The U.S. has sanctioned a “vast network” of 25 people and entities in Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, who they accuse of helping Iran exchange over one billion dollars to finance Iranian military operations across the Middle East.

The U.S. Treasury announced that it was blacklisting 25 individuals and entities, including front companies located in Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

The IRCG remains Iran’s most important powerful security organization and controls vast swathes of the Iranian economy and yields massive influence over the country’s political system.

The sanctions are designed to lock those responsible out of the global financial system by prohibiting both American citizens and businesses from dealing with them in any financial capacity.

Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker also explained that “Specifically our action targeted a total of 25 Iran, UAE and Turkey based entities and individuals and exposed an extensive sanctions evasion scheme established by the Iranian regime. Central to this network is the IRGC controlled Ansar Bank and its wholly owned currency exchange arm Ansar Exchange. Notably, Ansar Bank was previously designated in 2010 for providing financial services to the IRGC, and as we describe in our press release, Ansar Bank also provides financial services to the IRGC Quds Force including salaries to IRGC Quds Force officials and is also used by IRGC Quds Force to pay its foreign fighters, particularly those in Syria.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Under Secretary Sigal P. Mandelker, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence , U.S. Department of the Treasury

U/S Mandelker: Thank you so much, As was already mentioned, I’m here in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on a three-country trip. We’re also going to Singapore and to India with a very heavy focus on the maximum pressure campaign against Iran as well as other illicit finance issues. In fact coinciding with my trip this week we’ve taken two actions related to Iran. Very specifically, yesterday, March 26th, OFAC took action, as was already mentioned, against a vast network of Iran, UAE and Turkey based front companies that one, procured and transferred over a billion dollars and euros to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC, and to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, MODAFL, and that also procured millions of dollars’ worth of vehicles for MODAFL, again, Iran’s Ministry of Defense.

Specifically our action targeted a total of 25 Iran, UAE and Turkey based entities and individuals and exposed an extensive sanctions evasion scheme established by the Iranian regime. Central to this network is the IRGC controlled Ansar Bank and its wholly owned currency exchange arm Ansar Exchange. Notably, Ansar Bank was previously designated in 2010 for providing financial services to the IRGC, and as we describe in our press release, Ansar Bank also provides financial services to the IRGC Quds Force including salaries to IRGC Quds Force officials and is also used by IRGC Quds Force to pay its foreign fighters, particularly those in Syria.

Our action peels back the layers of deception the Iranian regime uses to traffic in dollars, euros and gold. Specifically Ansar Bank with Ansar Exchange created layers of intermediary entities in the UAE and Turkey to exchange devalued Iranian rials ultimately into dollars and euros in order to line the pockets of the IRGC and MODAFL.

The pattern that you see here is consistent with the kinds of deceptive practices and patterns that we’ve exposed numerous times over the past couple of years. Here it’s the use of banks, trading companies and other companies in these countries to move vast amounts of currency, again, for the benefit of IRGC. And as I already mentioned, the Quds Force MODAFL who then exploit these networks to pay foreign fighters and purchase vehicles for the military.

This vast network is just the latest example of the Iranian regime’s use of deceptive practices to exploit the global financial system.

We also emphasize to the private sector that it’s yet another reason why it’s so important for companies to do extensive, enhanced due diligence when dealing with Iran. This regime intentionally uses layers of intermediaries to cover up ultimate beneficiaries, and companies need to be well aware of those risks and of the steps they need to take to keep themselves from being caught in that web.

First, to execute the scheme Ansar Bank, that designated bank, established a network of front companies and intermediary agents in Iran, Turkey and the UAE.

Second, Ansar Bank used its wholly owned Iran based exchange broker, Ansar Exchange, to conduct a significant volume of foreign currency exchange services. Again, to the tune of over a billion dollars, using this network of front companies and agents in Iran, Turkey and the UAE to again exchange this devaluated Iranian rial.

Third, Ansar Exchange would then provide the currency it received through foreign currency exchange services to IRGC controlled Ansar Bank, MODAFL, and the IRGC.

I want to point out here, for those who don’t know more about MODAFL. So MODAFL, among other things, supervises Iran’s development and production of missiles including those used by Iran based Houthis in Yemen against coalition forces. It has also provided logistics support to the Quds Force and its regional proxy groups.

So on Tuesday we also sanctioned MODAFL for providing this material support to Iran’s IRGC Quds Force.

To be clear, MODAFL had been previously designated under our other authorities, but it is now designated under our terrorism authorities.

I would also note that the European Union had also designated both of these entities in 2011 under its nonproliferation sanctions authorities.

You’ll find a lot more detail in our press release, again, about how these companies operated and worked. Very significantly here you have all of these trading companies and we provide substantial details about these trading companies, where they were located and how much money some of them had exchanged in the context of this scheme. And also, of course, about the fact that the scheme also resulted in MODAFL being able to procure hundreds of vehicles for the Defense Ministry.

So we had two actions I mentioned this week. The other step that we took was on Monday where we provided an update to a Treasury Maritime Advisory that we had first issued in November 2018. This initial advisory was in concert with a vast oil for terror scheme that we exposed and sanctioned which involved Iran’s movement of crude oil, movement of money; it involved Russia and subsidiaries of the Russian Ministry of Energy; and it also involved Syria. We call this an oil for terror scheme in which we saw the transport of Iranian oil to Syria in return for hundreds of millions of dollars to Iran’s terror proxy groups including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Quds Force.

When we updated this advisory Monday we highlighted additional risks associated with shipping oil destined for Syrian government owned ports and we also included additional guidance to the private sector on risk mitigation. The advisory specifically describes deceptive shipping practices as well as the risks associated with facilitating the shipment of petroleum, again, destined for Syria. And we also identify a number of risk mitigation measures that companies and governments should be using to help counter those risks.

So in terms of the deceptive practices we highlighted, we noted that there’s been falsification of cargo and vessel documents, the disabling of automatic identification systems or AIS, and the changing of vessel names to obfuscate prior illicit activities. Then in the advisory again we recommend a whole number of risk mitigation measures that companies should take.

This new iteration of the advisory also includes major updates to the annex in which we added 16 vessels to the list of tankers that have delivered petroleum to Syria since 2016 in total. What we’ve done in the advisory is included more than 30 vessels that have engaged in ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum destined for Syria as well as adding another two vessels which have exported Syrian petroleum.

So when putting out this list it is our expectation that companies, ports, governments, will be alert to these ships and engaged in significant action, due diligence, refusal of port entry among other things in the event that the vessels are in fact carrying what we would consider to be illicit shipments of oil.

With that, we’ll turn it over to questions. My only final note that I would have about my trip to the region, and really in the various travels that I and many others have taken over the last year is we are seeking always to be fully transparent, to work closely with government counterparts but also be fully transparent about the enforcement of our sanctions.

As you know, the Iran pressure campaign is a very significant one with substantial resources dedicated to it. The kind of action that we’ve taken, we took yesterday, is just indicative of the kinds of actions we’ve taken in the past and that we’re going to continue to take in the future to put unprecedented maximum pressure on Iran.

Question: you have elaborated on networks and companies and you also underline that you’re working with governments regarding your actions. Could you elaborate on your cooperation with the Turkish government? The Turkish government has been very critical regarding the Iran sanctions. How would you define your cooperation and what are your specific expectations from Ankara?

U/S Mandelker: Thank you for the questions. I’m not going to get into details about our discussions with Turkey. Of course, we have had a number of visits to Turkey by Treasury officials and others. We do, for example, cooperate with them on efforts to counter ISIS among other areas.

Our message to Turkey is the same as our message to other countries worldwide which is our mandate is to aggressively enforce our sanctions. We do not want to see companies or countries unwittingly, or wittingly of course, caught up in what we believe is a web of deception that the Iranian regime engages in. And just as we’ve taken action yesterday where we designated Turkish companies that were involved in this significant currency scheme, so too in the future will we designate other companies that are violating our sanctions and that are providing support to IRGC, the Quds Force, MODAFL and others associated with the Iranian regime and their malign and nefarious activities.

Question: Timeframe of the alleged violations by these companies and this network. When did these take place? would these activities be prohibited even under the JCPOA? Or is this solely part of the U.S. sanctions?

U/S Mandelker: In terms of the timeframe, we put in some dates in the press release, and I’m just going to refer you to the dates that we put in to that press release. But look, Ansar Bank was designated in 2010. It has continued to be designated. It never came off of our list. And it was designated under authorities that carry secondary sanctions implications. So of course the kind of activity that you see here with the movement of U.S. dollars, of gold, some of those authorities came back into place because the President lifted the nuclear-related sanctions.

But independent of that, regardless of that re-imposition, this is the kind of activity that we would have targeted. Again, here you have the movement of money for the benefit of the IRGC, previously designated MODAFL, previously designated under the auspices of Ansar Bank, previously designated through this deceptive web of companies that were used really to obfuscate who the ultimate beneficiaries were. So it’s exactly the kind of activity that we targeted. In fact it’s similar to activity that we targeted pre re-imposition of the sanctions.

Question: How will the U.S. protect minorities in Iran? Will the sanctions stop the IRGC from attacking minorities like the Ahvazi people?

U/S Mandelker: I would answer that question two different ways. Number one, our actions are not only intended to bring maximum pressure on Iran in connection with the nuclear file, but also to disrupt the ability of the IRGC, IRGC Quds Force to gain access to the funds that they need to continue to carry out their activities. And you’re seeing a lot of pressure from us in that regard.

Similarly, as you’ve also seen, we have exposed in a number of our tranches of sanctions, there’s been 25 tranches with over 900 individuals and entities designated since the beginning of this administration. In a number of those we have exposed the grave human rights abuses that this regime is engaging in. Just recently, for example, we took action against the Basij militia which had a network of multi-billion-dollar companies that they were using to fund themselves. Basij, by the way, is directly under the IRGC. The Basij for many, many years has been recruiting, training and sending child soldiers to places like Syria where they go and they fight and they die. And we think it’s extremely important to expose that kind of abhorrent behavior.

Similarly, we’ve taken action against entities and individuals in Iran who have been responsible for torturing their citizens. Again, this is a regime that thinks nothing of imprisoning protesters, peaceful protesters. Throwing them in jail in places like the Evin Prison where they’re then tortured.

Look, for anybody who’s even considering doing non-sanctionable trade with Iran, they need to appreciate who they’re dealing with and what they may be contributing to by investing in that economy. Because unfortunately, so much of the economy is controlled by the very same people who are exposing and abusing children and others in Iran. So we stand very much with the Iranian people in protest of their government and will continue to take exactly these kinds of actions that expose that behavior and disrupt it.

Question: I would also like to know which countries is Iran, for example, I’m sure there are leading sanctions busters in countries which help Iran evade sanctions. Could you elaborate on your findings? Which countries are the most challenging ones for you?

U/S Mandelker: What I can say there is you can look at the countries where we’ve designated, for example, other government actors. So Syria would be a prime example where the two countries are working hand in hand to engage in absolutely abhorrent behavior. Obviously we’ve been deeply disturbed by what’s been going on in Yemen with the Houthis. There are many other countries. I’m not going to go into the specifics, but many other countries where we have a very heavy focus and a very heavy concern either about the relationship with the government or alternatively, that the government has been able to expose and abuse vulnerabilities.

The international community must agree on how to bring ISIS fighters to justice after SDF forces captured their last enclave of Baghouz, a senior commander says.

Maj Gen Christopher Ghika, deputy commander of the combined joint task force, said in Baghdad that his organisation and the global coalition fighting ISIS were trying to find fighters responsible for crimes against the Iraqis and Syrians.

“There is a specific strand of work on foreign terrorist fighters that seeks to identify those most responsible and their whereabouts if they are in custody,” Gen Ghika said on Tuesday.

“We need to come to an international consensus on how we deal with those who are responsible for the horrendous crimes of the past five years.”

Gen Ghika said how foreign citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS should be dealt with was a matter for each country to decide, but more co-operation was an option.

“In the longer term, we probably need to seek an international consensus on a process that holds those who are members of Daesh or who have assisted them to account,” he said. “That may be in the region, it may be elsewhere.

“I think that’s a subject of ongoing discussions. But the basic premise is that foreign terrorist fighters and the policy on what to do with them must be the preserve of sovereign national governments.”

“These family members will not easily abandon their ideology. Their reintegration into society will require a collective effort from the coalition and international community to help to eliminate conditions that would allow Daesh to re-emerge.”

The risk is that ISIS will try to evolve into an underground organisation, Gen Ghika said.

“They’re going to try and become a group that uses insurgent tactics to attack the stabilising forces of the state, to undermine efforts of reconstruction and stability, and to attack the population,” he said.

Gen Ghika said that the best way of battling that risk was to support the Iraqi security forces and SDF in rooting out ISIS members and supporters.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by U.K. Major General Christopher Ghika, Deputy Commander of Strategy and Information for the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve.

I’ll just give a couple of opening remarks and then I’ll turn it over to you for questions, because I think your questions will be the most valuable part of this, but I think it’s fair to say that this weekend has been a highly significant one in the fight against Daesh. It’s a signal to the end of their territorial control. This was an organization that established itself in 2014 and really made its mark by its claim of the creation of an extremist state which held land, where now today it holds nothing.

But I don’t think this is the end of Daesh. It’s not the end of the threat from Daesh or the military campaign against them, which will continue. It will continue because Daesh continues to pose a threat both to Iraq and Syria but also to the region and the world. They have adapted. They are trying to morph into an underground movement. They are seeking to conduct targeted attacks. And with the aim of destabilizing areas of Iraq and Syria, and we’ve seen this with some of their attacks in the last few months.

That is why the coalition are committed to supporting the Iraqi Security Force, supporting the Syrian Democratic Force to continue the fight against Daesh and prevent their reemergence.

That’s kind of where I stand this morning, but I’d be very happy to take any questions that you may have.

Question: Reports have mentioned that there are tens of thousands of silent ISIS supporters spread throughout Iraq and Syria. What measures are being taken to fight this threat?

Major General Ghika: I think that really speaks to ISIS’, Daesh’s narrative, because the silent supporters of those who for one reason or another have subscribed to Daesh’s narrative. That’s why you would be a silent supporter. That’s why you would be in any way a supporter of this organization. And I would say that if you were to go to people in the liberated areas of Iraq and Syria as I have done. I’ve walked down the street in Raqqa, in Kobani, in Mosul, and if you talk to the people who’ve lived under Daesh’s oppressive regime you would need no persuasion that people should move away from that narrative.

But countering the narrative against Daesh is one of the key challenges. One can defeat a military force, but defeating the narrative is more difficult. The way in which the narrative can be transmitted in this day, in the 21st century by the internet is one of those challenges.

So I think what we need to do is engage a whole collection of people, all elements of government. I think we need to engage different groups, different organizations, to show the evil in Daesh’s narrative; to show a better way of life. We need to have regional voices engaged in this so that we can bring out in the open and lay bare the emptiness and the evil of Daesh’s narrative which will at least go some way to countering those tens of thousands of supporters and persuading them that they are pursuing and supporting an empty group.

Question: I wonder now that the end of the territory is over, the military campaign so far, certainly from the public’s perspective, has been very much an air campaign. I wonder what kind of military campaign it is going forward? And do you have any idea how long this coalition will need to remain as a coalition, as a military force?

Major General Ghika: I wouldn’t want to be drawn on time in a call like this, but I think on the ground and from a U.K. perspective for BFBS, I think what’s important to understand is that the U.K. is at the center of a coalition of over 30 nations in the Middle East, 74 nations more broadly, who are training, developing, raising the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces — for the U.K. that’s at Taji and Erbil — so that the Iraqi Security Forces are increasingly capable of countering the threat from Daesh on their own. That is an effort that’s been going on since 2015. That is an effort that is working. I was here myself in 2014 and ’15 and I can see that the effort the coalition has put into the capability building of the Iraqi Security Forces really is working.

Question: According to data there are I think 1600 foreign fighters who joined ISIS and spread in the area of Iraq and Syria. I wonder, and many of them are women and children who are right now in the camp area which is under by SDF military forces. I wonder whether the government is proposing to send them back to their original country before?

Major General Ghika: We’re talking here I think about the foreign terrorist fighters who have been [inaudible]. And I think that my first thing to say is that those who have committed crimes, those who have been members of Daesh must be held to account in the force of the law.

The issue of what to do with foreign nationals who have left their own countries to fight for this terrorist organization is a matter for the sovereign national governments of those individuals.

I think more broadly, in the longer term, we probably need to seek an international consensus on a process which holds those who are members of Daesh or who have assisted them to account. That may be in the region, it may be elsewhere. I think that’s a subject of ongoing discussions. But the basic premise is that foreign terrorist fighters and the policy on what to do with them must be the preserve of sovereign national governments.

Question: Where will ISIS fighters go after being defeated in Syria and Iraq?

Major General Ghika: Thank you for the question, and that’s something which I think everybody’s concerned about. We know that a number of Iraqi fighters aspire, they want to return to Iraq, and that’s why the coalition is so active in helping the Iraqi Security Forces to raise their capability so they can counter that effectively. And the Iraqis are doing a very good job of that.

There are other places they could go. I suspect some of them would try and go back to places in Syria where they came from, and that again, is why we will assist the Syrian Democratic Force to provide security for the local populations in Syria so that they can prevent that happening.

But I think the intention is to make sure that the ISIS fighters do not have that freedom of action to decide where they want to go, and that we do everything we can to prevent their freedom of action.

Question: In places where the coalition has been working to defeat Daesh, we see huge infrastructure damage and what appear to be kind of lack of planning about the day after. And I wanted to ask you about what the long-term strategy is for the families of ISIS who’ve now come out of the Baghouz area in Syria. What is the long-term strategy for these families behind keeping them in an overcrowded camp with very bad humanitarian conditions and possibly not sufficient services? What’s the long-term strategy?

Major General Ghika: I think it’s fair to say that the, and I think you’re talking about the al-Hawl camp here in particular where a large number of the families are.

I think it’s fair to say that the population in al-Hawl, the population which has come out of the last ISIS pocket is bigger than anybody really expected. But the SDF, our partner force, have been very effective in screening the ISIS families and the aid agencies have done an excellent job in providing food, water, shelter, and essential supplies to the population of al-Hawl. But as you alluded to, that is a short to medium term solution.

I think the long term solution is that that population return to their homes. The government of Iraq have agreed that the Iraqi citizens can return to Iraq, and we would anticipate the Syrians doing likewise.

I think it’s important to remember that the issue of IDPs is not new in this conflict. Over seven million have been displaced in the course of the last five years, and the very vast majority of that population have returned home. That has been our long term strategy all along, and it remains so to this day.

Question: The first question would be could you give us any kind of guess how many ISIS fighters you think are still active somewhere in those hidden cells? The second question is, what do you know about the whereabouts of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

Major General Ghika: In the ISIS cells we’re unsure of the exact number but we think it’s probably some thousands. But it’s difficult to tell, and I think those thousands are probably split into some are fighters and activists and others are supporting members of Daesh.

Baghdadi, an often talked about subject. I’m afraid I don’t know where he is. If I did know, we would do something about it. But I think it’s important to realize that he is increasingly less relevant. He had his moment of prominence in 2014 and we believe that he is an ISIS member like any other, but one who decreases in relevance with every day that goes by.

Question: I was actually going to ask about Baghdadi. But what’s being done, now the caliphate has fallen, how much work is being done to sort of identify those who weren’t physically in the caliphate, who were internationally based, who were supporting them financially and acting as their agents abroad? I’m in Britain, so I’m thinking are we able to identify if anyone in the U.K. was supporting them. But I know it was an international movement.

So now that their physical compact is gone, how much work is being done to look at the international network that made up Daesh at its height? Does that make sense?

Major General Ghika: That’s a really good question.

I think there’s no doubt that Saturday was a very significant moment here in the Middle East because Iraq and Syria is where Daesh set their heart, it’s where their anchor point is, if you like. But it’s important, as you alluded to, to realize that this is a global issue. They present a global threat. So I would point you to the work of the Global Coalition. That’s the 74 nations and 5 organizations. And the Global Coalition has set up bespoke programs, bespoke lines of effort to deal with the breadth of the threat. So there are programs to counter financing, the ideology, the military operation, to bring in stabilization to liberated areas and thereby undermine the causes of Daesh’s rise. But the one you talked to, there is a specific strand of work on foreign terrorist fighters which seeks to identify those most responsible and their whereabouts, if they’re in custody.

Then as I said earlier, I think we need to come to an international consensus with how we deal with those who are responsible for the horrendous crimes of the last five years.

Question: What are your expectations for the next ISIS moves?

Major General Ghika: I think ISIS’ next moves are quite easy to talk about because ISIS, Daesh have put them out in the open source. What they’re going to try to do, they recognize that they are no longer a credible force holding territory. We’ve seen that, and they understand that. They’re going to try and turn themselves into an underground organization. They’re going to try and become a group that uses insurgent type tactics to attack the stabilizing forces of the state, to undermine efforts of reconstruction and stability, and to attack the population.

So what we need to do to counter that is to support the Iraqi Security Forces, support the Syrian Democratic Force, so that they can with our support identify where that is happening and then counter it effectively.

Question: how many boots on the ground are you planning to leave in Syria? And what are you expecting Turkey to do in the near future?

Major General Ghika: You’ll forgive me if, I don’t think you would expect me to tell you exactly how many forces we’re going to leave in Syria, but I think what’s happened since the end of February is that the United States have understood the threat that Daesh pose if they’re allowed to form a safe haven in Northeast Syria, if they’re allowed to reestablish themselves. So the president’s been quite clear that we will leave some forces behind who will be there with the intention of conducting a mission against Daesh to ensure with our partners, the Syrian Democratic Force, that they cannot reestablish themselves.

Question: I was just wondering if you could say to what extent allies coordinate their actions with the Russian side? How would you assess overall Russia’s contribution to defeating ISIS?

Major General Ghika: I think everybody in the world recognizes the threat that’s posed by Daesh, and I think that includes Russia. So I think we share a common view of the threat posed by Daesh and a common and positive view about what happened this weekend.

Question: With ISIS territorial defeat, how should the prisoners be handled? What are the security concerns with respect to the thousands currently in SDF custody?

Major General Ghika: I think the same applies to this question as applies to the numbers in the IDP camps. I think we’ve been really surprised by the numbers coming out of the MERV, out of the final Daesh pocket. But the SDF, our partner force, have done a really excellent job in screening the fighters and the families, to separate the fighters from the non-combatants. And the fighters are being held in SDF prisons. They are being held in accordance with international humanitarian law. Those prisons have been inspected by the ICRC.

I think that at this stage we need to leave it to what is an ongoing discussion about the way in which we hold accountable those who are proven to have been members of Daesh so that they are held to account for their crimes.

Question: The Pentagon has confirmed that the war on ISIS hasn’t ended completely yet. And that the limited number of U.S. troops will stay in Syria for an indefinite period of time. And that there is a plan to support a credible Syrian opposition to form about 60,000 fighters.

So my question is to you, does the Pentagon announcement encourage other coalition forces to keep troops east of the Euphrates? And what is the role in the previous U.S. proposal for the peacekeeping force and the international observers in that region?

Major General Ghika: I think the U.S. intention for Syria has been very clear, which is to keep a force in Northeast Syria which can help and partner the SDF in preventing the resurgence of Daesh.

As I think’s been clear by the tenor, the tone of some of the questions, it’s obvious that they still pose a threat and the continued American presence in Northeast Syria is recognition of that threat. It will enable a continuing effort against the Daesh so they cannot form a safe haven there from which they can threaten security in the region.

With respect to the coalition, I think the coalition presence is in Iraq so it’s not relevant in discussion of Northeast Syria.

Question: ISIS may have lost its territories and caliphate but many reports say that it remains, that the group remains a financial powerhouse. It still has access to hundreds of millions of dollars. What measures are you taking to confront this huge amount of money? And do you have information about transferring this money to Turkey or other countries?

Major General Ghika: The lead for this sits in the Global Coalition, so the Global Coalition of 74 nations have a specific cell, a specific group who work on the money, the funding flow for Daesh.

When you say they remain a financial powerhouse, I would challenge that, and I think if you were to examine their financial position compared to say four or five years ago, you would find that it was substantially reduced. In other words, this is going in the right direction.

The execution of that plan is not anchored, it’s not headquartered here in Baghdad, it is with the Global Coalition. There are a number of ways in which we are taking that effort on. For example, making it more difficult for Daesh to conduct any kind of transactional activity, making it difficult for them to sell a product like oil. There are a number of ways in which we do that, but I think it’s going in the right direction. Like in other areas, there remains more work to be done, but I think it’s trending positively.

Question: if the European countries don’t move as fast as you would like to take back their citizens, and that appears to be the case. Belgium, as one example, is fighting a court order to take back children of ISIS fighters. Is it still the case that there’s the threat that they would just be let go where they are? If they have no other place to go, they don’t have passports, nobody wants them. I mean what’s the scenario for them?

Major General Ghika: That is not a credible solution, a credible option. As I say, this is an issue, as I said before, for individual sovereign governments, but at the moment the SDF are holding the ISIS fighters. It is their interest probably above anybody else’s to hang onto them because they recognize only too clearly the threat that they pose. So they’re not going anywhere at the moment. They’re being held in humanitarian and acceptable conditions, and I think it’s a matter for discussion now with national governments about what happens to their own nationals. And then there needs to be a consensus about the way in which we hold those who are most accountable to a court of law and to justice.

But the threat of letting them go, I don’t see as credible.

Question: I just asked about the money, but there’s also possible ISIS using a hawala system. This system is very hard to detect. Are you aware of such transactions or such money moving from ISIS members?

Major General Ghika: I think there are reports of a range of ISIS attempts to continue their financial revenue streams. I don’t know how many of them are credible. But I think the more the work of the international coalition develops on preventing the movement or the transfer of ISIS money the more effective it will be and the less easy it will be for them to carry out what they’ve been able to do for the last few years.

I also think that as an organization that does not hold ground, it makes their long-term financial sustainability far more difficult because they’re less able to conduct extortion, smuggling, and sale of goods than they were in the past.

So I think as time goes on these restrictions will begin to bite. And as I said, the downward trend in ISIS’ financial credibility will continue.

Major General Ghika: I’ve enjoyed the question and answer session and I’d be willing to do it again if people would like to.