The U.S. is discussing with its NATO allies what they can offer Turkey in terms of military assistance in Idlib and discussing measures that may be taken if Russia and the Syrian government breaks a ceasefire, officials said on Tuesday.

“We are looking at what NATO can do,” James Jeffrey, the U.S.’ special envoy for Syria, told reporters in a conference call from Brussels where he was holding talks with allies. “Everything is on table.”

Jeffrey, who was speaking alongside the U.S. ambassador to Turkey David Satterfield, ruled out the use of ground troops should the ceasefire be broken and repeated that Ankara needed to clarify its stance on purchase of the Russian S400 Air Defence System.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador James Jeffrey, U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and Ambassador David Satterfield, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

Ambassador Jeffrey:  We are here today in Brussels to talk with officials of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and the European Union about the continuing crisis in Idlib despite the ceasefire last week.  Idlib is the focal point of the entire Syrian conflict since 2011, as the Assad regime, backed by Iran and Russia, seek a military victory in defiance of the international community’s approach, which is a negotiated settlement under UN Resolution 2254 – passed by everyone on the Security Council, including Russia, in December 2015.

Right now we are focused, first of all, on the humanitarian disaster, where some three and a half million refugees, or internally displaced people, jammed together in about half of the province of Idlib, many of them very close to the Turkish border, who risk coming across, destabilizing Turkey, and perhaps moving on to Europe if the ceasefire does not hold.  Therefore, we’re doing our utmost to work with the European Union and to work with NATO to see security, humanitarian, economic, and diplomatic steps that can be taken to, first of all, ensure that this ceasefire remains an enduring ceasefire, and secondly, that we can start moving all sides to a negotiated settlement.  

Ambassador Satterfield:  I just want to underscore the reality and the magnitude of the challenge that the global community, but particularly Europe, the region of the Middle East, and Turkey in specific, face here.  A deliberate Russian decision to initiate a campaign in Idlib – the last extant de-escalation zone – has used as its primary lever the presence of 3 million-plus innocent civilians, the majority of whom are women and children.  By forcing their movement, their displacement from their home under very difficult conditions, towards the Turkish border, Russia’s calculation is this will compel Turkey to take decisions favourable to Russian ambitions to both retake the Idlib zone for the regime and effect, through the retaking of Idlib, an end to the ability of the international community to see either the full implementation of Resolution 2254 or a situation in which there is any stand made against Russian aggression.

I underscore Russian aggression, because the Syrian regime on its own could not be conducting this campaign.  This is enabled by, at all times, Russian air and ground activity, but particularly air.  Turkey faces in the immediate case, but Europe as a whole, the challenge posed by up to 3 million displaced moving in an increasingly compressed fashion, as Jim noted, up against the Turkish border.  It is imperative that everything possible be done at this moment to stabilize, in an enduring fashion, the ceasefire agreed to in Moscow on March 5th, to put an end to territorial incursions.  There will be no safe zone, no secure zone, if there is not an enduring ceasefire.  

The sad record of Syria over the course of the past two years has been ceasefires with Russian guarantees have not been ceasefires; they are temporary, transactional halts until Russia is prepared to renew the campaign.  That must not be the case in Idlib.

Question:  We know that Turkey asked the United States to send Patriot missile defence batteries to improve its air defence capability in the Idlib escalation.  Recently there were reports that you were pressing the Pentagon to send Patriot missiles defence batteries to Turkey to help it repel the Syrian Government’s assault in Idlib, but Pentagon was resisting it.  And the Turkish foreign minister lately said that Turkey still wants Patriots to be deployed near its Syrian border as part of NATO Operation Active Fence.  And today you are in Brussels to increase NATO’s assistance to Turkey’s security concerns from Idlib.  So is there any possibility that the United States or any other NATO ally would send more Patriot missiles to Turkey as part of Operation Active Fence?  And is there any disagreement on this issue within the U.S. administration? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  First of all, that Politico article was quite false in the details and some of the basic points it made, but I’ll set that to one side because, of course, we are looking at ways we can assist Turkey.  That’s why we’re here.  That’s why Turkey, under Article 4 of the NATO Charter, called on NATO countries to support it, and we’re here working with the other NATO countries to see what options are available.  

There are NATO Patriot batteries from Spain, one battery right now in Turkey.  There has been various deployments of NATO forces since 2012 into Turkey in response to the Syrian crisis.  We’re looking at what NATO can do.  Everything is on the table.  We’ll see what happens next, what our allies are willing to put on the table, and then we’ll see what the United States can do to support them.

Question: What can you say about the presence and involvement of Iranian forces and proxies in Idlib?

Ambassador Jeffrey:  One of the major risks to the region of this terrible crisis is the involvement of Iranian forces – not only to prop up the war criminal Assad regime, but also to deploy long-range missile and other weapon systems to threaten our partners and allies such as Turkey, such as Israel, such as Jordan, and to threaten our own U.S. military positions in the Middle East as we saw recently in Iraq.  So we have noticed that these forces have become very directly involved in the fighting in Idlib, in part because the Syrian army forces have half-collapsed under the attack of the Turkish military in the past few weeks.  This is another indication that Iran is driving on its own axis in Syria, not only supporting the Assad regime, which is bad enough, but trying to expand its own hegemonic agenda throughout the northern Levant, and this is something the United States is absolutely opposed to.

Question:  Turkey expects a response from NATO regarding the request conveyed on the 28th of February.  Which are the requests you are willing to support and what are the specific challenges you are facing in meeting Turkey’s request?  And you have elaborated on the humanitarian aid topic.  EU has announced preconditions for humanitarian aid to Idlib.  The Europeans want security guarantees.  Erdogan stated that Turkey already started construction work for facilities and defined it as a safe zone.  And what is the U.S. administration’s view regarding the conditions for establishing a safe zone and humanitarian aid? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  That’s three separate questions: safe zone, military assistance, and humanitarian assistance.  Let me start with the humanitarian assistance.

The EU has been very, very generous, as has the United States as the largest single country donor to the Syrian crisis with over $10.6 billion committed since the beginning of the crisis, including 108 million more that our UN Ambassador Kelly Craft, Ambassador Satterfield, and I witnessed being presented last week on the border to Idlib.  There are always some technical and administrative issues involving the delivery of humanitarian assistance across borders.  These are routine.  I don’t think there’s a problem.  I am sure the European Union will be delivering the promised humanitarian assistance.  They have so in the past.  They have provided hundreds – hundreds of millions of euros to people in Idlib; they will continue doing so.  I’m not worried about that.

In terms of what the alliance can provide to Turkey to provide, let’s say, a safe zone broadly defined – that is, a permanent ceasefire and a secure area for the people who are now in Idlib to remain there, which is what everybody wants – that will require, first of all, an analysis of the military threats that are presented by the Syrian Government and Russia, and as we just discussed, Iran; secondly, Turkey’s capabilities; thirdly, what NATO states can do individually and perhaps as an alliance, because there are – again, as we just said – some alliance military decisions on deployments to help protect Turkey.  We’re going to look into those.  There are also things that the United States can do on its own.  We have considerable weapons agreements with Turkey and we’re looking into how we can be helpful there.  

Question:  Why did the U.S. decline to support the latest vote in the Security Council in favour of the recent Turkish-Russian agreement?  Second question:  How will the U.S. support Turkey in the event of confrontations in Syria between Turkey and the Syrian Government.  And third:  Why is the United States concerned about Russia providing Turkey with the S-400s?

Ambassador Satterfield:  The United States Government has made clear through every channel available to us, including briefing teams in Turkey since the fall of 2017, cautioning that acquisition of the most advanced Russian air defense system, the S-400, is fundamentally incompatible with Turkey’s obligations as a member of the F-35 consortium, it is incompatible with Turkey’s role as a NATO partner, and it would produce serious consequences with respect to the U.S. CAATSA, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, legislation.  There must be a resolution to the S-400 issue in order for all of the questions which that act has now raised to be fully resolved.  We hope that that can take place.

Ambassador Jeffrey:  On the Security Council deliberations on the ceasefire, first and foremost, let me make clear the United States welcomes this ceasefire as a potentially important step towards an enduring ceasefire and towards a political resolution under 2254, which calls for such ceasefires throughout the country.  What happened in the Security Council – and I have to be general because these consultations are not for the public – was that we and other countries were presented by a text given by the Russians that the Security Council was to adopt.  We and other countries had questions about that text.  We also pointed out that we had not heard from the Turks; the Turks had not cleared that text and we were not comfortable with that particular text going out at that time.  That’s all there is to that.

The final question – how will the U.S. support Turkey in the event of confrontations between Turkey and the Syrian Government – again, I just covered that in the last two questions that we answered.

Question:  Do you believe, or why would you believe, that Russia and the Assad regime has any interest in a permanent ceasefire in Idlib?

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Steve, you’ll get a very clear answer to that.  We don’t believe they have any interest in a permanent ceasefire in Idlib.  They are out to get a military victory in all of Syria.  Our goal is to make it very difficult for them to do that by a variety of diplomatic, military, and other actions.  One, for example, is we have basically prohibited the use of chemical weapons, which was a favourite tactic of the Syrian regime in making advances, because they know that we, probably with several of our allies, will respond in a very savage military way to that.

Secondly, we have for other reasons – fighting Daesh – U.S. and coalition forces in parts of Syria.  That is a complication for the Syrian Government.  They have to take that into consideration.  

Finally, there are U.S. sanctions; there are European Union sanctions; there is a ban on any reconstruction assistance to put this country back together again – all of which we are not going to relent on nor will the European Union from all of our conversations here until the Russians and the Syrian Government will actually sit down and talk about a compromise political settlement that will involve a ceasefire, not just in Idlib but throughout the country.  So we’re waiting for them to respond to us.

Ambassador Satterfield:  Let me go one step beyond what Jim just said.  Why should we believe that the regime has any intention of wishing to see its citizens remain in Idlib?  The answer here is we don’t.  We know the intent of the regime is to force these populations, like other Syrian populations, out of the country and to have them leave permanently.  There is no prospect of refugees returning to Syria.  The regime has done everything in its power with respect to the limited returns that took place from Rukban, the returns that have taken place in limited fashion from Lebanon and elsewhere, to send the very clear message:  “You’re not welcome, don’t come home.”  

And so everyone is quite right to be not just skeptical but absolutely disbelieving about regime intent and Russian intent.

Question:  I would like to understand how do you evaluate the recent messages coming from Ankara, especially on S-400s?  On the one hand, Erdogan underlines that they will not – they will not step back and it will become operational by April.  On the other hand, even today, just a few minutes ago before your briefing, Erdogan once more said that it’s a condition for NATO and U.S. not to activate the S-400s.  So do you think there is a conflicting issue between these statements on that?  And are you much more optimistic about Turkey’s attitudes on S-400s?

Ambassador Satterfield:  You would have to refer to the Turkish Government for clarification on its own statements and positions.  With respect to the United States, we have been very clear and very consistent.  We wish to move ahead in a robust economic-security relationship with Turkey.  The President, President Trump, is committed to this.  But for the security relationship to move forward as we would wish, as the Government of Turkey would wish, and I believe as NATO wishes, there will need to be a resolution to the S-400 issue.

Question:  My question is about the S-400 implications of Turkey’s purchase, which is what Mr. Satterfield talked about.  Do you see the CAATSA issue coming up in the Senate or elsewhere in the Congress later this month if Turkey does not back down from this decision?   And my second question is about Idlib and the ceasefire that Turkey and Russia agreed on March 5th.  Is there a backup plan for the U.S. if that ceasefire collapses and Turkey finds itself again face to face with Russian-backed forces, such as establishing a no-fly zone in the area? 

Ambassador Satterfield:  I’ll respond to the question about the S-400s and CAATSA.  I can only base my comments, which are well-known to the Turkish Government, on what we are told by congressional leaders, both Republican and Democrat.  They had indicated to us they’ve communicated directly to the Turkish Government as recently as the conference in Munich that yes, if there is no resolution to the S-400 issue, and even though there is strong support for Turkey’s role in Idlib as well as in Libya in standing up to Russian moves, that without a resolution on the S-400 the likelihood of legislation moving that incorporates a mandatory application of CAATSA will at some point in the not-distant future occur.

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Thanks for returning to the ceasefire.  As we said in answering Steve Erlanger’s question, we don’t think that the Russians or Syrians are serious about a long-term ceasefire.  That doesn’t mean we won’t have a long-term ceasefire.  That is still our hope, and that’s what we’re working for.  First of all, we note that if it wasn’t for the strong military performance by the Turkish army and the opposition forces, and if it wasn’t for the strong international reaction – diplomatic, media, and other – to the Russian-Syrian offensive, we don’t think we would have gotten this ceasefire in the first place.  

So our goal is to inventory here in Brussels with our European and NATO colleagues what are the military, the diplomatic, the economic, the sanctions, and the media and outreach steps we can take to encourage Russia and Syria not to do what we think they want to do, which is to break the ceasefire, push these 3 million refugees across the border, but rather to think twice.  If they ignore our warnings, if they ignore our preparations and move forward, we will then react as rapidly as possible in consultation with our European and NATO allies on what the package of sanctions and other reactions will be.

Question:  I was wondering if you have seen any evidence to suggest that the coronavirus is present and spreading among the civilian population among Idlib, and even if not, does the pandemic complicate your efforts to get a solution here? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  We have not seen any outbreak of that virus among the people in Idlib.  Of course, we have only limited eyes on through humanitarian aid delivery NGOs, but so far, we haven’t seen any.  We’re going to do our jobs as government officials regardless of the coronavirus situation.  That’s our instructions from the top and we’re carrying them out.

Question:   The Bosnia war ended with the Dayton Agreements.  What are the odds that a similar peace and stabilisation deal could be struck for the north of Syria?  Could NATO and/or blue helmets with a UN Security Council mandate play a role to provide a shield for humanitarian buffer and no-fly zones?

Ambassador Jeffrey:  First of all, UN Resolution 2254, which I mentioned a bit ago, was drawn up with the experience of, among other things, Bosnia and various other conflicts in mind.  It does see ceasefires as we got with Dayton, which I happen to have worked on, and then deployment of peacekeepers, deployment of international civilian organizations to help with reconstruction, and a political process to reconcile the sides.  That is basically the thrust of 2254, which we support very strongly.

How you will carry that out – once there is the will for a compromise solution – is a question of diplomatic expertise, technical advice, and the situation on the ground.  But certainly, everything that you recommended would be in play.

The key question is not how we would carry out a compromise solution.  The key question is how do we get the other side – Assad in Damascus, Putin in Moscow, the ayatollahs in Tehran – to agree to a compromise ceasefire.  That’s the task before us.

Question:  I want to ask about the reason for using the American veto against the Idlib agreement ? Is Turkey facing a difficult situation and divisions that prevent real aid from being provided to it outside statements and statements ? Do you think that let’s call it the Turkish-Russian honeymoon is over and the U.S.-Turkish relationship will return to how it used to be? If the U.S. agrees to provide aid to Turkey, what kind of support?  Are we talking about – is the military one among them?

Ambassador Jeffrey:  I’ll take the first and the fourth.  As I just explained, there was no American veto.  There was no vote.  We do welcome the 5 March Moscow ceasefire.  The problem in the Security Council was that Russia presented a text that contained language that we couldn’t see verified.  We had not heard the Turkish side of what was negotiated there.  We couldn’t verify the text with the Turks, so we and other countries had some questions and as a result, the Security Council did not issue a statement.  That happens all the time in these confidential discussions of security issues.

In terms of the U.S. aid, we’re looking at the various ways we can help Turkey based upon the situation, but also I want to stress based upon – this is a classic theme of the Trump administration, for good reason – what our other NATO allies can provide.  There are 28 of them, or 27 of them not counting us.  They have a GDP larger than ours and they’re much closer to the situation here in Europe.  So, therefore, it’s not unreasonable for us to also find out what they’re going to provide as we decide how we can be helpful.

Ambassador Satterfield:  The term “honeymoon with Russia” is yours.  It is not a term that has ever been used by the U.S. Government or by the Turkish Government with us.  Turkey is a part of the NATO Alliance; it is a part of Europe; it is a part, in our view, of the West.  Russia has interests in Turkey and through Turkey.  We all understand that.  The Turkish Government understands that.  But a honeymoon has never existed, and the cold reality of Russian intentions, of the contrast between Russian promises and Russian delivery, could not have been made clearer to all governments involved, including the Turks.

Since the fall of last year, I would cite northeast Syria, where Russia failed to perform on any of its assurances in Sochi towards Turkey, as well as the ongoing Russian mendacity with respect to ceasefires and arrangements having to do with Idlib.

Question:  I was wondering if there’s been any discussion of the deployment of ground troops into Syria if Russia violates the ceasefire again?  And then what exactly is being considered to hold them accountable for any ceasefire violations? I mean What’s being considered to hold them accountable for any ceasefire violations ?

Ambassador Jeffrey:  First of all, I think you can forget ground troops.  Ground troops is only an extremis measure, generally, in these things, and Turkey has demonstrated ably that it and its opposition forces are more than capable of holding ground on their own.  The issue is the situation in the air, and that’s what we’re looking at.

In terms of accountability, we, first of all, rely upon the United Nations.  And here the secretary-general, Secretary-General Guterres, has been very, very helpful.  He’s summoned forth a board of inquiry to look into the situation in Idlib.  We’re expecting its results to be made public very, very soon.  We have had a number of UN institutions, organizations, and study groups repeatedly point to violations of humanitarian law, violations of the laws of war by the Assad regime and, in some cases, the Russians.  We are bringing this up in the Security Council.  We’re bringing this up elsewhere in the United Nations.  We will continue to do so, and any violations of the ceasefire we will do our very best to include in the now extraordinarily broad and deep documentation of Russian and Syrian actions that, in some cases, reach the level of war crimes.

The United States will not invite Russian observers to visit NATO-initiated Defender-Europe 20 military drills in Europe as it is not hosting the exercises, Maj. Gen. Andrew Rohling, the deputy commanding general of the US Army Europe, said on Wednesday.

The drills are set to take place across 10 countries and envision the biggest deployment of US military forces to Europe in 25 years. The exercises expect to involve 37,000 allied troops from 18 nations, including 20,000 US servicemen.

“And so to maintain maximum transparency, host nations can invite representatives from OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] to participate and observe the exercise and to confirm their defensive nature. The United States Army will not invite Russian observers onto any other host nations’ soil. That is the the role of each individual country that is participating to invite any Russian observers,” Rohling told reporters via a conference call.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by  Major General Andrew “Andy” , Rohling Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe.

Major General Rohling:  I am Major General Andrew Rohling.  I am the Deputy Commander of the United States Army Europe.  I want to thank you for taking the time this morning to talk about DEFENDER-Europe 20.

The last time that we, the United States Army Europe, spoke to you, you heard from Brigadier General Sean Bernabe, our G3 operations officer, on what DEFENDER 20 – DEFENDER-Europe 20 is, and so today I’d like to kind of talk a little bit more about what we’ve done so far. 

As you know, DEFENDER-Europe 20 is the largest deployment of U.S.-based forces to Europe in an exercise for more than 25 years.  The purpose of DEFENDER-Europe is to exercise the U.S. military’s ability to deploy a large force of personnel and equipment from the Continental United States here to Europe – and, alongside our NATO partners and allies, quickly respond to a crisis. 

As the name suggests, DEFENDER and its linked exercises are defensive in nature.  They are not directed towards any one country or specific threat.  This is about building our collective capabilities as a nation, and as part of the NATO Alliance, to respond to a crisis.  

DEFENDER-Europe 20 will send a clear and unmistakable signal that the United States is committed to NATO and the defense of the European homeland.

It is not just a U.S. exercise.  DEFENDER-Europe 20 relies on the support of the entire Alliance and we will build a whole-of-Europe readiness and interoperability.

As U.S. soldiers began arriving at the airports and ports across Europe in the middle of February, their equipment had entered via multiple seaports in Belgium and Germany.  These sites, along with other seaports, serve as the logistical hubs for DEFENDER-Europe 20.

These personnel and their equipment have begun to move through multiple countries to arrive at training areas across Germany, Poland, and the Baltics, where they will join other NATO allies and partner militaries to conduct various linked training exercises. 

For some details, currently 15 of 27 air missions have brought approximately 3,500 of about 17,000 U.S. soldiers to Europe.  Four of 10 vessels have arrived into theater with three more currently in transit between the Continental United States and here.  These vessels have brought approximately 2,700 of about 18,000 pieces of equipment here to theater.  We’ve currently – we are currently executing 51 convoy movements through Germany and Poland, and completed one of four Army Prepositioned Stock draws of about 1,400 pieces of equipment.

Though our focus has been on DEFENDER, we are closely monitoring, of course, the current situation with the COVID-19 virus and its potential effect on all of us.  At this time, there are no U.S. soldiers, families or members or civilian employees affected by the virus, and it has not impacted the execution DEFENDER 20 at this point, although we are closely monitoring the situation and working with our host nation partners to make sure our policies with those of our host nations and work to prevent any spread of the virus.

Question:  You mentioned so far no sign of it affecting DEFENDER.  Could you talk about – I mean, it’s a fluid situation and there are signs that it’s expanding all over the place.  Are you guys involved in contingency planning, looking at options to alter the exercise should it expand more deeply into places like Germany and Poland? 

Major General Rohling:  Sure.  So just to make sure, the DEFENDER 20 plan in itself already had a robust medical support for all its exercise participants.  But in light of, as you say, the – where it’s going today, the United States Army, USAREUR, staff, we are in fact war-gaming public health and medical support plans to identify any potential changes or anything else we need to address, and most importantly, we’re tied very tightly with each of the host nations and what they’re conducting and their requirements across Europe.

Question: What U.S. armor units will participate in the exercise with Trophy active protection systems and what other new kit will be used for the first time?

Major General Rohling:  Sure.  So the Trophy equipment is coming out of the – the equipment is coming out of the Army Prepositioned Stocks in Germany, and it has already moved to Bergen-Hohne.  The unit that will exercise that is the 116th, the Army National Guard from Idaho, and they will be conducting the installation and initial training exercises on that.

As far as other equipment that’s being trained, we’ve got a number of small pieces of equipment.  The biggest is really going to be our – is conceptual training with new equipment that’ll happen during the Joint Warfighting Assessment in late April at Grafenwoehr, where we will train the concepts for new equipment and new doctrine that the Army is trying to do as part of its modernization efforts.

Question:  Have you invited Russian observers to the drills, and if so, did they accept the invitation?

Major General Rohling:  DEFENDER 20, Europe 20, was planned and executed in full compliance with all of our applicable conventional arms control agreements, so the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Vienna Document – the Vienna Document on confidence and security-building measures, and the Open Skies Treaty.  We have provided the appropriate Vienna Document notifications in November of 2018 and again in November of 2019 to all 57 participating states within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to include the Russian Federation.  And so to maintain maximum transparency, host nations can invite representatives from OSCE to participate and observe the exercise and to confirm their defensive nature.  The United States Army will not invite Russian observers onto any other host nation’s soil.  That is the role of each individual country that’s participating to invite any Russian observers, but we have been quite open and transparent in that.

Question:  I’m just looking at illustrations of the troop movements, and it doesn’t appear that any of the paths include Luxembourg.  Is there any involvement in Luxembourg territory or personnel in this?

Major General Rohling:  I’m just reviewing my map one more time to make sure that I can – I agree with that.  I think you are correct.  I do not see us driving through Luxembourg at this time, but Luxembourg has been a good partner in all the things that we’ve been doing in planning and other assorted maneuvers as we’ve transited in the past as part of Atlantic Resolve and other assorted activities.  But to my knowledge, we are not, in fact, using Luxembourg as a transit route.

Question:  Can you talk in more detail about the ‘joint forcible entry phase?’  Should we understand this as a power projection or reinforcement operation in an A2/AD-shaped environment or as a sort of REFORGER in an A2/AD environment?

Major General Rohling:  Sure.  Thanks for that question.  So the joint forcible entry portion of this is what is going to be known as Swift Response in the past; it’ll be a consolidation of airborne forces in Ramstein, Germany, and then we will conduct an airborne operation in Latvia, Lithuania, and into Georgia.  So it’s multinational in terms of the paratroopers, multinational in terms of the aircraft being used, command-and-controlled by a United States airborne division, and it’ll exercise the command and control over distance of multiple drop zones and soldiers.  And then, of course, the current A2/AD environment and capabilities has definitely been taken into consideration as we planned this exercise.

Question:  I would like to ask concerning the preparation and conduction of the exercise?

Major General Rohling:  we, in fact, have seen disinformation.  We were expecting some, exactly.  To make sure that we’re in tune to that, we have established a joint information center here at our headquarters that monitors open-source press and other – and open-source webs and other assorted media, and we’ve been attempting every time we catch wind of it to quickly assimilate it and put out the truth as opposed to misinformation that – and where it’s coming from.

Question: Will there be any Lithuanian seaports used in DEFENDER 2020?

Major General Rohling:  Thank you for the question, Andrius.  No, there will not be a Lithuanian seaport during this exercise.

Question:  This exercise itself is impressive, but it reminds us, unfortunately, of the times of the Cold War and how the nature of warfare has crucially changed since then.  As we see in Ukraine, an enemy that does not use open combat and prefers to use hybrid techniques, which are impossible to deal with via traditional military means, can be a challenge.  What are you going to do, General, if there are ‘little green men’ who engage in some kind of operation within the European theater?

Major General Rohling:  So this exercise is not exactly designed for that threat in mind.  This exercise is designed around the strategic readiness of the United States and its allies to move from the United States, here to Europe, to counter more of a conventional crisis.  So, admittedly, that’s not the scenario that we’re attempting to train in the larger picture of DEFENDER-Europe 20.  

However, inside of DEFENDER-Europe 20 is our Joint Warfighting Assessment that we’ll be conducting in our command post exercise at Grafenwoehr, Germany, where we are hoping to train the larger units at the corps and division level in warfare as we see it in the year 2028.  So those things that you’re talking about and have experienced in the Ukraine will be part of that scenario at the command post exercise, but not as we train in the large picture of ground maneuver here in DEFENDER-Europe 20.

Question:  I have two questions.  The first is on coronavirus.  What if any soldier would be affected by this disease ? What kind of measures is Army Europe going to take?  can you give me an approximate number of the soldiers which will be in Poland during DEFENDER-Europe 20?  Thank you very much.

Major General Rohling:  To your first question is, what are the measures that we will take with the coronavirus?  So we are – so currently, as I stated in my opening statement, no significant operational impacts right now in DEFENDER-Europe 20 due to the corona 19 situation.  The reception, staging, onward movement, and integration – RSOI – for this exercise is already underway and all of the planned seaports and airports remain operational and the borders remaining open.  Within the USAREUR area, only Georgia and Israel have enacted travel restrictions that ban arrivals from Italy, and these restrictions right now have no impact on DEFENDER-Europe 20.  

While you’re right, positive cases are increasing across Europe, we’re monitoring this closely and in coordination with our allies and partners, the DEFENDER-Europe 20 plan already provides a robust medical support for exercise participations.  But in light of this situation, we are working and war-gaming public health and medical support plans to identify any shortfall we might have and we’re addressing those shortfalls and/or requirements with each individual host nation and in coordination with their larger defense plans and their issues so that we’re tied in tight.  So in your case, we’re tied in with what Poland is going to do and making sure that we’re part of that plan, not a separate entity, so for the safety of our soldiers and for the safety of Polish citizens.

As to the total number of soldiers in Poland itself, the total number of soldiers from the United States is going to be somewhere in the realm of 19- to 20,000.  To be honest with you, Rafal, how many of those specifically are in Poland, if I was going to give you a guesstimation, or an estimation, I think we’re sitting in the realm of right around about 7- to 10,000 of those will be in Poland itself.

Question:  how do you address the challenge of the particular capabilities of potential adversaries like the recently developed or tested cruise and ballistic missiles?  Do you believe in the hyper hype – the hype of the hypersonic weapons, especially those missiles can be fired from small ships and mobile surface platforms?  So how do you address those challenges in the exercise?

Major General Rohling:  Those are exactly the sort of capabilities and things we’re going to exercise in the Joint War fighting Assessment that happens in the command post exercise in – at Grafenwoehr, Germany, in the end of April.  So in terms of the larger manoeuvring that we’re going to do in DEFENDER as far as the tanks manoeuvring across Europe or into the training areas in Germany and in Lithuania, that is not part of that exercise but it is absolutely a part of the command post exercise called Joint Warfighting Assessment.

Major General Rohling:  First, thank you, everyone, for your interest in DEFENDER-Europe 20.  We continue to believe that this is a very important exercise not only for the United States but for all of our European partners and allies.  We’re very appreciative of each nation and what they’ve contributed, and we are looking forward to a great event, a great learning event that will help strengthen the security of all our nations.

On Feb. 19, 2020, four RoNAF F-35A aircraft arrived in Iceland, where they have deployed to support NATO’s Airborne Surveillance and Interception Capabilities to meet Iceland’s Peacetime Preparedness Needs (ASIC IPPN) mission. The purpose of the NATO mission, initiated in 2008, after the withdrawal of US forces from the island, is to provide air surveillance and interception coverage over Iceland, in order to maintain the integrity of the NATO airspace.

The RNoAF F-35s will carry out a 3-week deployment with some 130 military and civilian personnel; Norwegian Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) personnel will be working alongside their Icelandic Coast Guard colleagues in the CRC at Keflavik Air Base.

RNoAF is the second F-35 operator to deploy the 5th generation aircraft in support of NATO’s Icelandic Air Policing: the first one was the Italian Air Force, that deployed its Lightning II jets to Keflavik in October 2019.

Norwegian F-35As achieved the IOC (Initial Operational Capability) on November 6, 2019, becoming the third European country to reach IOC with the F-35 after Italy and the UK. The deployment to Iceland is a milestone towards full operational capability in 2025. The RNoAF plans to replace its F-16s, that are currently performing Quick Reaction Alert missions, by 2022, when there will be enough F-35s (out of 52 ordered), pilots and maintainers available to deploy to Evenes Air Station (Northern Norway).

Norwegian F-35s are unique compared to other nations’ F-35s as they are the only ones to use a drag chute during landing, housed in a special fairing on the upper rear fuselage between the vertical tails. It can be used to rapidly decelerate Norwegian F-35s after landing on icy runways under windy conditions.

In Octore 2019 Defense News reported that the drag chute was failing more than expected and that the Royal Norwegian Air Force was working with the Pentagon to fix the issue.