

BALTOPS forms a key element of NATO’s exercise program – a key part in the alliance deterrence and defense, as both readiness and operating with each other rely on military training.  It’s the largest maritime exercise we conduct in the Baltic region.  It serves a number of purposes, but principally it’s an opportunity to demonstrate alliance cohesion, a chance to demonstrate and to develop and to test alliance capability, and it’s all done with an emphasis on transparency.  And I might just touch on each of those points in turn.

So first of all, BALTOPS is conducted annually, as the Admiral has described, and it’s the 50th exercise.  It’s a perfect platform for allies and partners to work together, and is a demonstrable commitment by NATO to the security and stability of the Baltic Sea region.  This year we have 16 NATO and two partner nations contributing, so 18 nations together, including Sweden and Finland.  And among them we bring 40 ships, over 60 aircraft, and over 4,000 people to the exercise.

Secondly, the exercise demonstrates and develops alliance capability and readiness.  The chance for allies to operate alongside each other, just as they would fight together, training across the entire spectrums of naval warfare against conventional threats from aircraft, ships, and submarines, including this year against a highly capable Swedish submarine, and in mine warfare, in amphibious operations, and in maritime interdiction operations.  

We’re going to do this in two distinct phases.  The first is a training and integration period to improve unit readiness using a pre-planned serialized program; and then a tactical exercise, or free-play phase, where we’ll immerse ourselves in a fictitious scenario.  Units won’t know what the enemy will do next and will be expected to react as they would for real to a series of multi-threat challenges.  

For the first time we’ll be playing defensive cyberwarfare tactics, techniques, and procedures into the scenario.  It’s something we contend with and do every day, but it’ll give both commanders and operators something else to contend with.  We’ll also be experimenting with unmanned and autonomous systems, particularly in mine warfare.  

Finally, all this takes place with an emphasis on transparency.  BALTOPS is a long-planned and publicly announced exercise conducted in compliance with international law, with a strong focus on real-world safety.  

In preparing for the exercise, we have of course had to account for the COVID pandemic at every stage, planning activity virtually wherever possible and minimizing travel.  One of the benefits has been to force the pace of adopting distributed command and control arrangements, in the same way that many organizations are now considering permanent changes to ways of working.  So while Admiral Black is connected from his headquarters in Naples, the team here in Lisbon will maintain overall control of the exercise.  Meanwhile, the command ship USS Mount Whitney will be in the Baltic to host the command teams from the Second Expeditionary Strike Group and Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade.  

Participation in BALTOPS allows allies and partners to demonstrate their commitment to regional security, working together.  The activity is a reinforcement of NATO’s commitment to regional security and a stable and prosperous Baltic Sea region, sending a strong message towards any potential adversary and reducing the chance of conflict.  

Question :  Have you seen any indication of a Russian military buildup in response to these exercises?  Have you seen any indication of increased Russian cyber activity?

Vice Admiral Black:  As we said, BALTOPS is regularly scheduled and announced, and always there is a slight uptick in Russian activity as we bring forces into and operate in the Baltic.  It’s completely within the realm of what we would expect, and we don’t anticipate anything terribly out of character from what we’ve seen before.  

With regard to the cyber ops, I prefer not to comment due to the concerns with operational security.  

Question :  How are the present tensions in the region between Russia and Belarus and the Western allies affecting the exercise?  Is there a higher risk of provocations or other conflict, and how will these risks be addressed during the exercise?  And was the program of the exercise somehow altered or affected by those tensions?

Vice Admiral Black:  As I said earlier, this is previously scheduled.  It’s the 50th iteration.  It’s generally in the same size and scope that we have done, and I do anticipate there will be Russian activity in response, as there always is, and is probably appropriate.  

With regard to tensions between Belarus and that, I’ll defer to my partners in the State Department to comment on that. 

Question : Is this year’s BALTOPS exercise linked to other exercises being held by the allies across Europe?

Vice Admiral Black:  While BALTOPS is not linked to another exercise, it does run concurrently with several that are ongoing in the theater, including Baltic Fortress hosted by the Lithuanians, and then DEFENDER-Europe, which is part of a series hosted by the U.S. Army in Europe. 

Question : I was wondering if there is any new – other than cyber, is there any new aspect or new equipment being used?  I mean, are any new unmanned underwater vehicles being used or used for the first time during an exercise or an international exercise, for example?

Rear Admiral Morley:  As I outlined in my opening remarks, the majority of the experimentation and new equipment that we’re trialing in this exercise are in the mine warfare area of warfare.  So we’ve got a high number of mine warfare platforms taking part this year, probably more than usual, from a range of nations.  And we’ll be using a range of both conventional and autonomous systems that various nations are trialing in the exercise to give them some real-world context and to test them alongside conventional capability.  

We can provide you with a bit more detail on that, if you want, in either a separate session or we can provide you with the actual detail.  I know Janes is particularly interesting in this particular aspect.  So we are very happy to provide that separately.  Over.  

Question:  My question is the Russian cyber company’s activities within NATO countries, especially in Amsterdam, they’re having some cyber operation in Amsterdam against the NATO countries.  How U.S. can respond to this?

Vice Admiral Black:  Nadarajah, Admiral Black here.  Thanks for your question.  I don’t really want to get into operational matters with regard to cyber.  

Vice Admiral Black:  Thank you for pulling this together and thank you to all of the folks participating for your interest in BALTOPS.  As we said, this is the 50th iteration of this exercise, and it’s foundational to so many of the things we do as an alliance.  We’re excited to be able to be doing it at sea, and mindful of the COVID restrictions, though, we are still able to have some interactions ashore and among the sailors, which we weren’t able to get last year.

Rear Admiral Morley:  The activity is absolutely a reinforcement of NATO’s commitment to regional security and a stable and prosperous Baltic Sea region, and we’ll be doing everything we can to reinforce that during the period of BALTOPS 50.  To go back to Justin’s question, very happy to take offline some – correction, Nicholas’s question – very happy to provide him with more detail on the specifics of the unmanned systems that we’re trialing during the exercise.