U.S. and other NATO forces are practicing how to fend off an attack in central Europe, bringing together B-52 bombers, fighters and missile defenses for a drill simulating a large-scale battle.

“It’s about putting the right force to defend against the right threat, in the right place at the right time,” France said in Wednesday in a call with reporters. “If we do that, our operators will hit home runs all day long.”

The exercise, slated to end Friday, also features the U.S.’ Patriot air defense system, which U.S. Army Europe brought to a military base in Szymany, Poland. The Patriots, along with Polish ground systems and allied airpower, are focused on defending and protecting urban centers and other priorities from attack, Polish Air Force Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Starzynski said.

U.S. Air Force aircraft involved include F-16s, F-15s, the KC-135 Stratotanker, KC-10 Extender and the B-52 Stratofortress. Polish F-16 fighters, SU-22 ground attack jets and Mi-17 helicopters also are part of the exercise.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by U.S. Air Forces Maj. Gen. Derek France, U.S. Army Europe Brig. Gen. Gregory Brady, Polish Air Force Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Starzynski, And Polish Air Force Maj. Gen. Dariusz Malinowski.

Maj. Gen. France:  I would like to start off just by thanking our Polish partners sitting here with me for being such gracious hosts today, for a tour of their facilities, and for the contributions they have made to ensure the success of this exercise.  Bringing together multiple nations for an exercise of this size, scope, and complexity contributes to the strength of our partnership of our two great countries and all of the countries involved.  And it is these partnerships that allow us to seamlessly execute Astral Knight and be ready and ready in combat. 

This year we’re building on the lessons learned from Astral Knight ’19, enhancing our ability to build a resilient, integrated air and missile defense enterprise.  We will be putting our combined airmen and soldiers through a demanding set of scenarios over the course of this week using both live fly and computer-based scenarios.  Our goal at the end of this week is to enhance command and control integration, improve coordination interoperability, land and air capabilities, and successfully overlap operations into an integrated air and missile defense architecture. 

Astral Knight incorporates a variety of U.S. Air Force and Polish Air Force aircraft, including elements of our current bomber task force in theater as well as Army Patriot missile systems and Polish ground-based missile systems.  Additionally, most importantly will be integrating our air operations centers, on the U.S. side at Ramstein, and the Polish air operations center in Warsaw to give us a greater combined awareness of the air defense picture. 

So bringing these assets together allows us to demonstrate, to test, to refine, and to learn our ability to execute integrated air and missile defense that incorporates both offensive and predominately defensive measures.  This creates a comprehensive joint and combined force capable of preventing any enemy from effectively employing offensive air and missile weapons on this soil. 

This exercise is also an avenue to enhance our partnerships across the Baltic region between U.S. joint partners and other nations such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, as mentioned, and Sweden as we share common interests in maintaining a Europe that is safe and secure and prosperous.  By training together in the region, we’re able to enhance our flexibility, our interoperability in the interests of strengthening combined response capabilities and demonstrating international resolve.  Our partners fly a variety of different weapons systems, and it’s important and crucial that we expand those capabilities by integrating with one another. 

The ever-evolving security situation in this theater requires precise focus and dedication, and Astral Knight is one of the key measures that ensures our nations are able to respond to any situation with speed and agility.  Enhancing our readiness through demanding and challenging exercises such as Astral Knight ’20 allows our joint and multinational team to be ready for any challenge we may face in the future. 

And the bottom line is this: that no nation can confront today’s challenges alone.  But because of the relationships we have built in these AOCs and through this exercise, they become the bedrock for us to undertake Astral Knight and present a ready and capable defense that is able to defend this area. 

I look forward to your questions, and I would like to turn it over to my good friend, Gen. Starzynski, who has some opening comments as well. 

Maj. Gen. Starzynski:  Thank you.  So from Polish side, from my point of view and my colleagues’, my commanders and subordinates, it’s a great time.  It’s great time for all of us to make exercise and practice with U.S. ally.  It allows us to build capability and interoperability, and ensure our strong bonds. 

So it is five days in the air, as well as on the ground.  Things, magic things, happens, I am sure.  So I would say one other point, very good point, that we can do it even if we are in the pandemic time.  So to ensure us to good cooperate, to do a great, great thing for U.S. and Polish air forces. 

Question:  What have been the U.S. Air Force’s biggest lessons learned from the operation thus far?

Maj. Gen. France:  I would say our biggest lessons learned has been just the challenges of networks.  When we look at networking individual aircraft, individual systems, with controls and reporting centers, and air operations centers, that’s not easy to do.  And so we rely on a small subset of experts that understand how those networks work so that we can communicate timely and effectively and accurately. 

We have found that even over the course of this week we’ve learned a tremendous amount of lessons, and the hope is and the plan is that as we capture those lessons at the end of the week, that translates into long-range plans both for future exercises and for some of the equipment and capabilities that we need to maintain in the theater moving forward. 

Maj. Gen. Starzynski:  Maj. Gen. Starzynski.  So it’s the first point is the same as for our allies, as Maj. Gen. France said, that the network established a good network to cooperate is the first point to achieve, and it is achieved so far.  

But so there are some other benefits for the Polish side.  As you know, we are in time of waiting for the fifth generation in the Patriot system.  So we can train, we can learn some – a lot from American colleagues how to integrate the system into one system. 

Question:  What kind of threats will be included in the exercise?  UAVs, stealth cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons?

Maj. Gen. France:  The scenarios we’ve developed over the course of the week involve a variety of threats.  We have forces that are capable of engaging each of those, and when we talk about command and control, which is one of the focus areas of this, it’s about putting the right force to defend against the right threat and the right place at the right time.  If we do that, our operators will hit homeruns all day long.  But it’s the understanding of how to posture those correctly.  And so it is a variety of threats, everything from ballistic missiles to aircraft to cruise missiles to unmanned aerial things.  And some of them are live fly, some of them are simulated, and some of them are injects that go into the planning system so that we plan against them.

Question: Could you comment on the capabilities that they bring to this exercise?

Brig. Gen. Brady:  This is Brig. Gen. Greg Brady.  As the Commander for the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, we focus exclusively on ground based air defense for this.  And we have a strong relationship with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.  One of the exercises we just executed previous and it gives you an understanding of the relationships we have built.  This was in Latvia.  We conducted a live-fire exercise with all of our capabilities.  And it was primarily our short-range air defense capabilities.  But what is important, in every country, while they do have different capabilities, it provides a multi-layered approach.  There isn’t one interceptor that can defeat all threats.  And so being able to synchronize the capabilities, understand what our allies have, and then building this architecture really leads to readiness matters.  

Question:  How is Sweden contributing to this exercise?  That’s my first question.  Can someone please answer that? how is communications doing?  How will that be arranged, for example, so that Sweden could get early warning, for example, for a missile threat?  Do you have any ideas or plans for that?

Brig. Gen. Brady:  Mikael, this is Brig. Gen. Greg Brady from the 10th AAMDC.  For the first part of your question, we actually have a very strong relationship for ground-based air defense forces.  As you know, Sweden will be receiving Patriots soon.  You have the RBS-98.  And they are actually here from a ground-based air defense as observers.  And it was yesterday I was able to sit down – or not I was.  My commander for the Patriot force was able to meet with them.  As you know, they will be receiving Patriots next year.  For the early warning for missile defense, I would have to defer to the Swedish defense ministry on how that is going to work.  

Question:  How concerned are you about Russia’s A2/AD efforts in the Nordic-Baltic region?  And have you seen any recent buildup of Russian forces in Kaliningrad or elsewhere to strengthen its position on NATO’s northeastern flank?

Maj. Gen. France:  I would say for the A2/AD scenario, because of the scenario of this exercise, this is largely defensive in nature there.  So for this particular force scenario that we looked at, the A2/AD was not as big a player as maybe other plans and other scenarios might focus on.  So it is a concern, broadly speaking.  It is not one of the tactical problems that we are putting out our forces for this one.  And, again, I won’t comment to specific force buildup we have seen, again because it was not part of this scenario.  So, broadly speaking, it is a concern, but for AK-20, again, we were much more integrated, much more focused on and integrated and capable, robust defense and the cooperation that needs to happen to make that happen across our nations.

Question:  I was wondering if it’s the first time Sweden is involved in an exercise like this, with an air defense exercise like this, with NATO countries ? I guess it has been touched upon, but Poland and Sweden are both going to buy Patriots.  So, I mean, is it being envisaged in the future that you would have, like, an integrated Patriot – well, let’s say the U.S. deploying Patriots and the Swedes and the Poles and maybe, for that matter, even going further south to Romania, where you would have this, like, integrated Patriot network stretching along the eastern flank. How are the Lithuanians already learning things from this exercise?  And I guess there have been past exercises in the Baltics for their acquisition of NASAMS.  And then, finally, is there any new equipment which has never been deployed involved in this exercise? 

Brig. Gen. Brady:  Greg Brady for the 10th AAMDC.  I would add for – with Sweden, for Astral Knight ’20, they are here in an observer status.  But to your point about Patriot and with them receiving I believe in the next year, so we are working with them and sharing our tactics and procedures.  

And for the network question, that is one of the objectives for this exercise.  And it’s focused on interoperability.  And it’s important, even as observers here, because when you look at the three aspects of interoperability, you have the human piece.  So we do have a bilateral relationship with Sweden, but in the technical aspects, that’s what the focus of Astral Knight ’20 is.  It’s about building the readiness through our networks and ensuring that we’re able to share data, whether it’s ground-based air defense systems or all the way to the air operations center.  So, really, it’s a combined and joint environment.  

Simultaneously right now, we have the Tobruq Legacy exercise happening in Lithuania.  I do not know if – I do not think Sweden is there with equipment.  Actually, I know they’re not there with equipment.  And I would have to return back to you if there’s observers there as well.  But that exercise, similar in the aspects of establishing datalink architecture of utilizing different systems to understand the capacity and capability.  But when you build these different systems together, you can have four or five different physical languages, different mission command elements, different interceptors, but your goal is to establish one single integrated air picture to understand early warning and building that situational awareness from a command and control perspective.

To your last point, I think you asked about if there was any new equipment in this exercise.  And so while there is no specific new hardware, there are all kinds of new ways of connecting that hardware.  So this is very much a learning environment as we move along.  And that’s really the goal that is happening here, is new ways to connect, both technically and on the human element.  And so that part is certainly a learning piece of this exercise.

Question:  Let me understand this scenario because, as far as I understand it, it was in the pre-Article 5 situation.  And is it that the first salvo of the missiles from the east triggered the active air defense?  how did you actually achieve this integrated air picture?  And what was the main platform for data sharing? 

Maj. Gen. Starzynski:  Okay.  Maj. Gen. Starzynski speaking.  So this is actually a pre-Article 5 situation scenario, as you said.  So we are in some exercise, some middle of the scenario.  So things are happening right now and we’re actually – it’s doing by the U.S. and Polish forces.  So the aircraft – fighters, tankers, E-3, GBAD forces that are involved in the mostly defense posture.  So we are trying to defend our key terrain objects, like – maybe like towns, cities, and so on, and try to respond with fighters in the air.  So, basically, it’s the basic scenario, so for the first question.

Maj. Gen. Starzynski:  I can’t say what is the platform because we use U.S. systems and Polish systems, and we integrate them together.  So it is the main point to achieve.  And we achieved that point that we can communicate, share information, send data from U.S., from Polish for all players in U.S., Europe, and Poland.  So it is the main point of this exercise.  And we achieved this goal.

Maj. Gen. France:  I just want to thank the media team for being here and for asking these questions.  I just will close by saying that, you know, at the end of this exercise compared to five days ago, when we started it, we are a stronger and more combat-ready combined force.  And so going out the doors as that happens, that is part of it.  And it is part based on the lessons we learned on the technical side of how to link these networks together and do command and control.  But the bedrock of that and the most important thing of that is the relationships and professional understanding we have between the nations involved and that really becomes the basis of that capability.  

And so, again, thanks for your time, and thanks for our Polish hosts.  And that’s all we have from here.

Maj. Gen. Starzynski:  I agree with Gen. France 100 percent.  So what I can to add, when we started one year, one and a half years ago to plan this exercise, it is U.S. partners to look to us, it’s almost impossible to do that thing, just to make the systems connected – that model, what we did, actually, during the last two days.  So I – but from my perspective, from the Polish and U.S., I’m sure, side, it is successful and very beneficial.  We are stronger.  We learn of each other, even personally.  It is very beneficial for us.  That’s it. 

The United States plans to impose sanctions on those who violate a UN arms embargo on Iran, which Washington says will now stay in place instead of expiring in October as agreed under a 2015 nuclear deal.

US Special Representative for Venezuela and Iran Elliott Abrams said Washington could deny access to the US market to anyone who trades in weapons with Iran, which President Donald Trump’s administration accuses of seeking to develop nuclear weapons.

“It’s like pulling a trigger and no bullet comes out,” a senior UN Security Council diplomat said on condition of anonymity. “There will be no snapback, the sanctions will remain suspended, the JCPOA (nuclear deal) will remain in place.”

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Elliott Abrams, U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela.

Special Representative Abrams:  Thank you.  Today under the leadership of President Trump the White House and the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce took significant action to counter Iranian nuclear threats, as well as missile and conventional arms proliferation.  Across each of these areas, the Islamic Republic of Iran poses a unique threat to the world.  

The regime uses its nuclear program to extort the international community and threaten regional and international security.  Iran possesses the largest ballistic missiles force in the Middle East, and it has exported both missiles and missile production technology to violent, non-state actors such as the Houthi militias in Yemen and Hizballah terrorists in Lebanon and Syria.  The U.S. and partner forces have repeatedly interdicted Iranian weapons en route to the Houthis in the last year, demonstrating that the regime continues to use its arsenal of conventional weapons to destabilize the Middle East and foment sectarian violence and terrorism across the region.   

These actions underscore that the U.S. will not hesitate to counter Iranian nuclear, missile, and conventional arms threats that led the Security Council to unanimously impose sanctions on Iran in the first place beginning in 2006.  These measures are now again in force against Iran thanks to the return of sanctions pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2231.  

The actions we’ve taken include the following:  First, a new executive order by President Trump targeting conventional arms transfers, and one of my colleagues will comment on that; designation by the Department of State of MODAFL, the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and Iran’s Defense Industries Organization and its director, as well as Nicolas Maduro, the illegitimate dictator of Venezuela, for conventional arms-related activities pursuant to the new Iran conventional arms executive order. 

State and Treasury have also designated six individuals and three entities associated with the AEOI, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, that deals with weapons of mass destruction proliferators.  Five more individuals who are affiliated with AEOI have been designated by Commerce today and put on the entity list which will impose export control restrictions on them.  

Treasury today designated three individuals and four entities associated with Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, SHIG, which is the organization that deals with Iran’s liquid propellant ballistic missiles.  This is also pursuant to Executive Order 13382 and updates some existing sanctions. 

The administration is dedicated to keeping Americans and citizens across the Middle East and in Europe safe by taking these actions against the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and anti-Semitism.  We will continue and we will expand our sanctions until Iran is willing to conclude a comprehensive negotiation that addresses the regime’s malign behavior.  We’re always open to diplomacy with Iran, but Iran must respond with diplomacy, not with more violence, bloodshed, and nuclear extortion.  And until then, maximum pressure will continue.   

Question:  Javad Zarif was just on CFR and basically shrugged off the sanctions, but also said that Iran is still very much looking for retribution for the killing of Qasem Soleimani.  So how seriously do you take that threat in terms of the security of your officials overseas?  Are there active plots against them? 

Special Representative Abrams:  As you can understand, I’m not going to reveal classified information about what we may or may not know.  What we do know is that Iran is the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism, and we do know that there have been Iranian plots, well, literally, for decades, including in recent years in the U.S., in Europe, and in the Middle East.  So Iranian threats of acts of terrorism need to be taken seriously.  It is a little bit surprising that such threats of acts of terrorism come from a foreign minister, but I gather from what you said that it was he who delivered those threats.  We are concerned every day to protect Americans overseas, including of course, the American official family:  our diplomats and their families, our service members and their families.  And should Iran commit acts of terrorism against Americans, you can be sure that they will pay a very heavy price. 

Question:  How will the new leader introduce U.S. sanctions that affect the European partners?  Will they be sanctioned by the U.S. if they continue working with Iran? 

Mr. Abrams:  These are sanctions against, potentially, individuals, companies, banks, that assist Iran in the violation of these very wide UN sanctions.  In some cases there are actually additional European sanctions still in place.  But really, the answer to your question is the answer we gave in 2018:  People who violate these sanctions will be investigated by the United States, and if we have the facts, then the provisions of all of these sanctions will be put into effect.  

Just to give you an example, if a European bank were to finance an arms sale to Iran or by Iran, absolutely it would be sanctioned.  That is what’s called for by the U.N. arms embargo on Iran. 

Question:  This are these executive orders mean that we are back before the nuclear agreement, which is what about the Section 7 from the – from the existive orders?  I need more elaboration on that ?

Mr. Abrams:  Well, as to what the executive order says, maybe I will call upon my colleague, another senior official, to talk about what the president said today. 

Senior Administration Official:  The action today is the broadest interagency action with regard to counter–proliferation that we have taken so far.  On the conventional arms executive order, the president signed it today.  It is the first major new Iran-specific counterproliferation authority since 2012.  It targets proliferators of conventional weapons to and from Iran and their supporters.  The executive order authorizes the State Department and the Treasury Department to impose financial blocking sanctions on certain persons involved in transfers to and from Iran of conventional weapons, which we define broadly as any item with a military end use.  

In this sense, it’s more expansive than the U.N. arms restriction, which only applies to arms or items listed on the U.N. register of conventional arms or are considered arms and related materiel.  For example, the authority would allow us to target speedboats that the IRGC buys and retrofits into attack crafts or harass vessels in international shipping lanes, or circuit boards that missile organizations incorporate into ballistic missile guidance and control systems.  

And, just to follow up with what Special Representative Abrams said, our intent with this rollout is to demonstrate our seriousness with implementing the reimposed U.N. restrictions and convince foreign governments, and even more significantly, private sector companies, to take action under the U.N. Security Council resolution to counter Iran.  We expect that even if countries do not agree, that they will adhere to snapback and that both governments and the private sector will not seek to expose themselves to U.S. sanctions. 

Question:  They cited a U.S. official saying Iran could have enough fissile materials for a nuclear weapon by the end of this year.  Could you elaborate a little bit on this?  And can you tell what’s the evidence for it?  Have you also seen Iran and North Korea resuming cooperation on the long-range missile project? 

Mr. Abrams:  As the exact views of the U.S. intelligence community of timelines for various pieces of Iran’s nuclear program, fissile material is one aspect but not the only aspect.  But, you know, this is really what the JCPOA ultimately allows and it is why the United States decided to pull away from the JCPOA.  The JCPOA is a path to a nuclear weapon for Iran.  

It gives you the years as markers, “Here is what Iran can do after five years.  Here is what Iran can do after eight and a half years.  Here is what it can do at the 10-year mark.”  Of course, we are already at the five-year mark.  

“And here is what it can do at the 15-year mark.”  So Iran is under the JCPOA, would be moving in that direction, and it would be doing so to begin with $70 billion that our sanctions in the last couple of years have deprived the government of Iran from having.  So I won’t get into detail about the timelines, but that is clearly the direction in which Iran wishes to move and in which under the JCPOA, it would have been able to move.   

We are very concerned about Iran’s cooperation with North Korea, again not too much I can really say about it here.  Maybe there are colleagues on the line who would like to add, but the Iranian ballistic missile development is really a dangerous thing for the region.  And we have seen, for example, the Houthis using those missiles to attack Saudi Arabia.  We will be watching the cooperation with North Korea very carefully and doing what we can to prevent it. 

Question:  I want to ask about Iran said that it is ready to exchange prisoners with the U.S., how the U.S. will deal with this?  And the Iranian regime says that it will continue to export its oil products to Venezuela and other countries.  How the U.S. will deal with that? 

Mr. Abrams:  let me just say that the United States has managed in the last two years to reduce by something like 90 percent Iran’s oil exports, and they continue to fall.  And most countries have gotten out of the Iran-Venezuela trade.  Most recently, Greek ship owners have gotten out of that trade.  

It may be relegated, it looks as if it will be relegated, just to a few Iranian-owned ships that can make that voyage maybe a couple of times a year.  But we will continue to pursue these sanctions, and they have been extremely effective in getting countries around the world out of that trade.  

And, just to give you an example, there are many, many countries because demand is low now for gasoline, that have gasoline.  Why aren’t they selling it to Venezuela?  And the answer is they don’t want to have to deal with U.S. sanctions.  So the ships, the insurers, the banks, the ship captains, the ship owners are all saying, “We don’t want to have anything to do with that trade.” 

Question:  I wanted to ask you a question on the policy options that are left to the U.S. in light of the rejection of a lot of other countries of the legal interpretation about Resolution 2231.  So what can the U.S. do to persuade other countries to adhere to its own interpretation of the resolution? 

Mr. Abrams:  First, there are a number of countries who certainly agree that Iran is extremely dangerous.  Many countries, including European countries, have said to us that they were seeking some way to extend the U.N. arms embargo on Iran.  What can the United States do?  Precisely what we have done.  

First, 30 days ago this past Saturday, we gave notice to the Security Council in exact compliance with Resolution 2231.  Thirty days later, snapback occurred.  That was this past Saturday 8:00 p.m. Washington time.  Today, we have announced what we mean by the return of U.N. sanctions and our enforcement of those sanctions. 

 I remember the debate two years ago about how, “Oh, U.S. unilateral sanctions will really not have an impact.  What’s the point?”  We have seen it.  

I would just point out one thing to you, which is, obviously, we knew last week that snapback was coming.  And it came on Saturday.  And the Iranian rial has fallen to its lowest position ever.  So people in business in Iran know that snapback will have an enormous effect.  And through the announcements today, I believe we are telling governments and we are telling businesses, individuals, banks, companies that it has occurred and that if they do not abide by these sanctions, there will be penalties to pay. 

Question: Could you expand a little bit, please, on your comments regarding the designation of the Iranian Ministry of Defense I think it was – I am afraid the line was not very good at my end – and its director and Mr. Maduro of Venezuela for conventional arms-related activity?  Can you just expand on what that means in practice, please? 

Mr. Abrams:  It should mean to people who are contemplating arms sales to Iran or contemplating dealing with in this case MDAFL, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and its director, that there can be sanctions, there can be penalties to pay for those agreements.  

And, by the way, we are under the executive order not required to wait until, let’s say, combat jets or tanks or speedboats are actually physically shipped.  The agreements themselves can lead to sanctions of the individuals involved.  So the message to people who are contemplating deals with that ministry is think twice, penalties are right around the corner. 

Question:  One question on the arms embargo and then another on Iranian uranium stockpiles.  One, I wondered if, you know, have European allies identified any areas in which they can cooperate to impede arms sales by Iran, notwithstanding the dispute over the U.N. Security Council?  And do you have a sense of what prospective customers the Iranians have in mind for arms sales and whether your sanctions can deter those deals?  And then a little more big picture, Iran deal proponents have long argued that the deal postpones the day when, as the saying goes, Western governments would have to choose between bombing Iran or an Iranian bomb.  The most recent IAEA report, if I am not mistaken, pegged the Iranian low enriched uranium stockpile north of 3,100 kilograms, which drew up some of the breakout time estimates of three and a half months.  So I wonder, has that day moved up?  Does the snapback decision diminish Iran’s incentive to abide by those terms of the deal that they are still abiding by?  And if process disputes, such as what we have seen over the arms embargo, can impede U.S.-European cooperation on security matters, you know, in conventional arms terms, how worried are you about whether the U.S. and Europe would be able to be on the same page in a potential breakout scenario to enforce deterring Iran’s development of nuclear weapons?

Mr. Abrams: I feel like saying thank you for your twelve questions. On the first part, there is an EU arms embargo. You know, the EU imposed an eight year arms embargo five years ago. There remains an EU arms embargo on Iran.  And I would hope not only will the EU maintain and enforce that arms embargo.  

Obviously we hope they would extend it, and we hope for very good cooperation from the EU in preventing anyone else from engaging in arms trade with Iran.  We certainly look forward to good cooperation on that. Who are Iran’s customers?  Well, one obvious customer potentially is Venezuela.  That’s one of the reasons why Venezuela and its illegitimate former President Maduro is included here.  The Houthis we know, and Hizballah and other terrorist groups, for example in Iraq, are customers as well.   

One of the things we’re doing here is saying to countries around the world who might be approached by Iran to say, look.  We have the following on our list that we would be prepared to sell you.  And the economic situation in Iran being as poor as it is, the regime probably will be thinking about trying to raise revenue by selling arms.  

Our message to anybody who’s considering buying is, again, don’t do it because the price you will pay will be quite elevated. Does – you asked about a diminished incentive for Iran to abide by strictures of the JCPOA or 2231.  They’re not abiding.  

There is a UN arms embargo for the last five years on Iran that we have now extended, which would have – would have disappeared on October 18th.  

In those five years, does anybody actually think Iran abided by that UN arms embargo, that it did not, for example, ship arms to the Houthis?  We have proved that they have shipped arms to the Houthis.  We have interdicted shipments of arms to the Houthis.  

We have seen in the archive that the Israelis recovered that while it was negotiating and while it was theoretically abiding by the JCPOA, Iran was hiding information from the IAEA.  

And Iran was keeping this archive of material about building a nuclear weapon, and it was maintaining the teams that have engaged in that project intact, preparing for the day that – in which they could start again. 

So I don’t accept the notion that Iran was abiding by the letter and spirit, and now won’t abide.  You may remember that the 2231 calls upon Iran to stop its missile program.  Does anybody believe they stopped the missile program?  So I don’t accept that Iran was abiding, and that there will now be a diminished incentive.  The only thing that is going to lead Iran to keep those commitments is, in our view, more pressure.  

You’re right that we had a process dispute with the EU.  Final point.  We were a little surprised by it.  We were certainly disappointed by it, that EU countries would say, “We want the UN arms embargo extended,” but then not really take any action to extend it.  

And it is their failure to take action to get the UN arms embargo extended that was a main contributor to our decision that the only way to do it was to snap back, in accordance with 2231, all the UN sanctions. 

Organizers amid the coronavirus pandemic downsized NATO-led Noble Partner military exercises in the country of Georgia to five participating nations from 26 envisaged originally, Deputy Chief of the Georgian Defense Forces Irakli Tchitchinadze told reporters on Tuesday.

“Originally we had 26 different nations from NATO and NATO partners, but… because of COVID it was impossible for everyone to participate here this time,” he said during a phone briefing.

Approximately 2,800 military members from France, Georgia, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are participating in the exercise that kicked off on September 7 and will include on September 18.

Joe Jarrard, US Army Europe Deputy Commanding General for the Army National Guard, mentioned Ukraine among the countries which were invited, but couldn’t make it to Georgia.

“Ukraine was invited to participate in exercise but… Ukraine along with several other countries was not able to participate due to the mitigation measures,” he said.

Armor, artillery, paratrooper, engineering and other units train at Vaziani and Camp Norio areas in Georgia to increase their “readiness and interoperability,” Tchitchinadze said. They all operate in a coronavirus-proof “bubble” at the training range and so far there has been no cases of contamination during the exercise, he added.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Maj. Gen.  Joe Jarrard Deputy Commanding General for Army National Guard, U.S. Army Europe And Brig. Gen. Irakli Tchitchinadze Deputy Chief, Georgian Defence Forces.

Maj. Gen. Jarrard:  I’m very pleased to join you today to speak about Noble Partner, and I’m also especially glad to join Gen. Tchitchinadze from Georgia.  U.S. Army Europe is honored and proud to work with our Georgian Defence Force partners to host this exercise, and I look forward to discussing it with you today.

Gen. Tchitchinadze:  Thanks, it’s my pleasure and great honor to speak about Noble Partner 2020.  It’s one of the very important events we are hosting now in Georgia, and especially my thanks and appreciation for Georgian Defence Forces and from Georgian Ministry of Defence to Gen. Jarrard and to our partners.  Thank you again.

Question :  Has the exercise scenario been reflected in the hybrid threats which Georgia and other countries like Ukraine are currently facing?  Was Ukraine invited to participate?  And if not, why not? 

Maj. Gen. Jarrard:  To the answer the second part of the question first, Ukraine was invited to participate in the exercise, but, as everyone understands, COVID is impacting a lot of the training and exercise that we’re trying to conduct in this current environment.  And so Ukraine, along with several other countries, were not able to participate due to the mitigation measures that were needed to take place to participate, and so they are not participating currently.

With respect to the first part of the question, the hybrid threats, we’ve got a numerous force structure participating in the exercise, so there are some artillery units, our Striker units from 2nd Cavalry Regiment, engineer units, along with special forces units.  And so throughout the scenario there are different types of events that are taking place, and there are several hybrid threat scenarios involved in the process.

Brig. Gen. Tchitchinadze:  Actually, we had invited 26 different nations from NATO partners – NATO members and partner countries, but again, as Gen. Jarrard mentioned, because of COVID it was impossible actually for everyone to participate here this time this year.

Regarding the first question about hybrid, if it’s also involved from hybrid threats, I could say yes, definitely, because these exercises also are focusing to improve synchronization planning and improve SOF integration and interoperability as well as interdependence with conventional forces.  So it means that we have conventional forces and where it’s sort of [inaudible] exercised together.  Plus, as you know already, we conduct joint force entry with airborne assaults at Vaziani Training Area.  And so all these [inaudible] forces, they are combined arms and combined units, all together, and of course there is huge efforts regarding hybrid assessment.  

Brig. Gen. Tchitchinadze:  I’d like to mention United States, United Kingdom, Poland, and France.  So we have about 2,800 personnel totally with Georgian Defence Forces, of course, participating this year.

Question : Gen. Jarrard, what were sort of – what are some of the principal capabilities that you will be exercising during the course of this joint exercise?

Maj. Gen. Jarrard:  I’ll quickly read some of the exercise objectives and then talk about some of the types of units that are participating.  So some of the exercise objectives involve conducting a joint forcible entry with airborne assault.  And as my partner just mentioned, build multinational regional combined and joint partnership capacity; exercise coordination and integration capability in a multinational environment; improve interoperability at the tactical level between allies and partner nations; improve synchronization planning for enablers to increase effective fire-and-maneuver units; improve SOF integration and interoperability; and exercise and improve multinational command and control capabilities at the tactical level.  So those are some of the overarching training objectives that are – that we have.  

But then we have the Georgian National Guard is participating with a firing – a field artillery battery, and so they’re getting after some of their training objectives such as processing fire missions and synchronizing fire support operations and things like that. 

The engineer unit from the Georgian National Guard is doing – is conducting – providing support for mobility and breaching operations.  And then you’ve got the 2nd Cavalry Regiment that is also doing – they’re doing some live firing and also working with the partners there throughout the exercise.  So underneath those overarching exercise objectives, the individual units are not only working with their partners, but also working on their readiness objectives with respect to the normal soldier tasks that they need to accomplish if they are ever called to fight.

Question : Gen. Tchitchinadze, what are some of the Georgian military’s goals for this exercise?

Brig. Gen. Tchitchinadze:  So the main goal for us is to increase our readiness and, of course, interoperability with, of course, first of all, the United States and NATO members.  And the key point, again, this is building our interoperability with NATO and allied countries.  Also, to build the trust between the participants and that we really highly appreciate participating from our NATO partners in this exercise.  So I think this is the main one.

Question:  What you’re describing, was originally going to be done for the large exercise of the Europe 20 exercises?  Is this part of that or originally part of that or is this something completely separate?

Maj. Gen. Jarrard:  I will say that the joint forcible entry portion of this exercise was planned as part of the original DEFENDER 20 Exercise, but DEFENDER 20 was a series, really an umbrella over a series of exercises.  And so Noble Partner takes place every other year in even-numbered years, and so it was not necessarily linked to DEFENDER.  But the first part of this exercise, the joint forcible entry, was included in DEFENDER 20 but had to get pushed to the right due to the COVID impact. 

Brig. Gen. Tchitchinadze:  Actually, a little bit just regarding Noble Partner, you know, we are already doing this the fifth time in Georgia because we started from 2015 actually.  And every year, as it was mentioned by Gen. Jarrard, that we do this exercise – this year in Tbilisi, near from Tbilisi.  Just last year, in 2019, we did not because we had another multinational exercise, so conducted with United States and with our partners named as Agile Spirit 2019.  And so this year again, as you all know, we do this Noble Partner 2020.

Maj. Gen. Jarrard:  Well, the first thing I’d like to highlight is the fact that although COVID impacts the things that we’re doing now, we are – we take the safety of our soldiers and those participating in exercises very seriously.  And so – and what we have determined is that we have to continue to train.  And so I think this exercise is a great example that we still will maintain our training exercises, and we will do those with multinational partners and allies, and that we have figured out how to do that safely.

And so all of the soldiers that are participating in this exercise are within a bubble at the training range.  No one enters that bubble other than those that are participating.  And we have mitigation measures in place and the ability to test individuals throughout the exercise to make sure that the bubble is staying clean.  And if somebody does experience symptoms, then we will move them out of the bubble and take care of that – them medically.  So I just want to highlight that we are working in a new way within this COVID environment, but we have figured out how to do it safely, and we will continue to do exercises like this with our allies and partners. 

And so, as Gen. Tchitchinadze mentioned a minute ago, I appreciate him mentioning the word “trust” because we talk about interoperability and a lot of people think that that is through our communication devices and radios and so forth.  And while that is important and may be the hardest part of interoperability, it does involve person-to-person interaction.  And that’s – through these type of exercises, we’re developing that trust with our partners and allies that enables us to understand each other’s culture so that we can train and fight together if necessary.

Brig. Gen. Tchitchinadze:  On behalf of Georgian Defence Forces and Georgian Ministry of Defense, I one more time would like to stress on the importance of this multinational exercise that we are hosting now in Georgia, and especially to send to our partners participating in these exercises this year and especially to United States, one of the most important strategic partners which actively support Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic development, and strengthening our self-defense capabilities, of course.  

Regarding Noble Partner, this exercise fosters regional stability and security, strengthening readiness and defense capabilities, as it was mentioned.  And of course, it facilitates stability and peace in the region.  And that’s why we are very, very appreciative and very happy conducting Noble Partner almost every year.

Regarding COVID, as it was mentioned by Gen. Jarrard, there was a lot of regulations, very strict regulations, being set up by us and our partners to prevent this disease, especially during these exercises.  And right now, till now actually we are doing well because we have no single cases, and this makes us even more happy.

So once again, thank you very much for giving us this opportunity to speak a bit about our important events that we are doing here in Georgia.  And again, my deepest appreciation to you, to the organizators and to all our journalists.  And Mr. General, we are looking forward to see you here soon in Georgia.

The United States said Friday it would impose new sanctions on Belarusian figures within days as it urged Minsk and its ally Russia to end a crackdown on protests. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said that the United States was coordinating with the European Union and looking to target both individuals and export rules.

“I expect in just a few short days we will be in a position to be able to definitively identify the additional list of sanctions that we will be imposing in parallel with those that are being enacted by the European Union,” Biegun told reporters by telephone.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo earlier hinted at new sanctions on Belarus as strongman Alexander Lukashenko clamps down on the biggest challenge to his 26-year rule.

Biegun said that the United States backed her demands for “truly free and fair presidential elections, the release of all political prisoners and the investigation of the authorities crimes against the people.”

Biegun asked how Russia “can back such a regime and such violence against peaceful citizens exercising constitutionally protected rights to freedom of assembly, association and speech.”

“If the Kremlin continues down this path, it risks turning the Belarusian people, who have no grievance with Russia, against Moscow.”

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by  Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun.

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  As I think is known by most who cover this issue, Secretary of State Pompeo has asked me to play a lead role in advancing our plans, our policies on – in regard to the events that are playing out in Belarus.  Like many in Europe, and also especially the Belarusian people themselves, the United States wants to see a sovereign, independent, successful Belarus in which the Belarusian people themselves have the right to choose their own future.  We commend the unwavering courage of the protesters who we’ve seen on the streets of Belarus, peacefully asserting their right to choose their own leaders in a free and fair election and not subject to unjustified violence or repression by their own ruler.

The abuses and brutal violence that we’ve seen against the peaceful protesters over the past month must end.  All unjustly detained, including the U.S. citizen Vitali Shkliarov, who continues to be held, must be released.  It’s alarming and deeply troubling for us to see the continued reports of politically motivated detentions and the forced deportations and kidnapping of Coordination Council members that we saw just a few days ago.  Belarusian authorities have a responsibility to ensure the full safety of Ms. Kalesnikava, Mr. Shkliarov, and all others who are unjustly detained.

We believe that the Belarusian people must be able to determine their own path free from outside interference or threats, including from powerful neighbors.  U.S. support for the Belarusian people and our support for productive dialogue between the regime and the Coordinating Council does not mean we are asking Belarus to choose between East and West.  This is not a contest between the United States and Russia.  This is a battle between a ruler and the people that he purports to rule.

The Belarusian regime is not working for the best interests of the Belarusian people.  The regime has used ill-gotten wealth to amass and maintain power, through a level of corruption that is all too apparent to those living inside Belarus, not to mention to the rest of the world.  And now, after being clearly rejected by his own people, the ruler of Belarus is using violence to maintain his grip on power and relying upon – increasingly upon support from Moscow to prop him up.  

Most Belarusians have seen Russia as the country closest to their hearts, and we respect that sentiment and sovereign choice.  It thus eludes us how Moscow can back such a regime and such violence against peaceful citizens exercising constitutionally protected rights to freedom of assembly, association, and speech.  If the Kremlin continues down this path, it risks turning the Belarusian people, who have no grievance with Russia, against Moscow.  Even more confusing is the reality that ordinary Russian citizens are also being sucked up by Belarusian authorities as part of the crackdown and subject to the same brutal violence.  Why would Moscow support such a regime?  We can see that the Russian people clearly do not.  And as Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said earlier this week, we urge the people of Russia to resist Kremlin-generated disinformation about the protest movement and support the Belarusian people in their desire for justice and free elections.  

And that brings me to a final important point.  Repeated reports suggest that Belarusian authorities have harassed, beaten, and arrested journalists and other media workers who are covering the election and the ongoing protests.  Coupled with the use of internet shutdowns, they have laid bare their blatant desire to suppress the exercise of free speech and to limit access of information to their own people.  

So where do we go from here?  As both Secretary of State Pompeo and I have previously noted, we are closely coordinating with partners and allies on the next steps.  This includes sanctions, and I want to be absolutely clear: The United States continues current sanctions on 16 individuals, including the ruler of Belarus and other high-level officials, and in addition we are closely coordinating with our European partners on targeted additional sanctions to promote accountability for those involved in human rights abuses and repression in Belarus.  We also call upon Belarusian authorities to immediately accept the offer of the OSCE chair-in-office to facilitate a dialogue with the Coordinating Council.

Just a couple weeks ago I had the opportunity of meeting Ms. Tsikhanouskaya in Vilnius.  I’d like to close my remarks before taking a few questions by echoing her three recent demands: truly free and fair presidential elections; the release of all political prisoners; and the investigation of the authorities’ crimes against the people of Belarus.  We share Ms. Tsikhanouskaya’s vision for Belarus’s future and we stand by our long-term commitment to support the sovereignty of Belarus as well as its territorial integrity, as the aspirations of the Belarusian people to determine their own path remains in front of us.  

Question:  My question is for the last year, contacts between the United States and Belarus were more or less well-established and we saw Mr. Kravchenko ultimately in Washington, and it was already planned that there will be exchange of ambassadors again.  Do I understand correct that the whole procedure with ambassadors is now canceled? 

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  The United States has no animosity towards the people of Belarus at all, and in fact, dating back to the very beginning of Belarusian independence in 1991, the United States has sought wherever possible to maintain close relations and cooperation with the people of Belarus, and that remains the same today and is very much why we are giving such voice of support to the Belarusian people.  As far as our ambassador goes, we have an excellent candidate who has been selected by the President by the name of Julie Fisher.  Julie is still in the approval process here inside the United States, and we have not suspended that process.  We believe it’s very important for the United States to have a representative in Belarus that can give a voice to the policies of the United States of America and strongly represent the values and interests that we believe are important to address in our relations with Belarus.  I have noted with great encouragement the presence of several of our partners’ ambassadors in standing side by side with brave members of the Coordinating Council, like Svetlana Alexievich, and I very much look forward to having a United States ambassador standing side by side with her colleagues in Belarus in defense of the Belarusian people.

Question:  You mentioned, the Secretary mentioned sanctions.  Do you care to describe that in any more detail?  One of the sanctions that could be lifted easily are those that were – sorry, that could be reimposed easily are those that were lifted after a waiver in 2015.  You could do that easily.  Is that something you’re considering?  And an overall question about Europe: The EU, as you know, is struggling to maintain unity on Belarus because of divisions over the Eastern Mediterranean.  Does that hamper a unified response?  

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  As far as sanctions go, let me first say that we’re coordinating very closely with our European partners, and as we identify the appropriate targets, we will – we will seek in every possible way to act in concert with our partners in Europe to make a clear statement and also a clear response to those who are perpetrating the violence or who are responsible for the theft of the election on August 9th.

The United States currently has 16 individuals under sanctions, including the ruler of Belarus, as I said.  And we’ve never lifted those sanctions.  In fact, they’ve been in place for a number of years.  Our European partners are reinstituting sanctions that they had lifted in an attempt to draw Belarus into a closer relationship and perhaps moderate the behavior of the current ruler of Belarus.  But in addition to those 16 individuals, we and the European Union are exchanging information on a number of other names that we will be prepared to announce in the very near future.

Separate from these targeted individual sanctions, the United States does have also a number of sanctions against enterprises, some of which have a limited licensing ability for very specific purposes.  We definitely will be reviewing the entire range of sanctions, including the existing sanctions and some of the general licenses that are – have been put in place over the past few years.  We will be announcing all of our steps on sanctions in the very near future, and you’ll see then the ultimate decisions we’re going to make. 

Question:  What are the effective ways of helping the opposition in Belarus?  In the case of Solidarity in Poland in the 1980s it was international support, sanctions, and funding of the opposition.  Is this scenario possible here 40 years later?

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  I want to be very careful to say that first and foremost, the United States is going to fully respect the sovereignty of all the Belarusian people.  We’re not seeking to steer the opposition.  We’re not seeking to control the opposition.  And in fact, we don’t and it’s not ours to do.  When I met with Ms. Tsikhanouskaya in Vilnius just a couple of weeks ago, she very specifically asked that the United States, and all other countries as well, respect the sovereignty of Belarus, and that’s our intention.  Of course, we remain in contact with the breadth of Belarusian society, including members of the Coordinating Council as well as those who inside and outside of Belarus are seeking to support the voice of the Belarusian people and the demands of the Belarusian people.

The United States, we’ll certainly use our international influence to create necessary space for the Belarusian people to achieve their ambitions for a free and fair election under independent observation.  We’ll do that by engaging with friends and countries with whom we don’t always cooperate.  I had a very important meeting just a week and a half ago where we visited Moscow with a delegation to have deep and substantive talks on the issues related to Belarus.  At the time, my sense was that the Russian Government itself was looking for a constructive way forward, and it’s why I find it so disturbing to see increasing signs of overt Russian support to prop up the current regime in Belarus.  But also we’ll be working through international organizations like the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has stood up very quickly a troika of the chairman-in-office willing to travel to Minsk to meet with both the government and the opposition to facilitate the dialogue that is going to be necessary in order to allow Belarus to move forward to a better future.

We will use our – the tools we have for leverage inside Belarus, including the sanctions that I mentioned a moment ago, to make clear that those who are subjecting their people to brutal violence or who are responsible for the theft of the election will face consequences even if they live inside a system that currently delivers impunity to them.  

So we will be using our influence in every way possible, carefully respecting the will of the Belarusian people themselves, and respecting the independence and the true voice of the Belarusian people that we see demonstrated in Ms. Tsikhanouskaya and the Coordinating Council.

Question:  why do you think we haven’t seen much messaging on Belarus or Navalny from the President?  And is there concern by the President that being more vocal will jeopardize the New START talks which he had mentioned on Friday?

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  Nobody in the United States is linking our positions on either the theft of the elections and the brutal violence in Belarus nor the tragic poisoning of Alexei Navalny to any other – any other matters, New START or negotiations or anything else.  In fact, the New START negotiations continue and if we are successful in achieving a new agreement, it will be based upon such a negotiation delivering an outcome that respects the interests of the United States of America, and I am sure from the Russian side they would say the same.

As far as the President’s comments, the President has in fact made comments on both of these issues, recognizing the tragic poisoning of Navalny and calling upon our German allies to consider this as the appropriate moment to suspend the completion of the Nord Stream 2 project that will only increase the dependency of Western Europe on Russian energy and reward the very economic interests that are responsible for much of the challenge that we face in U.S.-Russia relations around the world.  

As far as Belarus, the President and the Secretary of State have both spoken out on this issue, and in fact the Secretary has designated and delegated to me the responsibility to play a leading role at a very senior level to ensure that the United States is actively engaged in this issue.  He sent me to Europe just a couple of days after the election.  It was an incredibly important and productive visit, not only to talk to the Belarusian opposition but to have a candid discussion with our counterparts in Moscow and also to work closely with our friends and allies in the OSCE in order to generate a proposal which offers a way out for the Belarusian ruler and allows the international community to use its influence to push for a peaceful conclusion to this dispute.

Question:  The U.S. ambassador to the OSCE said last week in an interview with Foreign Policy magazine that the U.S. should try to persuade Lukashenko that he cannot be the president of Belarus under these circumstances.  Is this the U.S. administration’s position or some freewheeling diplomacy?  Who do you now recognize as the leader in Belarus, and judging by your comments, do you want to see a rerun?  And by the same token, was Mr. Gilmore speaking for the administration and the State Department when he blasted an open letter written recently by a large group of prominent Russia hands, including Thomas Pickering, Thomas Graham, Rose Gottemoeller, and dozens of others?  They were calling for the rethinking of the U.S.-Russia policy.  Do you believe it really was a, quote/unquote, “shameful document,” as Ambassador Gilmore put it?

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  In regard to your first question, the United States believes it’s not simply our belief but it’s also guaranteed to the Belarusian people by the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE charter document, as well as by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the United Nations – the Belarusian people are entitled to a free and fair election in which they choose their own leaders, and they were denied that opportunity on August 9th.  There is no legitimacy delivered to the ruler of Belarus by the August 9th election.  The Belarusian people deserve and demand the opportunity to hold such an election under independent observation, and the United States strongly supports their desire to do so.

As far as the U.S.-Russia relationship and the – and differing views across the spectrum of nongovernment individuals regarding the appropriate course with Russia, I can only say that those of us in government have the responsibility to deal with the critical issues in front of us, and on matters like the tragic poisoning of Alexei Navalny or on ensuring a peaceful outcome in Belarus that gives the Belarusian people their entitled right to have a free and fair election, we do need to talk to the Russian Government about these issues because they are as much in the interest of Russia as the United States, and in the case of Navalny’s poisoning, the burden of an investigation falls entirely upon the shoulders of the Russian Government, which needs to respond with far more urgency to the use of a banned nerve agent – a chemical weapon on the territory of the Russian Federation – against a Russian citizen.  It is unbelievable to us that this would happen on the territory of any country and the government would not react with the appropriate urgency to investigate and hold accountable those who committed the crime.

And so in our relations with Belarus we will continue in our relations with Russia we will continue to engage and we will continue to have an honest dialogue and exchange of the views of the two countries.  I think that’s the appropriate responsibilities of our diplomats in the Department of State, and it is our intention to continue to do so.

Question:  Am I correct in understanding that the United States does not intend to impose additional sanctions on Belarusian figures for the election fraud and violence until it can do so in concert with the European Union?  Second, is the U.S. Government considering the possibility of imposing sanctions on Russia for what you just described as its increasingly overt interference in events in Belarus?  And finally, as I’m sure you’re aware, Lukashenko is to meet with Russian President Putin in Sochi on Monday.  Is – would you like to see that meeting canceled?  Is that the kind of Russian involvement that you feel is deleterious to a resolution of events in Belarus?

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  On your first question, the United States and the EU are not linking their efforts on sanctions; we’re coordinating, and neither would be held up by the other.  The reality of targeted sanctions against specific individuals is that a certain amount of investigative work and documentation needs to take place in order to be able to effectively implement the sanctions.  We are actively doing that in coordination with the United States Department of Treasury, who has the lead on sanctions implementation here in the United States, and I expect in just a few short days we will be in a position to be able to definitively identify the additional list of sanctions that we will be imposing in parallel with those that are being enacted by the European Union.

I don’t speak for the European Union or for the European Commission, but I know they too have their evidentiary process that they need to complete before the final designation of sanctions, and we’re working closely in cooperation with them to ensure that both of us are prepared in the near future.

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  As far as sanctions on Russia goes, I am not at this point going to forecast any specific actions the United States will take in relation to the challenges we have with Russia.  The reality is that a substantial amount of the commerce between the United States and the Russian Federation is already covered by broad and sweeping sanctions dating back to approximately five years, six years ago, when most of these sanctions were enacted, and those remain in place today.  

Regarding the visit on Monday between Presidents Putin – President Putin and the ruler of Belarus, I would only say that it would be our hope that the Russian Government gives full voice to the concerns that all of us share regarding the brutality on the streets of Minsk that we have seen play out in front of us.  I would hope that the president of Russia raises the concerns that we raise about the unjust detention of so many Belarusian people, and also the brutal violence that’s been used against Russian citizens, and especially Russian journalists, by the regime in Belarus.  Of course, ultimately, we hope the message from Moscow to Minsk is that the ruler needs to give way to the will of his people.  A free and fair election will allow the Belarusian people to select who will be the next president of Belarus, and we strongly support their wish to do so, and we very much hope and expect that the Russian president will convey the same message that the regime in Belarus is hearing from so many other nations around the world.

Question:  Yeah, so it’s Iurii Sheiko from Deutsche Welle.  So I have a question, additional question on sanctions.  You spoke about personal sanctions against officials.  So do you consider economic sanctions on Belarus to convince Belarusian authorities to change their policies, or you do not consider these sanctions? 

Deputy Secretary Biegun:  we are looking at targeted sanctions aimed at the individuals who are most responsible for the circumstances, both the violence as well as the theft of the election.  The message will be very clear to them that their assets and their freedom to travel will be affected by the conduct that they – how they comport themselves at this moment in relation to their own people.  It is just unbelievable to me, as an American citizen, to see that level of violence imposed by Belarusian authorities against their own people, and I know it has shocked many Russians and many others in Europe as well to see that.  That behavior will not be treated with impunity by us or our European partners.

As far as sectoral sanctions or enterprise sanctions, I suppose that as events play out it’s possible that additional measures would be considered, but we also are mindful that the people of Belarus need to work and need to earn a wage and need to live.  We certainly, of course, support and admire the courage of those who have chosen to lay down their tools or walk away from their machinery in the factories and in the shops of Belarus.  It’s a clear statement that the Belarusian opposition is united across all strata of Belarusian society.  But we do not also want to impose upon the citizens of Belarus any additional punitive measures unless absolutely necessary in support of the goals that we’re seeking in Belarus.

I will say that, as I said at the beginning, the United States has no animosity towards the people of Belarus, and we want to find a way to tailor our policies to best protect their interests, the stuff that is sorely lacking in the policies of their own government, unfortunately.